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SEAMAN: A Security-Enabled Anonymous MANET Protocol. Harald H.-J. Bongartz, Tobias Ginzler, Thomas Bachran {bongartz,ginzler,bachran}@fgan.de Pere Tuset tuspeipe@eupmt.upc.edu. Problem Statement (1/2) - Scenarios. Communication within group of vehicles. Tactical military operations
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SEAMAN: A Security-EnabledAnonymous MANET Protocol Harald H.-J. Bongartz, Tobias Ginzler, Thomas Bachran {bongartz,ginzler,bachran}@fgan.de Pere Tuset tuspeipe@eupmt.upc.edu
Problem Statement (1/2) - Scenarios Communicationwithin group ofvehicles • Tactical military operations • Police and emergency response operations • Multi-robot systems in military and civilian emergency scenarios Communicationof foot soldiers Data exchange in multi-robot system or sensor network Command postnetwork Source: DRDC Valcartier, Canada
Problem Statement (2/2) • Requirements • Data transmission over wireless medium (radio) • No infrastructure available • Fast deployment • Self-configuring • ”Self-healing” • Assumptions • Mobile Ad hoc Network • Platoon size (approx. 50 participants) • Continuous operation during deployment (sufficient power supply)
Security Requirements Our concern: External (non-authenticated) eavesdroppers/attackers! • High confidentiality • Secrecy of message contents • Anonymity of node identities • Message and Network integrity • of payload data • of network management data • Resilience against various attacks • General reconnaissance • Identification of conspicuous nodes • Replay attacks
SEAMAN Concept Security Enabled Anonymous MANET Protocol = Full External Anonymity + Link Layer Encryption and Integrity + Efficient Multicast MANET Routing + Distributed Key Management
Network Topology Operations • Node Join • Node Leave • Forced Node Eject Group Merge Group Split
Authentication Sequence • Anonymous Authentication using • Perfect Pseudonyms and • Group-identifiable Pseudonyms • Result: • Temporary Bridge Key • Used until common MANET key established
Group-identifiable Pseudonyms • Node identity hidden • Public keys signed by Certification Authority (CA) • Pseudonym revocation by publication of Sym(A)
Other Network Topology Operations • Group Split / Node Leave • Through automatic Key Update • Forced Node Eject • Goal: exclude compromised nodes • Revoke GiP Symmetric Key • Update MANET Key
Conclusion and Future Work • Conclusion • SEAMAN Framework for mobile ad hoc network security • Against external attackers in mission-critical MANETs • Secrecy, Integrity, Anonymity • Future Work • Implementation • WNet for MANET Routing • MIKE for Key Management • MASK for Anonymous Authentication • Tests in simulation and testbed • Integration of Intrusion Detection System