Greifswald October 2006

1. Greifswald October 2006 The National Offender Management Service (NOMS): implementation and evaluation Peter Raynor University of Wales, Swansea

2. What I will talk about: • Background: the ‘What Works’ experiment in Britain • The results of research on effective practice • Reasons for developing integrated offender management • Evidence and politics in penal reform • Proceed with caution

3. The world’s biggest experiment in evidence-based rehabilitation • Probation services and prisons in England and Wales • Now approximately ten years’ experience • Large scale: targets for completions of offending behaviour programmes in 2005 were 15,000 for the Probation Service and 7,000 for prisons. • (Prisons started earlier but numbers expanded more slowly)

4. Why did the experiment start? In the mid-1990s we had: • Limited evidence of any impact on re-offending • Politicians who were sceptical about rehabilitative services • Some new ideas about effective corrections from meta-analyses and pilot projects

5. For example: STOP (Straight Thinking On Probation) • Mid Glamorgan 1991-5: evaluated pilot of ‘Reasoning and Rehabilitation’ • 72-hour cognitive-behavioural group programme • Implemented for those at high risk of custody • Required consent • Two PO tutors per group

6. Evaluation showed: • Probation officers could deliver this • The ‘right’ people were on it • Crime-prone attitudes and personal problems were reduced • Some reduction in reconviction for programme completers (and high completion rate) • Reduction in seriousness and reincarceration

7. STOP completers: Custodial comparison: Expected rate 42% Actual 35% Expected rate 42% Actual 49% Reconvictions in one year:

8. Seriousness: • Stop completers: 8% had a serious reconviction by 12 months • 2% returned to prison on first reconviction • Custodial comparison group: 21% had serious reconviction within 12 months • 15% returned to prison on first reconviction

9. Other results: • Crime-prone attitudes decreased • Self-reported problems decreased • Project members described what they had learned • They reported changes in thinking, e.g. they had become less impulsive

10. Exit interview quotes: • ‘It’s helped me to solve problems and get them through to people better. Prevents me from jumping off the handle. I listen more, I think about problems more and discuss things. It takes a lot of stress off my head because I Iisten to others.’

11. More: • ‘It’s made me realise . . It’s learnt me to put myself in other people’s places if they’d been burgled . . Guilty’s the word . . It’s out of order. It’s opened my mind and I look at a subject from all different angles . . Not just jumping the gun. With problems I can clear them up more easily.’

12. Meanwhile: a crisis for probation In 1993 the Conservative Government appointed a new Home Secretary, Michael Howard, who: • Announced that ‘prison works’ • Reduced spending on the probation service • Abolished training for probation officers • Would the probation service survive?

13. Why a new probation strategy was needed In 1995 the Home Office issued a circular on ‘critical success factors’. In 1996 the Inspectorate’s survey found: • 267 ‘effective programmes’ claimed by Chief Officers, of which: • 109 claimed to be evaluated • 50 were left after meaning of evaluation explained • 33 had some documented results • Only 4 had adequate evaluation and positive results • Something needed to be done!

14. Target risk Focus on criminogenic need Are structured Use direction Use cognitive-behavioural methods Are (best) located in the community Are delivered with high integrity Have committed management Have appropriately trained staff Have adequate resources Have integral evaluation What we knew by mid-90s: effective programmes . . .

15. The ‘What Works’ strategy The ‘New Labour’ government was elected in 1997 and announced its support for evidence-based policy. For probation this meant: • Pathfinder projects • Integration of areas into national Service (by 2001) For probation and prisons: • Some new resources • Accreditation of programme designs • Evaluation

16. Accreditation: promoting quality • Prison Service General and Sex Offender Treatment Programme Accreditation Panel set up 1996 • Joint Prisons/Probation Services Accreditation Panel set up 1999 • Renamed Correctional Services Accreditation Panel • To approve programme designs and quality control arrangements

17. (In 2002 when evaluated by Home Office): Clear model of change Selection of offenders Targeting dynamic risk factors Range of targets Effective methods Skills orientated Sequencing, intensity, duration Engagement and motivation Continuity of programmes and services Ongoing monitoring Ongoing (plans for) evaluation Accreditation criteria for programmes

18. What the panel did and didn’t do: • Accredited approx. 28 programmes • Did not control: • Targets • Timing of roll-out • OASys • National Standards and enforcement • Whether evaluation took place • Relations with sentencers and communities • Resources and management generally

19. Some results of evaluation so far: Prisons Three evaluations of offending behaviour programmes: • First (2002) shows positive effect for medium risk • Second (2003) shows no significant effect • Third (2003) shows positive effects for completers • All show problems of matching comparison groups

20. More results: probation • Programme completers reconvict less than comparison group offenders • Programme non-completers reconvict more • Low completion rates (21% - 38% in the main studies) make evaluation difficult, as we cannot distinguish between programme effects and selection effects • (completion rates are improving but still only a minority complete)

21. More results: resettlement of prisoners • The resettlement pathfinders (phase 1) looked at seven projects (ABCDEFG) of which three (led by voluntary organisations: EFG) aimed mainly to address ‘welfare problems’ while the four probation-led projects (ABCD) aimed also to address attitudes, thinking, behaviour

22. Resettlement pathfinder phase 1: • Seven projects A B C D E F G • Rank on continuity: + A B C D E F G - • Impact on attitudes: + C B A D G E F - • Impact on problems: + C D A G B E F - • ABCD consistently better: why?

