David Coleman University of Oxford

1. University of Helsinki, Department of Social Sciences, 16 May 2012.The ‘Second Demographic Transition’: What does it mean? How far will it go? David Coleman University of Oxford

2. In the beginning. the standard story: characteristics of the ‘Western European demographic regime’(according to Malthus, Wrigley and Schofield, Laslett, Hajnal et al.) 1. Relatively slow, intermittent population growth. 2. Moderate mortality levels. Mostly epidemic, not starvation or war. e0 35 – 40 years. 3.Moderate fertility – ‘low pressure’ regime. TFR 4 – 6. Parity-specific family planning rare. Illegitimacy usually low – 5% of births or fewer. 4. Central role of late and variable marriage in a feedback system with the economy and population. Cohabitation and divorce unusual. 5. Household mostly based on nuclear family plus non-relatives (husbandry service, lodgers). 6. Possibly a promoting factor in market economy, capitalism, need for formal welfare systems.

3. England – mean age at first marriage 1600 – 1849.

5. Index of proportions married (Im), 1900, showing Hajnal’s line.Red= marriage late or avoided, blue = earlier, prevalent marriageSource: Coale and Watkins 1996.

6. The end of the old marriage regime in Western Europe after the 1960s Later or marginalised marriage. Divorce terminates up to one marriage in two. Cohabitation becomes ‘normal’. Up to 60% children born outside marriage. Childbearing postponed, family size falls. These are the empirical indicators of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’ (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa)

7. The end of the ancien regime in marriage: mean age at first marriage in England and Wales 1889 - 2001

8. Trend in mean age at first marriage (females), The English-speaking countries 1945 - 2010

9. Parallel developments throughout Europe.

10. Percent ever-married - decline from 1935 to 1960 birth cohorts, selected countries. Source: Eurostat.

11. High levels of cohabitation instead.Source: Kiernan 2004 table 2.

12. Total First Marriage Rate – a simple synthetic cohort measure of proportions ever-marrying at current rates.

13. ‘Gross nuptuality’ – a life-table measure of proportions ever-married implied by current patterns.

14. Trends in Total First Marriage Rate, groups of European countries 1960 - 2002. Source: Council of Europe and Eurostat.

15. Not as low as it seems? Period measures of total first marriage rate, Austria, Germany and Switzerland, 1970 – 2000, observed and corrected for postponement etc (left to right), according to Bongaarts and Feeney (BF), Kohler and Philipov (2001, KP) Kohler and Ortega (2002, KO). Source: Winkler-Dworak and Engelhardt 2004

16. Trends in Total Divorce Rate, groups of developed countries. Source; Council of Europe, Eurostat.

17. Total Divorce Rate, selected countries 1960 – 2003.

18. Total Divorce Rate 1948 – 2011, selected countries. Source: national statistical offices.

19. Total Divorce Rate Finland 1970 - 2008

20. Trends in births outside marriage, groups of developed countries.Sources: Council of Europe, Eurostat, National statistical yearbooks

21. The ‘Second Demographic Transition (SDT)’ theory (van de Kaa, Lesthaeghe 1986) Explains high levels of cohabitation, extramarital births, retreat from marriage, divorce, ‘lowest- low’ fertility since 1960s. Driven by spread of new attitudes and values of tolerant, individualistic nature (‘post-materialism’). ‘Inevitable consequence of realisation of higher-order human needs in prosperous, educated, secular, secure welfare societies’ (Maslow, Ingelhart). Will therefore become a universal attribute of developed societies.

22. Part of the coherent SDT ‘package’: births outside marriage and the total divorce rate, selected European countries around 2000.

23. A hierarchy of human needs. (based on Abraham Maslow, ‘Motivation and Personality’, 1954).

24. Measuring ‘post-materialism’. Inglehart’s ‘post-materialist’ questionnaire.Bold = short questionnaire. Blue = ‘materialist’ responses; Green = ‘postmaterialist’ responsesRobert Inglehart (1977)The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.

25. ‘post materialist’ attitudes and values

26. Association between an index of SDT values (SDT2) and an index of family behaviour (SDT1) (not total fertility). Source: Sobotka 2008, Figure 4.

27. Other approaches. Heath, Evans and Martin 1993. Libertarian scale. responses to: ‘Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values’. ‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’. ‘People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives’. ‘Homosexual relations are always wrong’. ‘People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government’. ‘Even political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should not be banned’. Socialist/laissez-fair scale. responses to: ‘There is one law for the rich and one for the poor’. ‘There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages’. ‘It is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’. ‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems’. ‘Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’.

28. Some problems with the SDT concept Wrong in respect of fertility. No so much ‘Second’ but ‘secondary’? Not really ‘Demographic’? Not (yet) a ‘Transition’ Imperialistic. Other explanations preferable for demographic change in Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia.

29. Birth rates can go up as well as down, and the end of ‘lowest-low’ fertility.

30. An incoherent concept? International comparisons show that national populations most enthusiastic for ‘SDT’ behaviour have the highest, not the lowest fertility.

31. Persistent variety - Crude Divorce Rate 2003 . red = high, blue = low.Council of Europe, recent demographic developments in Europe 2003 map 6

32. Works better at sub-national level? Spatial distribution of the SDT factor for US counties (blue= higher STD factor) Lesthaeghe, Neidert and Surkyn 2006

33. Not ‘Second’ but ‘Secondary’? A major change in behaviour. But some aspects not without precedent (Cliquet 1991). Other ‘transitions’ important (e.g 16th C. West European Marriage Pattern) In some respects a consequence of ‘First Demographic Transition’ or a continuation of it.

