260 likes | 271 Views
Review of Helium Venting Analyses. Chris Tutt AMS-02 Project Manager. Review of Hazard. Hazard to be addressed is release of asphyxiant gas into an occupied area. Three major helium reservoirs within AMS-02 payload and GSE. 2500-liter main helium dewar inside the payload.
E N D
Review of Helium Venting Analyses Chris Tutt AMS-02 Project Manager AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Review of Hazard • Hazard to be addressed is release of asphyxiant gas into an occupied area. • Three major helium reservoirs within AMS-02 payload and GSE. • 2500-liter main helium dewar inside the payload. • 1000-liter master dewar used for filling main dewar. • 1000-liter transfer dewar used for filling master dewar. • Venting analysis focused on main dewar as enveloping case, but results for all others are similar. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Main Helium Dewar • Main Helium Dewar has two major components • Helium Tank contains the cryogen itself • Vacuum Case provides vacuum space around the tank. • 3 bar burst disk on helium tank defines the Maximum Design Pressure for the system. • Nominal operating pressure is ~16 mbar. • All hardware will be extensively tested prior to arrival at KSC. • Structural analysis shows high margins for MDP. • All welds will be inspected per MSFC-STD-504C. • Both items will be proof pressure tested. • Both items will be vacuum leak tested. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Main Helium Tank AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Vacuum Case AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
GSE Dewars AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Tank Overpressurization • Two mechanisms for overpressurization of tank. • Failure to remove nominal boil-off from tank. • Large external heat source increases boil-off beyond pump’s capability to remove. • First scenario requires weeks to reach burst pressure, so does not present safety hazard. • Only possible heat source for second scenario is ambient atmosphere and requires air leak into the dewar vacuum space. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Two leak scenarios were considered in analysis Loss of Vacuum (LOV) – Total loss of vacuum caused by large breach of Vacuum Case. Requires major accident: Forklift tine breaks through VC outer cylinder Payload dropped during lifting operations Large hardware falls on payload from significant height. Maximum Credible Leak (MCL) – 3” leak through the double O-Ring seals in the VC upper and lower support rings. Leak size defined by Payload Safety Review Panel and used for all payload bay leak analyses. LOV can be prevented operationally, so following discussion will focus on MCL. Cause of Leak AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
VC O-Ring Seals AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
INTERFACE PLATE O-RING TEST PORT SUPPORT RING CONICAL FLANGE VACUUM SPACE • Each sealing surface has double O-ring seals. • In MCL, both seals are assumed to have failed in the same location. OUTER CYLINDER AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
MCL Defined Leak Size AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Venting Analysis Overview • Venting Analysis consists of three basic steps • Calculation of time required for tank to reach 3 bar burst pressure after leak begins. • Calculation of mass rate of flow of helium leaving the main tank. • Calculation of oxygen levels in surrounding external space. • Only the third step is location dependent. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Time to Burst • Pre-burst pressure rise modeled as isochoric heating. • Heat flux from MCL calculated to be 655.5 W. • Helium thermodynamic properties from NIST handbook. • Results driven by initial temperature and fill level. • Calculated times range from 54 min (1.9K, 95% full) to 86 min (1.7K, 80% full). AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Typical Pressure Rise Profile AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Time to Empty Tank • Mass flow out of the tank modeled as isentropic expansion through choked nozzle. • Results driven entirely by fill level. • The more helium in the tank, the longer it takes to empty. • Below 90% full, helium becomes two-phase prior to reaching 1 atm. • Calculated times range from 131 min after burst (80% full) to 239 min (95% full). AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Typical Mass Flow Profile AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Exterior Volume • Analysis done for four KSC spaces • Space Shuttle Processing Facility • Canister Rotation Facility • Canister • Payload Changeout Room • Results driven by three factors • Volume of external space • Air refreshment rate • Gas diffusion model AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Original Gas Diffusion Assumption • Original discussions assumed that helium vapor would rise to the ceiling of external volume. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Current Gas Diffusion Assumption • At GOWG in November, GSRP requested analysis be redone assuming gas spreads evenly throughout the room. • Model used GSFC algorithm provided by SHOOT team. • Based on helium sensors measurements from Tevatron accident at Fermilab. • Venting memo describes results using second assumption. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
GSFC Algorithm • Helium enters control volume at R m3/s. • Ambient air removed by ventilation system at Q m3/s. Incoming Air Ventilation Exhaust Incoming Helium AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Oxygen Concentration Levels in PCR AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Oxygen Concentration Levels in Canister AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Oxygen Concentration Levels in SSPF AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Oxygen Concentration Levels in CRF AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Overall Trends • PCR falls briefly below 19.5%, but high ventilation rate allows rapid return to safe levels. • Canister’s small volume can be rapidly overwhelmed, but is not normally a manned volume when door is shut. • SSPF/CRF volumes are large enough and ventilation rates are fast enough that oxygen level never falls below 19.5%. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review
Proposed Safety Controls • GSE should be monitored for signs of temperature or pressure rise while AMS-02 is in manned area. • If leak observed, personnel should be removed from vulnerable areas. • Entire PCR • Elevated structures within SSPF and CRF • Oxygen sensors should be used to determine safety of atmosphere prior to reentering any area after venting event or opening Canister in the PCR. • Additonal vent lines and building modifications should not be necessary. AMS-02 Phase II Safety Review