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Connection-oriented Service Management in Provider Alliances: a Shapley Value Perspective.
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Connection-oriented Service Management in Provider Alliances: a Shapley Value Perspective Stefano Secci a,b, Jean-Louis Rougier a, Achille Pattavina b, Mariusz Mycek c, Michal Pioro c,Artur Tomaszewski ca Télécom ParisTechb Politecnico di Milanoc Warsaw University of Technology2009 EuroNF Workshop on Traffic Management and Traffic Engineering for the Future Internet, December 7-8, 2009, Paris, France
ContextCooperative provider alliance architecture • Inter-provider MPLS/G-MPLS provisioning • An end-to-end network service as result of service elements composition
Context AS-level routing in provider alliances AS-level routing at the service plane Routing requirements 1. Policy routing 2. Directional metrics 3. Pre-computation 4. Multipoint routing 5. Route diversity breadth-first search with limited depth, pruning and pre-computation, and diversity requirements good complexity and optimality trade-off page 2
Context testbed implementation of control-plane extensions • G-MPLS network plane extensions • Policy management modules • Path Computation Element Protocol (PCEP) and RSVP-TE protocol filtering
Why should one plan resources for other providers’ services? A shapley value perspective The Shapley value can be used to assign the payoff (income) of a player (provider) as function of his marginal contribution to the coalition. The Shapley value is calculated as follows: consider all the possible permutations of the players for each per mutation and each player, calculate the marginal contribution that the player grants if he joins the coalition formed by the predecessor players for each player, calculate the average of its marginal contributions on all the permutations.
Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value computation example Shapley value computation Starting with per-destination link reservation levels How much each provider in each ordered subcoalition can guarantee? What is itsmarginal contribution in terms of bw reservation? The weighted average is the SV p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.25, p3 = 0.25 page 5
Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value perspective • Fair multi-provider schemes for cost&revenue sharing • Application of cooperative game theory • Shapley value: strategic weight of the importance of each player in each possible (sub)coalition • As income distribution incentive for cross-provider added-value services • Accounting for how much each provider has reserved resources for other providers’ services
Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value-based income distribution Fair multi-provider schemes for cost&revenue sharing Application of cooperative game theory Shapley value: strategic weight of the importance of each player in each possible (sub)coalition As income distribution incentive for cross-provider added-value services Accounting for how much each provider has reserved resources for other providers’ services Future work: strategic optimization of cross-provider reservation levels page 7
Summary • Proposition of a strategic and fair income distribution scheme to incent cooperation among provider for cross-provider connection-oriented services • Which can ease a seamless provisioning of service elements in a provider alliance architecture • Use of the Shapley value as power index built upon cross-provider bandwidth reservation levels • Further work • Integration of the Shapley value into the distributed optimization framework:Optimized inter-provider link reservation levels Shapley Value
Related publications • M. Mycek, S. Secci, M. Pioro, J.-L. Rougier, A. Tomaszewski, A. Pattavina, "Cooperative Multi-Provider Routing Optimization and Income Distribution", in Proc. of 2009 7th Int. Workshop on the Design of Reliable Communication Networks (DRCN 2009), 25-28 Oct. 2009, Washington, USA. • M. Mycek, S. Secci, M. Pioro, J.-L. Rougier, A. Pattavina, "A Shapley value-based Incentive Scheme for Cooperative Multi-Provider Traffic Engineering", in Proc. of 2009 16th Polish Teletraffic Symposium (PTS 2009), Lódz, Poland, 24-25 September, 2009. DISTRIBUTED MULTI-DOMAIN OPTIMIZATION • A.Tomaszewski, M.Pioro, M. Mycek, “A Distributed Scheme for Inter-Domain Routing Optimization”, in Proc. DRCN 2007, La Rochelle, France. • M. Pi´oro, A. Tomaszewski, M. Mycek, “Distributed Inter-Domain Link Capacity Optimization for Inter-Domain IP/MPLS Routing”, in Proc. of Globecom 2007. PROVIDER ALLIANCE: architecture, testbed, AS-level routing • R. Douville, J.-L. Le Roux, J.-L. Rougier, S. Secci, "A Service Plane over the PCE Architecture for Automatic Multi-Domain Connection-Oriented Services", IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 46, No. 6, June 2008. • A.P. Bianzino, J.-L. Rougier, S. Secci, R. Casellas, R. Martinez, R. Munoz, N. Djarallah, R. Douville, H. Pouyllau, "Testbed Implementation of Control Plane Extensions for Inter-Carrier GMPLS LSP provisioning", in Proc. of 2009 5th Int. Conference on Testbeds and Research Infrastructures for the Development of Networks and Communities (TRIDENTCOM 2009), Washington, USA, 6-8 April 2009. • S. Secci, J.-L. Rougier, A. Pattavina, "AS Tree Selection for Inter-Domain Multipoint MPLS Tunnels", in Proc. of 2008 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC 2008), Beijing, China, 19-23 May 2008. • S. Secci, J.-L. Rougier, A. Pattavina, "On the Selection of Optimal Diverse AS-Paths for Inter-Domain IP/(G)MPLS Tunnel Provisioning", in Proc. of IEEE 4th International Telecommunication Networking WorkShop on QoS in Multiservice IP Networks (IT-NEWS 2008 - QoS-IP 2008), Venezia, Italy, 13-15 Feb. 2008.
Funding projects TIGER2: Together IP, GMPLS and Ethernet Reconsidered – Phase 2Funded by CELTIC Initiative. July 2008 - June 2010. With Alcatel-Lucent, IBBT, FORTH-ICS, Net Tech., Virtual Trip, RAD, DorukNet, T-Systems, UniGirona, INTERCOM.GI, BUTE. I-GATE: Internet – Game-theoretical Analysis of Traffic Engineering mechanismsFunded by InstitutTélécom, ICF Networks of the Future Lab. Jan. 2009 - Dec. 2009.With Télécom ParisTech, PoliMi, UniGenova. INCAS: INter-Carrier Alliance StrategiesFunded by FP7 Euro-NF JRA.S.7. Sep. 2008 - Aug. 2009. With Télécom ParisTech, PoliMi, Alcatel-Lucent, WUT.