120 likes | 246 Views
IIPPE Commodity Studies Working Group Workshop SOAS (London), 08.03.2008 ‘Doing value chain analysis in the field’ J ö rg Wiegratz University of Sheffield (Department of Politics). Markets, actors, Uganda.
E N D
IIPPE Commodity Studies Working Group Workshop SOAS (London), 08.03.2008‘Doing value chain analysis in the field’ Jörg WiegratzUniversity of Sheffield (Department of Politics)
Markets, actors, Uganda • Academic interest: (a) (cultural) political economy & economic sociology of ‘markets’ (production/exchange); (b) social change & actor’s behaviour in capitalism/neoliberalism • Prior to PhD: involved in two empirical studies on value chain (VC) governance & upgrading in Ugandan context • Ugandan exporters & European importers (study 1), • Farmers&buyers (traders/processors) in Uganda (study 2) • Questionnaires (for in-depth interviews) based on mainstream GVC framework: Gereffi et al. (2005), Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) etc.
Rationale & focus of the two studies • Apply GVC framework to Uganda; exploratory studies (issues raised could inform the debate and be followed up by others) • Document & analyse governance systems and their dynamics, upgrading efforts of local suppliers, development implications • Focus of interviews: • Starting a relationships between VC actors: rationale, linking up, requirements, challenges at the beginning, etc. • Division of labour between supplier and buyer • Coordination, monitoring, supervision, cooperation • Advantages & disadvantages of the arrangement • Upgrading of suppliers (exporters, farmers) • Role of support institutions (and industries) • Outlook of the relationship • Support needed from Government of Uganda & other actors
Where did the studies lead us to? • Insightful interviews with actors (which we documented & analyzed in length in the reports, 400+pp. per study) • Learnt a lot about: coordination forms & practices, cooperation, governance drivers & changes, challenges; thus, about actor’s behaviour and inter-actor relationships • ‘New issues’ (less discussed in mainstream GVC literature; African context) such as: actors’ behaviour, emotions, (mis)trust, communication, business culture, learning, political economy (VCs actors & state, donors), etc. • Diversity of findings (economic and non-economic issues) • Can’t be (un-)covered/explained by one approach • Calls for: GVC+ (or leaving GVC framework altogether to explore particular issues?)
Study 1: suggestions for future GVC research • Incorporate tools & concepts of branches of social and other sciences that enrich the framework: ‘Mixing efforts’ (GVC+) could improve the approach’s (i) coverage, (ii) explanatory power and (iii) policy relevance • To date, little work on: mechanisms of communication and trust in GVCs, or emotional/psychological & normative aspects of inter-actor relations and cooperation • Deficient (macro/micro) theoretical foundation on behaviour and social relations of GVC actors (especially in African context) • Study non-economic aspects of GVC embeddedness at local nodes • Social, cultural, normative, political, institutional and cognitive pre-conditions of GVCs • Prerequisites that allow/hinder local actors to integrate/perform in GVCs and carry out related domestic VC governance in a certain way • Study domestic/regional VCs in developing countries: see deficits in organization, cooperation, trust and performance in VCs in Uganda
Study 2: suggestions for future VC research • Role of lead farmers as link between buyer & farmer groups • Supervisors as link between buyer’s management & farmers • Trust links and (farmers’) loyalty cycles in the domestic VC • Behaviour of arms-length’ buyers (‘non-developmental buyers’, incl. those who cheat farmers) and related effects on governance system of ‘developmental buyers’ (those who interact & cooperate with farmers beyond arms-length) • Sector’s codes of practices to ‘regulate’ behaviour of buyers • Governance tools & technologies (buyer’s rewards & sanctions systems, quality testing machines and its effects on farmers’ trust)
Study 2: suggestions for future VC research, cont. • Actors’ switching of business partners • Village-Kampala distance & farmers’ loyalty levels • State-buyer alliances and the ‘spillovers’ to VC governance • Role of other governors: development agencies, local politicians, support institutions/industries • Political economy & sustainability of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for VC development • Links between global structural forces & local VC governance systems and practices • Etc.
Concluding remarks • Inductive (& deductive) methods important; qualitative research (interviews) helpful & promising • Economic sociology, economic anthropology, etc. helpful • International Political Economy: way to go to be relevant & open for e.g. ‘bottom-up’ VC studies (but notable: every-day IPE, regimes of accumulation, etc.), would have to open up more to interdisciplinary field research • Mainstream GVC literature: good starting point (in absence of other research programmes & frameworks…) to inform research, develop a questionnaire, derive at findings etc.; • But mainstream governance typology (Gereffi et al. etc.) • Does not always work very well for agriculture in Uganda (e.g., ‘modular governance’?); reformulation of governance typology needed for studies in small-holder agriculture? • Ill-equipped to guide research on: (i) ‘new’ aspects mentioned above: trust, embeddedness, actor’s behaviour beyond ‘homo economicus’, subjectivity formation, role of institutions, contentious trade practices, and (ii) ‘old’ aspects of political economy including recent neoliberal ‘phenomena’ related to GVCs
Concluding remarks, cont. (1) • Insufficient set of independent variables: typology based on ‘firms’ not individual actors – actual human beings - in international production and trade, e.g. stand-alone traders • No ‘variables’ (or consideration) for politics, culture, non-economic (including moral) behavioural motivations • A number of issues look ‘a bit different’ in face-to-face trade context in rural UG (than suggested by mainstream view with its industry starting point) • Mainstream GVC debate somewhat ‘blind’ (‘ignorant’?) vis-à-vis some ‘unconventional’ issues and thus of limited help for research on certain aspects of global production & trade • Gibbon&Ponte seem to suggest: take the ‘escape route’ (complementary concepts), ‘frustration’ with GVC mainstream? • A range of writers from political economy, economic sociology, economic anthropology, economic geography etc. seem very relevant for a more diverse & critical analysis
Concluding remarks, cont. (2) • How to carry out critical analysis & field research? • Views of actors (farmers, supervisors, managers, exporters, importers, state/donor officials) on critical VC issues, data? • How to contribute to academic & policy debate, locally & internationally? • Important to carry out critical research that can actually explain local situations, raise also unconventional issues, and inform VC actors (farmers, developmental buyers etc.) & related parties • Otherwise research agenda of mainstream economics (and its proponents) will continue to overwhelm & somewhat ‘misguide’ (especially local) debates on production and trade • ‘Better’ governance typology? Different concepts? ‘Better’ set of research questions? Beyond: ‘GVCs’, ‘upgrading’ & ‘governance’?
Concluding remarks, cont. (3) • Main deficits of mainstream GVC approach & debate: its poor account of GVC embeddedness, actors, inter-actor relations & interaction, politics, and other points made by presenters in articles circulated. • For details/references on all points made in the presentation see: Wiegratz (2008), Wiegratz, Nyabuntu, Omagor (2007a, 2007b), Downloads: www.shef.ac.uk/politics/research/phd/jwiegratz.html • For comments, please e-mail: j.wiegratz@sheffield.ac.uk • Suggestions from Guido Starosta (group member) on field research: • Analyze average annual rate of profit (AROP) of individual capitals in the chain (comparison with AROP of economy as a whole) • Identify mechanisms of transfer of surplus value between capitals in each chain (commercial credit, unequal distribution of circulation costs, fixing unfavourable prices) & respective effect on AROP • Simulation: effect of policy related changes in conditions of circulation of capital on profitability of different individual capitals • Link between: Law of value - related social processes - objective limits of certain governance structures