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Course Registration Auctions

Learn about course registration auctions where students use fictional currency to bid on course seats, and explore the fairness, efficiency, and honesty of such systems. Examples from Colorado College, Kellogg School of Business, and more.

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Course Registration Auctions

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  1. Course Registration Auctions Zachary Schutzman Presented May 2016

  2. What is a course registration auction? • Students use fictional currency to bid on course seats

  3. What is a course registration auction? • Students use fictional currency to bid on course seats • Potentially scarce good

  4. What is a course registration auction? • Students use fictional currency to bid on course seats • Potentially scarce good • Ghosh paper

  5. Things to think about

  6. Things to think about • Is it fair?

  7. Fairness Do two identical students have the same access to information and resources?

  8. Fairness Do two identical students have the same access to information and resources? • Students paying real money for advance registration

  9. Fairness Do two identical students have the same access to information and resources? • Students paying real money for advance registration • A professor allows a student to move up the waitlist

  10. Things to think about • Is it fair? • Is it efficient?

  11. Efficiency Do the students with the highest preference for a course get a seat in that course?

  12. Efficiency Do the students with the highest preference for a course get a seat in that course? • Total lottery is fair, but not efficient

  13. Efficiency Do the students with the highest preference for a course get a seat in that course? • Total lottery is fair, but not efficient • Random pruning also ignores preferences

  14. Things to think about • Is it fair? • Is it efficient? • Does it elicit honest preferences?

  15. Honest preferences Do students’ bids reflect their relative valuation for a course?

  16. Honest preferences Do students’ bids reflect their relative valuation for a course? • If a student values Courses A and B equally, but knows B will not fill up, she should spend all of her points on A.

  17. Honest preferences Do students’ bids reflect their relative valuation for a course? • If a student values Courses A and B equally, but knows B will not fill up, she should spend all of her points on A.

  18. Things to think about • Is it fair? • Is it efficient? • Does it elicit honest preferences? • Is it easy to understand?

  19. Easy to understand Are the rules of the auction straightforward and simple enough for all students to participate?

  20. Easy to understand Are the rules of the auction straightforward and simple enough for all students to participate? • We don’t want suboptimal outcomes to result from students misunderstanding the auction formats.

  21. Some examples

  22. Some examples • Colorado College

  23. Some examples • Colorado College • Kellogg School of Business (Northwestern)

  24. Some examples • Colorado College • Kellogg School of Business (Northwestern) • Wharton School of Business (UPenn)

  25. Some examples • Colorado College • Kellogg School of Business (Northwestern) • Wharton School of Business (UPenn) • Booth School of Business (UChicago) • Harvard Kennedy School of Government • MIT Sloan School of Management • Harvard Business School [draft] • NYU School of Law • University of Michigan (Law School and Business School) • UC Berkeley Haas School of Business • ...

  26. Colorado College

  27. Colorado College • Small liberal arts school in Colorado Springs

  28. Colorado College • Small liberal arts school in Colorado Springs • Uses a “block” course calendar

  29. Colorado College Course Auction

  30. Colorado College Course Auction • Students are allotted 80 points with which to bid for a full year

  31. Colorado College Course Auction • Students are allotted 80 points with which to bid for a full year • Multi-unit, simultaneous, first-price, sealed bid

  32. Colorado College Course Auction • Students are allotted 80 points with which to bid for a full year • Multi-unit, simultaneous, first-price, sealed bid • Students have access to the full anonymized results from previous years

  33. Colorado College Course Auction • Students are allotted 80 points with which to bid for a full year • Multi-unit, simultaneous, first-price, sealed bid • Students have access to the full anonymized results from previous years • Waitlists are ordered by bid amount

  34. Colorado College Course Auction • Students should use all of their points

  35. Colorado College Course Auction • Students should use all of their points • Looks like weighted preference, but does not elicit honest weights

  36. Colorado College Course Auction • Students should use all of their points • Looks like weighted preference, but does not elicit honest weights • All students get 80 points, even those studying abroad

  37. Kellogg Course Auction

  38. Kellogg Course Auction • Students are allotted a fixed budget of points for the year • Varies based on student status (full-time get more than part-time/evening)

  39. Kellogg Course Auction • Students are allotted a fixed budget of points for each term • Varies based on student status (full-time get more than part-time/evening) • The auction occurs by term and unused points are carried over

  40. Kellogg Course Auction • Students are allotted a fixed budget of points for each term • Varies based on student status (full-time get more than part-time/evening) • The auction occurs by term and unused points are carried over • There are two rounds of auction with opportunity for section switching and dropping in between

  41. Kellogg Course Auction • Students are allotted a fixed budget of points for each term • Varies based on student status (full-time get more than part-time/evening) • The auction occurs by term and unused points are carried over • There are two rounds of auction with opportunity for section switching and dropping in between • Courses are sold at a clearing price rather than each student paying their bid

  42. Kellogg Course Auction

  43. Kellogg Course Auction • Points are carried over, so prices should rise as terms progress

  44. Kellogg Course Auction • Points are carried over, so prices should rise as terms progress • The clearing price rule should elicit more honest preferences

  45. Kellogg Course Auction • Points are carried over, so prices should rise as terms progress • The clearing price rule should elicit more honest preferences • Refunds mean there are no negative consequences to bidding on and winning two courses that meet simultaneously

  46. UPenn Wharton Course Auction (RIP)

  47. UPenn Wharton Course Auction • Students begin with an endowment of points at enrollment

  48. UPenn Wharton Course Auction • Students begin with an endowment of points at enrollment • The course auction is single round, sealed bid with a clearing price

  49. UPenn Wharton Course Auction • Students begin with an endowment of points at enrollment • The course auction is single round, sealed bid with a clearing price • Points are earned by completing courses and...

  50. UPenn Wharton Course Auction • Students begin with an endowment of points at enrollment • The course auction is single round, sealed bid with a clearing price • Points are earned by completing courses and… • By buying and selling seats in an open market

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