1 / 19

EGEE Site Security Group 5 May 2004

EGEE Site Security Group 5 May 2004. David Kelsey CCLRC/RAL, UK d.p.kelsey@rl.ac.uk. Overview. LCG Security Group Mandate and membership Meetings and web pages LCG Policies and procedures LCG Security Risk Analysis LCG Operational security LCG Security Group future plans

xanthus-little
Download Presentation

EGEE Site Security Group 5 May 2004

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. EGEE Site Security Group5 May 2004 David KelseyCCLRC/RAL, UKd.p.kelsey@rl.ac.uk D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  2. Overview • LCG Security Group • Mandate and membership • Meetings and web pages • LCG Policies and procedures • LCG Security Risk Analysis • LCG Operational security • LCG Security Group future plans • EGEE Site Security Group • Mandate, deliverables etc • Relationship to EGEE MWSG • Relationship to LCG Security Group • Discussion D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  3. LCG Security GroupMandate • To advise and make recommendations to the Grid Deployment Manager and the GDB on all matters related to LCG-1 Security • GDB makes the decisions • To continue work on the mandate of GDB WG3 • Working Group 3 (Security) was one of 5 such groups • Policies and procedures on Registration, Authentication, Authorization and Security • To produce and maintain • Implementation Plan (first 3 months, then for 12 months) • Acceptable Use Policy/Usage Guidelines • LCG-1 Security Policy • Where necessary recommend the creation of focussed task-forces made-up of appropriate experts • e.g. the “Security Contacts” group (n.b. GDB = Grid Deployment Board) D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  4. LCG SEC Membership • Experiment representatives/VO managers • Alberto Masoni, ALICE • Rich Baker, Anders Waananen, ATLAS • David Stickland, Greg Graham, CMS • Joel Closier, LHCb • Site Security Officers • Denise Heagerty (CERN), Dane Skow (FNAL) • Site/Resource Managers • David Groep (NIKHEF) – and link to EGEE JRA3 • Dave Kelsey (RAL) - Chair • Security middleware experts/developers • Roberto Cecchini (INFN), Akos Frohner (CERN) • LCG management and the CERN LCG team • Ian Bird, Ian Neilson (LCG Security Officer) • Non-LHC experiments/Grids • Many sites also involved in other projects • Bob Cowles (SLAC) D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  5. LCG SEC Meetings, Web etc • Agenda, presentations, minutes etc http://agenda.cern.ch/displayLevel.php?fid=68 • LCG Security Group Web site http://proj-lcg-security.web.cern.ch/ • Meetings • Started in April 2003 • Met 15 times to date • 5 face to face and 10 phone conferences • Report to the monthly GDB meetings http://agenda.cern.ch/displayLevel.php?fid=3l181 D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  6. LCG Policies and procedures 6 documents approved to date (see LCG SEC web) • Security and Availability Policy for LCG • Prepared jointly with GOC task force • Approval of LCG-1 Certificate Authorities • Audit Requirements for LCG-1 • Rules for Use of the LCG-1 Computing Resources • Agreement on Incident Response for LCG-1 • User Registration and VO Management 4 more close to approval (prepared by/with GOC group) • LCG Procedures for Resource Administrators • LCG Guide for Network Administrators • LCG Procedure for Site Self-Audit • LCG Service Level Agreement Guide D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  7. LCG Security and Availability Policy • Prepared jointly with GOC group • Editor: Trevor Daniels (RAL, GOC) • Objectives • Agreed set of statements • Attitude of the project towards security and availability • Authority for defined actions • Responsibilities on individuals and bodies • Promote the LHC science mission • Control of resources and protection from abuse • Minimise disruption to science • Obligations to other network (inter- and intra- nets) users • Broad scope: not just hacking • Maximise availability and integrity of services and data • Resources, Users, Administrators, Developers (systems and applications), and VOs • Does NOT override local policies • Procedures, rules, guides etc contained in separate documents D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  8. LCG Policy: Ownership, maintenance and review • The Policy is • Prepared and maintained by Security Group and GOC • Approved by GDB • Formally owned and adopted as policy by LCG PEB • Technical docs implementing or expounding policy • Procedures, guides, rules, … • Owned by the Security Group and GOC • timely and competent changes • GDB approval for initial docs and significant revisions • Must address the objectives of the policy • Review the top-level policy at least every 2 years • Ratification by LCG PEB via GDB if