Presentation Transcript

1. Prison Radicalization

   North American Association of Wardens & Superintendents 2014 Training Conference Memphis, TN Tony Parker Assistant Commissioner of Prisons Tennessee Department of Corrections
2. Center for Homeland Defense and SecurityMaster’s Degree ProgramSecurity Studies (Homeland Defense and Security) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
3. Establishing a De-radicalization/Disengagement Model for America’s Correctional Facilities:Recommendations for Countering Prison RadicalizationMaster’s Thesis http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736334
4. Research Questions Primary Question – What are the most effective strategies to counter prison radicalization in the United States? Secondary Questions – What are the contributing factors that promote prison radicalization? What elements of the Singapore and Saudi Arabia’s prison deradicalization rehabilitation program could be applied to an American deradicalization program?
5. Methodology Comparative analysis of two deradicalization / disengagement programs being utilized in the Singapore and Saudi Arabia prison systems. Development of a United States model will require identification of contributing factors within the prison setting that promotes prison radicalization and methods of countering and reducing effects.
6. Methodology (cont’d) Determining factors that suggest program success: 1. Program rehabilitative efforts (cognitive or educational); 2. Program characteristics – voluntary or involuntary participation and incentives; 3. Reported success of the program; 4. Methods used to promote legitimacy and validity; 5. Methods of aftercare or post release supervision.
7. Research Limitations The deradicalization programs of Singapore and Saudi Arabia were designed and based on governmental oversight (applicable laws & cultural considerations); Difference in governmental structures, variations related to the absence of civil liberties protections, and due process protections; Solutions to radicalizations in the U.S. should be studied and evaluated while maintaining the constitutional protections afforded to U.S. prisoners.

8. Prison Radicalization Defined

   “A cognitive process whereby inmates develop a violent, extremist mindset that legitimatizes the need and use of violence to promote a political or religious agenda.”

