DEPLOYABLE JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS

1. DEPLOYABLE JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS (JMAP) DJFHQ Adaptation and Implementation

2. Why Bother • I don’t work at this level. • I’m in a Service or Unit that doesn’t use this process for very good reasons. • It’s just more bloody theory anyway - only ever used at Training Institutions.

3. Why Bother • Well it isn’t just theory any more. We are in the busiest operational planning period of my career. • Similar processes are used by Defence Forces around the world. • You must certainly modify it to suit your purposes but directions you are likely to receive have been formulated using this process so it best to get to grips with it.

4. I promise: • As little doctrine as possible. • Personal views based on either operations or major exercises. • A joint perspective.

5. A lecture is the process by which the notes of the lecturer become the notes of the students, without passing through the minds of either. R.K. Rathburn

6. An expert is one who knows so much about so little that he can neither be contradicted, nor is worth contradicting Henry Ward

7. STEP 2: STEP 1: Course of Action DEVELOPMENT Comd’s Guidance MISSION ANALYSIS JIPB STEP 4: STEP 3: DECISION & EXECUTION Course of Action ANALYSIS Modified COA’s JMAP Preliminary Scoping

8. Deficiencies/Requirements • Situational Awareness across the staff • Linkages between Components, BOS and staff functions • Utility of current products - Inputs/Outputs • Gap between Mission Analysis and COA Development • Time Management

9. I took a speed reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes. Its about Russia. Woody Allen

10. Planning Groups • Commander’s Planning Group • Joint Planning Group • Joint Admin Planning Group • Joint Intelligence Planning Group • Joint Surveillance and Targeting Planning Group and Targeting Board

11. STEP 2: STEP 1: Course of Action DEVELOPMENT Comd’s Guidance MISSION ANALYSIS JIPB STEP 4: STEP 3: DECISION & EXECUTION Course of Action ANALYSIS Modified COA’s JMAP Preliminary Scoping

12. PRELIMINARY SCOPING • Situation update/Forces Available - a need for the reintroduction of relative strengths. • Strategic/Higher direction - clarity and focus are the essential requirements. • Commander’s initial guidance • Planning timeline • Division of responsibilities

13. Preliminary Scoping • The initial CPG Meeting • Incorporating the components • Set the focus for IPB • Determine the initial staff effort • Establish the time management

14. Time Management

15. Time Management DECISION / EXECUTION 10% COA COMPARISON 10% DECISION BRIEF 70% COMD GUIDANCE 20% ORDERS PRODUCTION 10% WRITE ORDER 60% EDIT BY J5 / J3 15% EDIT BY COFS 10% EDIT BY COMD 5% REPRODUCTION / DISTR 10% MISSION ANALYSIS 20% MISSION ANALYSIS 50% COG / DE CONSTRUCT 10% MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF 30% COMD GUIDANCE 10% COA DEV 30% BROAD COA DEV 20% SCHEME OF MANOUEVRE 50% COA DEV BRIEF 20% COMD GUIDANCE 10% COA ANALYSIS 30% PREP FOR WARGAMING 20% WARGAMING 60% PROD OF SYNCH / DSM 10% COMD GUIDANCE 10%

16. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace • Getting the composition of the JIPG right. • For example - the need for joint logisticians • The utility of higher level product. Country studies vs the need for an analysis of strategic and operational level COG. • The ability to analyse and articulate the intangible.

17. Mission Analysis • COG Construct considered earlier than COA Dev • Proposed Decisive Events and Draft Comd’s Intent (Method Statement) • Improved Situational Awareness • Preparation for COA Development • Decisive Event linkages

18. And a chance for the staff to think on their feet under pressure Did they pass the Charles De Gaulle test?

19. Charles De Gaulle looked like a female llama surprised in her bath.Winston Churchill

20. CRITICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS The enemy COG is his ability to generate combat power. I intend to negate this COG through disruption of the enemy’s ability to observe and direct fire by the denial of key terrain suitable for OPs. I will dislocate the enemy combined arms team by a combination of tactical obstacles and the siting of positions to maximise the constraining effects of the ground and the range advantage of my anti-armour weapons. Finally, I will disrupt his ability to fight dismounted by encouraging an attack at night over terrain suitable for concentrated direct and indirect fire.