23. Results of the resettlement pathfinders When projects addressed both practical problems and thinking: • Greater positive change in attitudes • Improvement in self-reported problems • Greater continuity of contact with helpers • Higher continuity associated with lower reconviction • NB use of cognitive-motivational programme

24. Why? • ‘In the case of criminal behaviour, factors in the social environment seem influential determinants of initial delinquency for a substantial proportion of offenders . . . but habitual offending is better predicted by looking at an individual’s acquired ways of reacting to common situations’ (Zamble and Quinsey 1997) • Persistent offenders need practical help and changes in thinking

25. Overall, the results of first-wave studies so far are ‘mixed’ • Some good outcomes: correctional services are now committed to reducing re-offending; many hundreds of staff now understand principles of effective practice • What do we learn? Lessons for: • Theory • Research • Implementation

26. These problems are not unusual – e.g. Lipsey 1999: • Compared 205 ‘demonstration’ (pilot) and 196 ‘practical’ (routine) interventions with young offenders • ‘Practical’ interventions were half as effective (6% decrease compared to 12%) • 57% of the ‘practical’ interventions had no effect • What should we expect from rapid roll-out?

27. Lessons for theory • International research continues to support effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural programmes • UK research suggests need to improve impact through motivation, negotiating meaningful goals with offenders and case management • The programme is part of the correctional experience: the impact comes from the whole experience • No case for a return to ‘nothing works’

28. Lessons for research: • Design pilot projects and early stage roll-outs as experiments, to be evaluated • Build in proper comparison/control groups by improving quasi-experimental methodology or, if feasible, random allocation • Collect fuller information including dynamic risk factors • Motivate staff to provide good quality information by building a culture of curiosity

29. Lessons for implementation I • Don’t set non-evidence-based targets (high initial targets of 30,000 led to pressure to fill programmes regardless of suitability) • Assess risks and needs in correctional populations before deciding programmes and scale (not possible because of delays in OASys) • Don’t rely on managerialism to change staff culture • Don’t go too fast • Expect initial reduction in effectiveness of roll-out (Lipsey 1999) • Don’t over-enforce or drift down-tariff

30. Lessons for implementation II • Case management, supervision and follow-up are an integral part of effective programmes • They require Core Correctional Practices i.e. Effective authority Pro-social modelling Good relationship quality: open, warm, empathic, optimistic, structuring, motivating (Dowden and Andrews 2004)

31. Impact of CCP: • Mean effect sizes are higher when CCPs are present • They make significant differences when other principles of effectiveness (risk, need, responsivity) are also followed • Effective interventions and staff skills are mutually beneficial – neither replaces the other

32. BUT: • ‘Clearly these CCPs were rarely used in the human service programs that were surveyed in this meta-analysis . . . These results suggest that the emphasis placed on developing and utilizing appropriate staff technique has been sorely lacking within correctional treatment programmes.’ (Dowden and Andrews 2004)

33. All this suggests that offender management can work well if we have: • Sound assessment of risks and needs • Resources to match needs • ‘Relationship skills’ to understand, build trust, motivate and challenge • ‘Structuring skills’ to clarify expectations, requirements, controls • High continuity • Prisons and probation working together

34. Lessons for implementation III • Offender management also needs to address the full range of problems which offenders experience. • The Social Exclusion Unit’s report in 2002 on Reducing Re-offending by Ex-prisoners identified several areas of concern which became the ‘Seven Pathways’ in the national and regional ‘reducing re-offending’ plans:

35. Seven pathways • Accommodation • Education, training and employment • Mental and physical health • Drugs and alcohol • Finance, benefits and debt • Children and families of offenders • Attitudes, thinking and behaviour

36. For example (from SEU report): prisoners are: • 13 times more likely to have been in care • 13 times as likely to be unemployed • 15 times as likely to be HIV positive • 80% have writing skills, 65% numeracy skills and 50% reading skills at or below 11 yr old level • 60% to 70% using drugs before imprisonment

37. 20% of male and 37% of female sentenced prisoners have history of suicide attempts • Half had no GP • Twenty times more likely to have been excluded from school • 80% of drug users have never had contact with treatment services • A third lose accommodation in prison, two-thirds lose their job, one fifth have money problems and two fifths lose family contact.

38. Integrating services: The Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced new sentences, including: • A single community sentence • A new hybrid sentence, combining a short period of prison with a longer period of supervision in the community (‘Custody Plus’) to improve resettlement for short-sentence prisoners

39. Also in 2003: The Carter Report (Managing Offenders, Reducing Crime) prepared by Patrick Carter for the Prime Minister recommended: • Limiting the prison population (to 80,000) • End-to-end management of offenders (linking prison and probation, as in Custody Plus) • A National Offender Management Service (NOMS) • ‘Contestability’, market testing, private sector involvement

40. But the political context changes: • 2006: New Home Secretary, John Reid, wants to be seen as ‘tough on crime’ • 8,000 new prison places • ‘Custody Plus’ is cancelled • NOMS is still not running • Staff are unhappy • Private sector involvement is a political priority

41. Lessons to learn from the UK: • Developing evidence-based effective offender management is a slow and gradual process • Politicians want quick results • Evidence tends to be used selectively to support policies already chosen for other reasons • We now know more about what to do: will we be allowed to do it? • Proceed with caution