150 likes | 261 Views
Going Up Market to Serve Low Income Groups. HOUSING FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS World Bank Group Conference Washington, March 15-17 2006 Olivier Hassler The World Bank Financial Sector / Housing Finance Group ohassler@worldbank.org. OUTLINE.
E N D
Going Up Market to Serve Low Income Groups HOUSING FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS World Bank Group Conference Washington, March 15-17 2006 Olivier Hassler The World Bank Financial Sector / Housing Finance Group ohassler@worldbank.org
OUTLINE • Rationale for a Bottom up development by alternative lenders: • Implications: external funding and financial soundness • Capacity Enhancing Options
The Coverage Gap • Commercial banks focus on higher end segments– especially in new or unstable markets • Opportunity cost • Lack of origination/servicing capacities for asset based retail lending • Flaws of market infrastructure • Micro-credit for housing is growing, but: • Incremental, minimal housing conditions • Serves the poorest • Often dependent on donors’ support • As a result: • Large vacuum between the two • The deficiency of distribution channels: a reason of the low financial sector efficiency in channeling resources towards investments
Top Down Policies hadMixed Results • Incentives to banks: Chile • 2001: origination subsidy to banks for small loans • Contractual approach: South Africa • Records of Understanding GoSA / banks (1994, 1999), 2003 Financial Sector Charter, March ‘05 commitment by the 4 main banks to extend a certain volume of low income housing loans within in 5 years • Mixed result • Regulatory approach: USA (Community Reinvestment Act), India (Priority lending) Down market expansion: a slow and uncertain process, at least until mortgage markets reach a certain level of maturity (middle segments fully served).
Bottom up option Some grass root institutions (Financial cooperatives, including Credit Unions, Savings and Loans, Cooperative banks) • Which target • low wage earners (Credit Unions in particular) • Informal sector–dual economy: a major issue for the development of financial systems • With a savings mobilization capacity • Can diversify “upwards” by offering housing loans that are not micro-credit • Amount : USD 2,000-30,000 range • Secured lending: mortgages, payroll deductions, personal guarantees, pension fund accounts
Some Examples • Mali Nyesigiso S&L network (47 S&L, 200,000 accounts): • Mortgage loans since 2002 • Additional guarantees: mortgage insurance (Mali Guarantee Fund) • Up to 20 years, competitive interest rates • Rwanda Union des Banques Populaires (150 banks, 360,000 accounts): • 2nd housing loan provider of the country • 15-year housing loans, Savings-for-housing scheme, liquidity support from the Apex Bank • Paraguay • Main housing finance providers: Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito, ”Cajas Mutuales” (closed membership). Hardly any housing finance offers by commercial banks • Savings & Loans cooperatives: 18% of the credit market Cooperativa Universitaria: 10th largest FI
Lending for Housing requiresstable, sound funding • Loans for relatively large up-front investment imply • Longer amortization periods • Adequate funding • Although community based savings can be stable • Closed membership implies limited collection capacity Alt. Lenders are generally characterized by savings collection limited in breadth and depth Need to raise funds externally Financial soundness = a fundamental condition
However, Weaknesses Affect Cooperative FIs. Typically: • Not all banking risk management tools are available: • credit information sharing • integration in payment systems • access to interbank market/Central Banks (liquidity management) • Constrained ability of cooperatives to raise equity • Lack of expertise • Oversight framework often integrated with non financial cooperatives, under the purview of non-financial supervisors
CFIs Typical Weaknesses, Ctd • Lessons from past crises must be kept in mind: • Governance issues • Lax supervision • Asset Liability mismatches • S&L crises often linked to the removal of regulatory privileges (USA, Chile, Colombia…) Artificially supporting specific circuits is in fact dangerous in the long run . This is not the right way to strengthen them
III. Enhancing Capacities to Lend for Housing • Promote federations of lenders with Apex entity • Use access to adequate funding to promote discipline and soundness • Institutional levers: • Prudential oversight • Rating • Specialized agencies: • General agencies
1. Federations with Apex Entities Unions of CFIs can provide very important support • Technical: • capacity building • Technology platforms • Financial: • Intra group treasury management • external funding • If banking arm: access to money market and payment systems • Equity raising • Prudential: • Credit enhancement (joint liabilities, guarantee fund) • Prudential oversight – quasi SRO
2. Access to funding as incentive to discipline • Specialized second tier facilities/windows • South Africa since 1994: Beside push down attempts (banks), pull up policy through 2 wholesale finance providers: • National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) • Rural Housing Loan Fund (RHLF) Mixed success • Mexico: BANSEFI(not specific to housing, considers developments)
2. Access to funding asan incentive to discipline • Debt guarantees • Can connect Alt.Lenders to traditional Financial institutions, while promoting standards and soundness • Modalities are critical • Selectivity • Risk based Premiums • Partial Credit Guarantee • Graduation support: creditworthiness building, development of business relationship, reduction of amount guaranteedover time • Limited experience in housing finance: • Guarantee funds exist in other areas (SME finance, short term micro-credit) • Credit support by donors' agencies (USAID, Accion, CAF, IFC, …) • WB is working on establishing sustainable schemes (Guatemala, Ethiopia)
2. Access to funding asan incentive to discipline • Securitization / Wholesale finance (Unbundling social & financial intermediation -CFI as an underwriter – servicer) • Especially useful for capital constrained lenders • Only possible when capital market investors or wholesale lenders are available • Requires • Sufficient volumes • Sound credit policies • Risk sharing arrangements (first loss borne by originator) • Still few experiences, not for housing (ICICI bank/Grameen partnership in India)
Conclusion • Where cooperative FIs exist, a better vehicle than commercial banks to cater to the housing needs of low income groups • An alternative to state housing banks to serve these groups: wider outreach, non distortive, better savings mobilization capacity • Adequate funding is the main constraint • Soundness is critical to establish needed links with the mainstream financial system, but access to adequate funding = strong motivation • Strengthening routes: • Network organization, incl. joint liability + apex + banking arm • Market discipline through guarantee / funding schemes • Adequate prudential regime (under the purview of a financial, not agricultural or commerce, supervisor) • Rating Still a prospective dynamics for the most part, but quite a few experiences = maybe the beginning of a trend