34. Not ‘Demographic’ – does not address the central issues? Demography deals centrally with birth and death, migration and population ‘SDT’ concept more concerned with sex, changing morals and living arrangements – a sociological transition Prediction of very low fertility contradicted by international comparative data Does not address mortality or population growth, decline or ageing. Has nothing directly to say about migration.

35. Not a ‘Transition’? A ‘transition’ is permanent, universal, irreversible? Otherwise a limited set of behaviour. Some take it, some leave it: result is diversity, not uniformity (so far). Nowhere yet universal, unlike First DT. Will other cultures (e.g.) Muslims adopt it? Some elements traditional in non-European societies (simple societies, South America)? However, some aspects of SDT behaviour now emerging more widely (Northern Italy, Japan).

36. Not reversible?

37. ‘Sustainable? Fiscal burdens e.g. divorce adds 15% to UK benefit bill (£15 bn); creates 3 for 2 new households. Can an economy afford SDT and population ageing? The latter is unavoidable. Psychosocial externalities. In UK and US at least, some evidence that ‘new living arrangements’ damage childrens’ (social) health and prospects. Controversial UK social policy (after 2010) aimed at reversing elements of SDT? Economic recession may be a test.

38. Underlying theory SDT good as empirical description of behaviour Inglehart ‘post-materialism’ an uncertain theoretical foundation : really different from ‘conservativism / liberalism’? Weak test / retest and predictive power? Plurality of explanations needed for diverse situations (CEE). Ultimately an Economic model?

39. Central and Eastern Europe demographic behaviour –a diversity of explanation needed. Is female education and workforce participation part of the SDT? Post – communist demographic modernisation after abrupt end to state socialist demographic regime (e.g. early, universal childbearing) ; more crisis than emancipation? Social dislocation and anomie – predominance of SDT behaviour among poorest, including rural populations

40. ‘Hajnal’s line’ persists into the 21st century – low mean age at first marriage in Eastern Europe around 2002 as a relic of the state socialist demographic regime . Source: Council of Europe 2003

41. Trends in rate of union formation (cohabitation and direct marriage, competing risks) 1960 – 2004 in Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Source Hoem et al 2008.

42. Rapid ‘modernisation’ of marriage in Central and Eastern Europe post-1989 .

43. Mean age at first marriage 1960 – 2010. Selected countries in Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

44. Former Soviet Union, 1956 – 2010, births outside marriage per 1000 live births.

45. Is Central and Eastern Europe really ‘post-materialist’?

46. Is some SDT behaviour driven by poverty, not prosperity? some examples ‘UK upper-middle class pioneers in cohabitation’. British Household Panel Survey 1950-62 cohort : ‘More cohabitation with higher father’s social status. Class distinction disappears with 1963-76 cohort, cohabitation normative’. (Ermisch and Francesconi , 2007) USA: ‘Transitions to marriage especially unlikely among poor women. Cohabitation among poor women a long-term substitute for marriage’. Poor family background, women’s economic resources salient in transitions. (Lichter et al. 2006, Demography) Sweden: ‘Women of lower socio-economic background more likely to cohabit and have births outside marriage’. (Hoem 1986, EJP) Russia: ‘Least-educated women have highest birth rates within cohabitation, lower probability of legitimating a nonmarital conception. Nonmarital childbearing in Russia more like pattern of disadvantage in United States than ‘second demographic transition’. (Perelli-Harris 2011,Demography). USA: ‘Transitions to cohabitation more rapid among working class for practical reasons - financial necessity, convenience, housing need. Middle-class cohabitors more likely to become engaged than working-class cohabitors’. (Sassler 2011, Family Relations)

47. Association of SDT behaviour with poverty USA: Most working and lower-middle class cohabitors mentioned lack of economic resources as delaying marriage: insufficient money “to pay the bills,” desire to own a home upon marriage, be debt-free, have a “real” wedding. Stress over money source of conflict for some couples. (Smock, Manning, and Porter 2005). Edin (2000) low-income mothers women chose cohabitation or single-parenthood due to their partner’s fragile income. “pay and stay rule. USA (Smock et al 2008 Michigan Population Studies Center) women from more affluent backgrounds more likely to cohabit, but less likely to have a child in cohabitation, middleclass women remain single longer. First birth within a cohabiting union in Britain more likely when the man unemployed. Women with fathers in unskilled or semi-skilled manual jobs much more likely to become mothers in cohabiting unions. Cohabiting couples with children are generally more likely to have low socio-economic status compared to childless cohabitants, UK, Morgan 2000 p. 16 ‘cohabiting couples with children two or three times as likely to be in the semi-skilled and unskilled groups’ (UK, Kiernan and Estaugh, 1993, p. 16).

48. Births outside marriage by social class of father, England and Wales 1976 – 2000 (percent). Source: Maher and Macfarlane 2004, table 2 (from ONS)

49. Births outside marriage, percent, England and Wales 2010 according to fathers’ socio-economic category.Source: ONS. Note: births registered by mother only not included.

50. Another badly-fitting example– trends in marriage and reproduction in East Asia. Mean age at first marriage, females, in East Asia 1947 – 2010