9. Radicalization in Prison?

10. Radicalized Inmates

    Kevin James: 1. 21 years old, Crip gang member when he entered California State Prison. 2. Founded the extremist group with strong ties to Al Qaeda. 3. Used his gang influence and charisma to radicalize and recruit fellow gang members while encouraging other members to recruit once released on parole. 4. Outside of prison, members planned terrorist attacks on Los Angeles area synagogues, military facilities and the Israeli consulate.
11. Radicalized Inmates (cont’d) Jose Padilla: 1. Serving a 17-year sentence; 2. Converted to Islam in prison and associated himself with members of Al-Qaeda before becoming a member himself; 3. Plotted multiple “dirty bomb” attacks. Michael Finton: 1. Radicalized in an Illinois prison; 2. Conspired with an undercover FBI agent to murder Representative Adam Schock by setting off a bomb outside of his office.
12. Literature Review Prison Radicalization: Contributing Factors 1. Perceived racism or discrimination; 2. Identified Gap in the Literature: Different types or levels of incarceration; 3. Crisis of self-identity; 4. Poor screening and inadequate supervision of clergy and religious volunteers; 5. Prison’s isolated environment where violence and cultural discontent is the norm. Prisons identified as “radicalization cauldrons”
13. Literature Review (cont’d) Prison Radicalization: Counter-Radicalization Strategies: 1. Control gang activity and its influence on extremist groups. National Gang Intelligence Center reported that STG’s resentment of authority & feeling rejected made them susceptible to radicalization; 2. Law enforcement and correctional systems share information related to radicalism and terrorism; 3. The literature identified the problem yet failed to provide a solution for disengagement.
14. De-radicalization Policies: Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and United States Difference between deradicalization and disengagement. Singapore: Fights the radical mindset utilizing a soft approach while incorporating the religious community as a partner; Saudi Arabia: Three main areas of focus are prevention, rehabilitation and aftercare. Christopher Boucek described the program as a “war of the minds” .. Inmates have a “flawed ideological perspective of the Islamic faith; United States: No literature available. Significant void !
15. Representative Peter King Chairman, U.S. Homeland Security Committee 2011 Comments Related to Prison Radicalization
16. An Analysis of the Correctional Environment “a dynamic, temperamental and unforgiving environment”
17. Social Identity Theory (SIT) Social Identity Theory provides an analytical framework that helps explain/understand group behavior. In-groups Out-groups
18. Cultural Markers Related to SIT Honor – Shame Challenge – Response Patron – Client Relationship Limited Good
19. Groups and Security Threat Group Influences Gravitation of like-minded individuals into groups; Within those groups, commonalities form thus separating the in-group from general population; i.e. “self segregation” Charismatic leader promotes an in-group ideology resulting in an opportunity to promote a radical translation of religious doctrine to vulnerable members;
20. Groups and Security Threat Group Influences (cont’d) The National Gang Intelligence Center reported that prison gang members were more susceptible to radicalization; Security Threat Groups have crossed racial lines and joined forces with traditional enemies with the goal of destroying a mutual opponent.
21. 4. Setting Ripe for Radicalization Experiences Identity Crisis Self Segregation Develops New Identity Established In-Group Solidifies Group's Ideology Forms 1. Individual Enters Prison 3. Power of Charismatic Leader 2. Prison Groups/ Gangs Promotes Ideology Promotes/Enforces In-Group Cohesion Inmates Join for Protection/Support/ New Identity In-Group Cohesion Develops
22. Inadequate Vetting of Prison Chaplains/Religious Volunteers Correctional Chaplain(s) Duties/Responsibilities: 1. Unique insights into the ideologies and agendas of various religious groups; 2. Charged with monitoring and supervising religious activity to maintain integrity of programs; 3. The American Correctional Association requires Chaplains to “plan, direct and coordinate all aspects of the religious program, including approval and training of both lay and clergy volunteers.”
23. Inadequate Vetting of Prison Chaplains/Religious Volunteers (cont’d) Difficult to employ and locate qualified Islamic volunteers to lead services. Who’s qualified as an Islamic religious leader/scholar? 1. There is no ecclesiastical body to certify Islamic providers. 2. The BOP as well as other correctional departments utilize an intensive screening process which includes interviews and background checks.
24. Inadequate Vetting of Prison Chaplains/Religious Volunteers (cont’d) Faced with a void and pressured to ensure constitutionally protected religious freedoms, some correctional Chaplains and Wardens approve Islamic services that are being led by inmates who serve as “prison Imams.” Recent survey of 193 state prison wardens Only 50 % of the religious services supervised by staff
25. Inadequate Vetting of Prison Chaplains/Religious Volunteers (cont’d) Problems associated: 1. New York State correctional system failed to properly screen a prison Chaplain who was later discovered to have exhibited ties to Al-Qaeda and actively engaged in anti-American extremist activities.