major changes required D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  9. LCG User Registration& VO Management • (n.b. Currently the procedures are being improved) • User registers once with an LCG VO (and not at individual sites) • http://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/(using Grid certificate) • Accepts User Rules • Gives the agreed set of personal data • Agreement on a minimal set was important achievement • Sites need robust VO procedures to check • The user actually made the request • User is valid member of the institute & experiment • That all user data looks reasonable • The User data is distributed (or read access) to all LCG sites D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  10. LCG Risk Analysis • Identified Security risks in 2 main categories • Intentional or malicious • sub-categories • Misuse of LCG resources, Confidentiality or Data Integrity, Disruption for political or other reasons, Other attacks • Non-intentional or accidental • Quantified Likelihood and Impact • Both on scale of low, medium, high (1 to 3) • Risk = likelihood * impact • Will use these to guide work and developments over next 12 months • Started to define course of action for highest risk items D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  11. Risk Analysis (2) D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  12. LCG Operational Security • LCG Security Officer – Ian Neilson • See next slide • Security Contacts lists • Mail list • Other contact info (phone etc) also distributed • New sites informed of policy documents • Incident response • Document describes the procedures • Emergency security updates/patches • Deployment team pushes these D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  13. LCG Security Officer • Ian Neilson (CERN) • act as point of contact within the Deployment Team for matters related to grid security • act as a point of ownership within the Deployment Team for security related problems which impact on grid operation • advise Deployment Team over necessary actions regarding security incidents and required patches • active participation in the LCG Security Group • monitor security aspects of candidate future grid services • liaise with and take advice from others as appropriate D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  14. LCG SEC Future plans • Must manage risks identified in Risk Analysis • We need secure middleware to protect resources • Design and implementations (EGEE MWSG :=)) • Grid security still relatively immature • Very important for production Grids • Many of the policy and procedure documents are for LCG-1 (2003) • All need reviewing for 2004 and beyond • And expansion to general HEP and EGEE D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  15. EGEE Site Security Group (SSG) • No definite plans (yet). Just some thoughts for discussion! • Mandate? • To represent the Sites and their security requirements and constraints • To prepare and maintain EGEE Security policies and procedures • Operational security responsibilities? • Jointly with ROC’s/ GOC’s? • Who owns and approves the policies? • SA1? (need equivalent of the LCG GDB?) • JRA3? • EGEE PEB? (PMB?) or OMC? D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  16. SSG Deliverables • Are there any formal SA1 and/or JRA3 deliverables? • “Informal” deliverables • Prepare and maintain policy and procedure documents • SA1 Site requirements – input to MWSG • SiteAAA-RG document (GGF) • BY WHEN? D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  17. SSG and MWSG (and JRA3) • Cross membership of groups is essential • David Groep, Ian Neilson, DPK, … • Security procedures will need middleware and tools • Strong links to JRA3 and JRA1 (via MWSG?) • Depends who “owns” and approves the policy? • Input SA1 Site Requirements to MWSG/JRA3 • JRA3 has a task on Incident Response • Work together on this item? • Need direct channel to JRA1? D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  18. EGEE SSG and LCG SEC • Not yet discussed with the LCG SEC group • Our next meeting is on 11th May • Wherever possible aim for common policy and procedures • Is it possible to have one set? • Also work with the EU eInfrastructure Initiative • BUT… LCG is a global project and there will be a need (perhaps?) for separate LCG policy • Depends on the future relationship between LCG GDB and EGEE SA1 D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

  19. Next steps • Discussions with SA1 and LCG GDB • What are the relationships? • Prepare and agree SSG mandate • Define members of SSG • Get started! • On updating documents • Requirements (is the GGF document enough?) • Now: DISCUSSION… D.P.Kelsey, EGEE Site Security Group

More Related