21. Example CJTF Operational COG Force Projection ASSESSED OPERATIONAL COG (From GCB until Lodgement) PHASES Transit Focal Area Lodgement Forced Passage CVBG/ ARG Int Assets ARG CVBG TACTICAL COG Morale Ability to sustain ops WLS Essex Ability to detect deception Ltd number strike acft Casualties MCM CAS/CAP Weather Fire spt AOR SLOC Attack helo CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

22. COG construct • Threat Targetable Critical Vulnerabilities • Targeting, Collection Plan, RSI • IO planning • Templated - matrix approach early in process • Can be qualified by • BOS to deliver effect • Time or Phase • Close, Deep, Rear • Utility across the whole staff. Basis of the common understanding of the en and the effect we want to have on him

23. COG construct • Friendly forces • Vulnerabilities - Force Protection tasks • EEFI - OPSEC, CI, and IO planning • Force ratio comparison in key capabilities, strengths vs weaknesses.

24. Decisive Event Planning • What events must I successfully achieve to target the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and achieve my superior commanders intent ?

25. Decisive Event Planning • Two key elements combined to ensure success (Defeat en and meet Comd’s Intent) • Target en weaknesses to get to his COG • Complete tasks to meet superior Comd’s Intent • Determine which of the CVs we are able to Target and have an effect on • Review of the Essential Tasks

26. COA Development • Focus shifted to targeting as a “driver” • Decisive Events and effects on TCVs • Key input from BOS planners - effect

27. Lines of operation through Decisive Event combinations COA Development

28. COA Development • Time compressed planning - modification • COA Dev ends with Hasty Wargame and brief of results • Detailed preparation and synchronisation of one COA

29. Targeting at DJFHQ • Targeting at DJFHQ incorporates lethal and non-lethal targeting. • Aims to integrate the RS&I effort with the exploitation effort and BDA, which in turn informs the continuing targeting effort in support of the overall plan.

30. The Targeting Working Group (TWG) • The TWG, headed by the J9, integrates the targeting plan with the JMAP and is one of the HQ key working groups • The TWG comprises core targeting and TA staff with augmentation from SMEs, and LOs for the full gambit of RS&I assets, and lethal and non-lethal exploitation assets. • The inputs and outputs between the TWG and the JPG during the JMAP are shown in the following slides.

31. TWG Inputs and Outputs to the JMAP

32. TWG Inputs and Outputs to the JMAP Contd...

33. Course of Action Analysis • War gaming to endstate • Throughout the battlespace • Identifies adv and disadv of COA • Identifies Risk • Identifies Comd’s Decisions • Synchronises capabilities • Identifies NAI and TAI • Establishes the key logistic requirements

34. Course of Action Analysis • Dry synch and preparations are essential • Synchronisation and Decision Support Matrix • Production of Operational timeline - Battle Management

35. Decision and Execution • Review of Products • Less cumbersome OPORD • Proposed changes to: • Task Organisation Matrix • Synchronisation Matrix • OPORD body • Better use of Graphics

36. Hitler’s original title for Mein Kampf was Four and a half Years of Struggle against Lies, Stupidity and Cowardice. Everyone needs an editor. Tim Foote

37. Conclusion • DJFHQ has embraced the JMAP and Decisive Event Planning • Improving Situational Awareness through using TCVs and Decisive Events is the basis for the common understanding of Comd’s Intent • Linkages between planning groups, Components, BOS and advisors remains the area for focus

38. And for all that there will be times when your views about the JMAP will be similar to Mr Thomas’s views about Welsh Nationalism

39. When asked his opinion of Welsh nationalism, Mr Thomas replied in three words, two of which were “Welsh nationalism”. Dylan Thomas