26. Inadequate Vetting of Prison Chaplains/Religious Volunteers (cont’d) 2. WarithDeenUmar, an ex-inmate and former Imam in charge of recruiting and training Chaplains for New York’s prison system. Umar declared the 9/11 hijackers as “martyrs” and identified African American inmates practicing Islam as “natural candidates” to lead further attacks.
27. Loss of Liberty and Family Contact Sykes studied 1,200 inmates and identified the loss of liberty as being one of the most dramatic characteristics experienced by the inmates Gresham Sykes Research on Maximum Security in the state of New Jersey “Pains of Imprisonment”
28. Loss of Liberty and Family Contact Separation from family/friends (support network) can result in the inmate seeking support or a sense of belonging The potential for gravitation toward a group increases
29. Absence of Social Science Research and Intelligence Sharing Most Social Science Research considers Prisoners as a “Protected Class” There is a substantial absence of data and research related to the prison environment and how it may or may not effect radicalization (George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute)
30. Absence of Social Science Research and Intelligence Sharing In 2011, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States The plan tasked the Department of Homeland Security to find ways to promote and enforce information sharing in the correctional setting February 2003, the Correctional Intelligence Initiative was developed by the FBI and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force
31. Absence of Social Science Research and Intelligence Sharing Originally designed to share information between the FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons Today, most states share information with federal, state, and local partners 93 % serving in state/local prisons What about line staff? Have we provided the training to recognize radicalization at the ground level?
32. Prison Environmental Factors
33. Existing U.S. Strategy for Housing Incarcerated Terrorist in U.S. Prisons Currently, approximately 362 individuals incarcerated in the BOP with convictions of terrorism related crimes 269 have international relations as compared to only 50 in 2000 93 have a domestic terrorism nexus Restrictive, Controlled and Non Conducive to Rehabilitation (Current U.S. Method) Communications Management Units (CMU) 2006 Mark Hamm – “Total Segregation Model”
34. Existing U.S. Strategy for Housing Incarcerated Terrorist in U.S. Prisons Current U.S. strategy, So What? “Out of sight, Out of mind” Let us not forget, 95% will return!
35. Analysis of Singapore’s Prison Deradicalization Model
36. Rationale of Comparative Analysis Singapore utilizes an established program to combat radicalization and has a minority Muslim population. Like the United States, most significant threats from terrorism have developed from Islamic radicalization.
37. Singapore’s Governmental Structure Parliamentary system consisting of three branches: Executive, Legislative and Judicial. Internal Security Act (ISA) gives government officials a wide discretion to enforce preventative detention without a trial for those suspected of terrorist activity. Supervised by the Minister of Home Affairs, the ISA also allows the government authority to enforce curfews, control movement and other restrictive measures.
38. Singapore’s Realization for the Need of Prison Deradicalization JemaahIslamiyah (JI) is a militant group with strong ties to Al Qaeda infiltrated Singapore in 2001. Utilizing the internal security act (ISA), 31 individuals identified as JI members were placed in detention for planning terrorist activities in Singapore. The government called on the Muslim community to develop an ideological response. The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) was formed in April 2003.
39. Religious Rehabilitation Group Structure Counseling Program: Volunteer Counselors that focus on the Reeducation of misguided JI members through effective counseling techniques and psychology. Four stages of countering the radical mindset: 1. Interview to detect extremist mindset 2. Discredit all radical and extremist views 3. Replace incorrect interpretations with moderate Islamic interpretations 4. How to live with diversity and secularism
40. Religious Rehabilitation Group Structure Enhance deradicalization by engaging the community thus providing social support and serving a twofold purpose: 1. Social assistance provided by the community gives family members an option other than relying on JI members for support. 2. The assistance establishes a sense of obligation to the Muslim community from the detainees.
41. Religious Rehabilitation Group Structure Internal Security Department collaborates with RRG: 1. A comprehensive review of the inmate’s progress in the program prior to release. 2. Multiple sources of information are reviewed to determine the need for continued detention or restrictive orders upon release. 3. Counseling & monitoring provided upon release.
42. Internal Security Department’s Role in Deradicalization Three part process is utilized in an attempt to reprogram the mindset of the detainees: 1. Psychological rehabilitation (Mindset change) 2. Religious rehabilitation (Misconceptions of justified religious violence) 3. Social rehabilitation (Aftercare and family support)
