報告人：朱美琴 南台科技大學國際企業系 2014/9/16

1. How to build up a research project? 98學年度第一學期國際企業所專題研討 報告人：朱美琴 南台科技大學國際企業系 2014/9/16

2. 簡 報 內 容 • 個人背景(學經歷、研究領域) • 計畫源起與目的 • 背景說明 • 水患治理之經濟效益評估 • 結語與建議

3. 學經歷、研究領域 • 密西根州立大學農業經濟系博士 • 專長：環境資源經濟學、成本效益分析 • 經歷：台灣經濟研究院、國際合作發展基金會 • 過去研究計畫： • 生產契約與非點源污染 • 廢容器回收處理(費率訂定、成本估算) • 綠色國民所得帳、環境支出帳、環境會計帳 • 生態效益指標的建立 • 生態旅遊 • 綠色行銷、行銷等方面

4. How to Build Up a Research Project？ 10/7/2009 Mei-chin Chu, Assistant Professor Department of International Business Southern Taiwan University

5. Designing Production Contracts to Reduce Nonpoint Source Pollution • What are the natures of Nonpoint source pollution (NPSP)? • What are the features of business structures? • How might production contracts be designed to combat NPSP?— a case study in Michigan

6. Research Objecctives • Identify the relationships among contract specifications, nitrogen use, yield and nitrate leaching. • Identify production practices that can reduce nitrate leaching. • Identity contractual terms that could reduce nitrate leaching. • Structure a theoretical framework to analyze alternative “green” contract. • Formulate an empirical framework to examine and evaluate the impacts of alternative contract.

7. Theoretical Framework—Principal-agent Model • Model:

8. Empirical Principal-Agent model • Crop growth simulation model—DSSAT • Nitrogen vs Crop yield and nitrate leaching • Mathematical programming model: • Payment: s(y)=[α(y-y0)+Q] βp’=a+by • Objective function of the principal and agent: principal: maxa,b,n E(y-s(y)]=(1-b)y-a agent: E u(w)=E u(s(y)-c(n,z)) = a+by-(λ/2)b2σ2-pn-z • Production function: y=f(n,z)+ε, ε~N(0, σ2) • Leaching function: L=g(n,z,y(n))+η , η~N(0, ψ2)

9. Yield versus nitrate leaching

10. Empirical Principal-model (cont.) • basic empirical principal-agent model: maxa,b,n E(y-s(y)]=(1-b)y-a sub. to a+by-(λ/2)b2σ2-pn-z≧u0 byn=p • Alternative contract designs: • Restriction the level of nitrate leaching • Restriction the level of nitrogen applied • Charge a fee on nitrate leaching or nitrogen • change the payment scheme

11. Evaluation Criteria • The ability to reduce nitrate leaching. • The magnitude as well as incidence of abatement costs. • Contract acceptability dominance • Cost efficiency dominance.

12. Conclusions and Implications • Review of research objectives • Identify the relationships among contract specifications, nitrogen use, yield and nitrate leaching. • using a crop simulation model, Payment based on yield performance encourage the grower to use high N • Identify production practices that can reduce nitrate leaching. • Crop rotation and applications of N • Identity contractual terms that could reduce nitrate leaching. • Output/inputs/production practice/emission/ambient level • Structure a theoretical framework to analyze alternative “green” contract. • principal-agent model • Formulate an empirical framework to examine and evaluate the impacts of alternative contract. • a whole-farm math programming model

13. Conclusions and Implications (cont.) • Major Findings • Corn might be responsible for much less NL than other crops • Relative prices among N and various crops are important in determine NL • The grower’s risk preference level is important • Imposing a fee on N is not effective in reducing NL. • Changing payment scheme might not be effective to reduce NL. • NL reduction could reduce the processor’s gross margins and the grower’s expected utility. Risk-averse grower will bear more than risk-neutral. • Targeting only one crop might not reduce NL for the whole farm. • Enforceability and efficiency are keys to contract designs.

14. Conclusions: Conclusions and Implications (cont.)