Linguistic Theory

Linguistic Theory Lecture 8 Meaning and Grammar

A brief history • In classical and traditional grammar not much distinction was made between grammar and meaning: • Word categories (noun, verb, adjective, etc.) and syntactic functions (subject, object, etc.) were defined in semantic terms • In American structuralism meaning was shunned as it was not observable • In Generative grammar, meaning was considered relevant, but separate from grammar

The generative position • Grammaticality and ‘semanticality’ are not the same thing: • Colourless green ideas sleep furiously • * Furiously sleep ideas green colourless • Grammatical facts have semantic consequences because semantics ‘interprets’ what syntax provides:

The generative position Syntax  structure  Semantics (produces) (interprets)

Problems • How do we know what are syntactic facts and what are semantic facts? • E.g. ‘selectional restrictions’ • Sincerity frightens John • John frightens sincerity • Is the oddity of the second sentence a syntactic or semantic fact? • It depends on your theory – we do not have reliable intuitions about this.

How do grammar and meaning interact? • An early theory was that transformations do not change meaning (Katz Postal Hypothesis) • This lead to the idea that meaning was associated with Deep Structure, while Surface Structure was associated with phonology:

How do grammar and meaning interact? • Deep Structure meaning transformations Surface Structure phonology

How do grammar and meaning interact? • But this is problematic as there are certain surface structure facts that influence meaning: • It seems to John that he is smart • He1 seems to John [ t1 to be smart] • John believes the king of France is bald • The king of France1 is believed [t1 to be bald]

How do grammar and meaning interact? • So it seems that the situation should be: • Deep Structure meaning transformations Surface Structure phonology • But what is the nature of D-structure and S-structure meaning?

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • In 1965 Chomsky proposed to account for the oddity of ‘John frightens sincerity’ through a lexical property (=selectional restriction): • Frighten: sentient object • These restrictions apply at D-structure: • * John frightens sincerity • * sincerity is frightened by John

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • In 1967 Fillmore proposed a limited set of ‘cases’ which play a role in determining the interpretation of elements accompanying verbs:

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • Agentive (perceived instigator of an action): John broke the window • Instrumental (object used to put into effect an action): the stone broke the window • Dative (affected object): the window broke • Factive (resulting object): bake a cake • Locative (place at, also to): put the pen on the table, went to London • Objective (dustbin category)

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • These roles were stated in the verb’s lexical entry, restricting the contexts which they can be used: • Break: [(A) (I) D] • John broke the window • John broke the window with a brick • The brick broke the window • The window broke • Case hierarchy – determines what will be subject • A > I > D

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • These ideas transformed into ‘theta theory’ in GB syntax (1981) • ‘theta’ = thematic = semantic relations between predicates and their arguments (who does what to who)

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • Theta theory operated with a set of theta roles (agent, experiencer, goal, theme, patient, etc.) • Theta roles are stated in a predicate’s lexical entry but assigned to elements in certain positions • John hit Bill agent patient • But: • No one agrees on how many or what the definitions of these roles are • There is disagreement over how involved in syntax they are

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • A theory of minimal involvement: • The theta criterion • All theta roles must be assigned to an argument • All arguments must be assigned a theta role • * John hit (not enough arguments) • * John smiled Mary (not enough theta roles) • Theta roles are assigned to governed positions

Aspect of meaning associated with D-structure • But this theory cannot account for why subjects tend to be agents not patients • For this you seem to need to refer to specific theta roles • Solutions • Grimshaw: specific theta roles play a role in determining the ‘prominence’ of an argument • Hale and Keyser: the lexicon stores argument structure as sub-trees so the positions of arguments are given in the lexicon

Aspects of meaning associated with S-structure • Binding relations: • John1 seems to himself1 [t1 to be smart] • * it seems to himself1 [that John1 is smart] • It seems to John1 [that he1 is smart] • * he1 seems to John1 [t1 to be smart] • These relations seem to be established after movement and therefore do not apply at D-structure but at S-structure

Aspects of meaning associated with S-structure • Binding relations: • But there are problems: • [Which picture of himself1]2 did Mary say John1 thinks Susan likes t2 • At S-structure the reflexive is not in a position where it can be properly bound by John • --- Mary (did) say John1 thinks Susan likes [Which picture of himself1] • At D-structure the reflexive is not in a position where it can be properly bound by John • So where are binding relations established?

Aspects of meaning associated with S-structure • Binding relations: • Due to restrictions on movement, the wh-phrase cannot move in one go, but moves to the beginning of each clause • wh-P1 did Mary say [t1 John believes [t1 Susan likes t1]]] • In one of the intermediate positions it is in the relevant relation with John • But these are neither D- or S-structure positions

A new level of representation • The following sentence is ambiguous: • Every man loves a woman • For every man there is a woman (a different one) who he loves • There is a woman (the same one) and every man loves her • In some languages these meanings are associated with different sentences: • Minden férfiszeret egy nőt • Egy nőt minden férfi szeret • It is not accident that the quantified phrase at the beginning is interpreted like this (see English examples too)

A new level of representation • It has been proposed that these quantified expressions undergo a movement to the front of the clause and their order determines the interpretation: • Every man1 a woman2 [t1 loves t2] • A woman1 every man2 [t2 loves t1] • But where does this movement take place and why can’t we see it (in English)

A new level of representation • Suppose there is another level of representation after S-structure which is associated with semantic interpretation = Logical Form • Suppose S-structure feeds phonological interpretation = Phonological Form

A new level of representation • D-structure movement S-structure LF PF

A new level of representation • Any movement that takes place between S-structure and LF will not affect PF, but will affect meaning • Therefore we have semantically motivated but phonologically invisible movement

A new level of representation • This helps to unify languages even more • Chinese does not have (overt) wh-movement • But the Chinese can still ask questions • Thus we either assume that asking questions in Chinese involves a very different process • Or we assume that Chinese does have wh-movement, but only at LF

Linguistic Theory