43. Analysis of Saudi Arabia’s Prison Deradicalization Model
44. Rationale of Comparative Analysis Intensive counter terrorism campaign which includes a rigorous deradicalization initiative resulting in a six percent rate of recidivism. Program recognized by multiple international agencies and other governments.
45. Saudi Arabia’s Governmental Structure Considered the birthplace of Islam and ruled by a monarchy (King Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz). Constitution is based on Islamic (Sharia) law and the Quran. Ultra conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam provides the framework for the Kingdom’s policies.
46. Saudi Arabia’s Legal System Based primarily on Islamic law; however, secular codes and committees have been recently introduced. Codified a “Law of Criminal Procedure” in 2002 which provided a guide for legal procedure and limited individual rights. Anti-terrorism law permits indefinite detainment for suspects including warrantless wiretaps and searches.
47. Saudi Arabia’s Realization for the Need of Prison Deradicalization Targeting visitors to Saudi Arabia since 1995. By 2003, attacks are more prevalent and aggressive and include members of the royal regime and citizens. 2004/22 incidents of violent extremism claimed 90 civilians To quell the violence, an initial offer of amnesty was made to any terrorist who surrendered, renounced ideologies ,and accepted the state’s version of Islam. Some of those who rejected the offer used this as justification to kill nonbelievers (Takfir).
48. Saudi Arabia’s Prison Deradicalization Program Launched the “Advisory Committee Counseling Program” in 2004. Rehabilitative services provided to detainees returning from Guantanamo and Iraq. Due to security concerns radicals are segregated to reduce prisoner radicalization. Some counseling sessions are conducted via video technology.
49. Saudi Arabia’s Prison Deradicalization Program In 2010, 9 of the 13 security prisons provided program Each designed to house approximately 1200 inmates with an operating budget of 40 to 50 million dollars Program supervised by the 3rd highest ranking government official – Minister of the Interior
50. SaudiArabia’s Program Structure
51. Advisory Committee Coordinates the activities and personnel for the deradicalization program. Carefully screens potential counselors, clerics and religious leaders. The program utilizes a “soft approach” or “soft power” Program wants community/family interaction and support.
52. Religious Subcommittee Framework Largest of the four subcommittee’s Comprised of approximately 150 Muslim clerics, Islamic scholars and professors responsible for engaging inmates in a non-intrusive manner. Provide a support network upon an inmate’s release. Counselor names are not made public for fear of retribution.
53. Psychological and Social Subcommittee Framework This committee serves dual purposes. Consists of over four dozen psychologists, psychiatrists and social scientists. Great emphasis is placed on providing social support for the inmate and family members. Saudi government encourages inmates to marry as promoting a stable lifestyle which promotes disengagement.
54. Security Subcommittee Framework Determines risks associated with each prisoner and make recommendations regarding release and supervision. Works closely with the inmates and provide advice on how to be successful once released (expectations, monitoring process, etc).
55. Media Subcommittee Framework Intense media initiative to reduce radicalization and promote the Kingdom’s message. Primary target audience are young Saudi males. Most effective method of delivering message is through Friday prayers (Jumu’ah prayer).
56. Success of the Program A 2010 Department of State reported recidivism rates to be at 10 percent for program participants and 20 percent for those who returned from Guantanamo. (>3200 inmates served) The figures are reported by the Saudi government.
57. Recommendations For A U.S. Prison Deradicalization Model
58. A) Suggested Proactive Measures for the Correctional Environment Aimed at Reducing the Vulnerability of Prison Radicalization
59. 1. Productive Rehabilitation and Effective Security: The Dual Strategy (effective rehabilitation enhances security)
60. 2. Effective Monitoring and Control of Prison Groups
61. 3. Rigorous Vetting and Monitoring of Prison Chaplains and Religious Volunteers
62. 4. Encourage Positive Inmate / Family Social Interaction and Communication
63. 5. Correctional Policy Should Encourage Social Research within Prisons
64. 6. Provide Adequate Staff Training and Develop Intelligence Sharing Networks with Criminal Justice Partners
65. B) Suggested Proactive Measures That Provide Individual Treatment Options for the Radicalized Inmate
66. 1. The establishment of voluntary cognitive based counseling program for inmates who are incarcerated for terrorism related crimes or inmates who exhibit violent ideological expressions.
67. 2. Inmates who participate in voluntary deradicalization programs should be afforded the same incentives related to sentence credit reductions, vocational / educational opportunities as well as aftercare programs that support their chances for successful reentry and reduce the chances of further extremist activity.
68. Questions / Comments