Learning from Mega-disasters

1. Learning from Mega-disasters Rasha Rayes The World Bank May 14, 2013 Entebbe, Uganda – April 29-30, 2013

2. Megadisasters Learning from Megadisasters is a knowledge-sharing project sponsored by the World Bank and the Government of Japan. It is collecting and analyzing information, data, and evaluations with the objective of sharing Japan’s knowledge on disaster risk management (DRM) and post-disaster reconstruction with countries vulnerable to disasters.

3. Sharing experiences with others • Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of Japan’s response to GEJE, a set of key messages that can be recommended to countries, cities and communities vulnerable to disasters has been developed; • A Capacity development program, which includes: • A set of 32 Knowledge Notes • Capacity building in 7 pilot country to mainstream DRM in development projects. • A community of practice: https://collaboration.worldbank.org/groups/login.jspa

4. Summary of findings and lessons

5. Japan had not foreseen an event of this magnitude and complexity • It was a high-impact event with a low probability of occurrence, and a highly complex phenomenon, the effects of which cascaded to sensitive facilities. • Direct damage to major Japanese industries rocketed through supply chains around the world.

6. Japan had not foreseen an event of this magnitude and complexity • In coping with the GEJE, Japan’s advanced DRM system, built up during nearly 2,000 years of coping with natural risks and hazards, proved its worth. • The loss of life and property could have been far greater if the country’s policies and practices had been less effective.

7. Japan had not foreseen an event of this magnitude and complexity

8. Damages • The Cabinet Office estimated direct damages to public and private capital and infrastructures of JPY16.9 trillion (US$210 billion), or about 4% of Japan’s GDP and about 3.2% in 2011.

9. Lessons learnt – what worked • Investments in structural measures, cutting-edge risk assessments, early-warning systems, and hazard mapping; • A culture of preparedness, where training and evacuation drills are systematically practiced at the local and community levels and in schools and workplaces; • Dual insurance system, as well as financial and fiscal measures;

10. Lessons learnt – what worked • Stakeholder involvement, where the national and local government, communities, NGOs, and the private sector all know their role; • Effective legislation, regulation, and enforcement; • The use of sophisticated instrumentation to underpin planning and assessment operations.

11. Lessons learnt – what worked less well • Spreading a better understanding of the nature and limitations of risk assessmentamong local authorities and the population at large; • Coordination mechanisms on the ground should be agreed on before the fact; • Vulnerable groups must be not only protected but also engaged.

12. The many roles of the community in multi-hazard DRM Local communities play a key role in preparing for disastrous events, and are normally the first responders to take action

13. Vulnerable Groups Culturally appropriate services and social safety nets for vulnerable groups are needed in times of emergency and during reconstruction. They should be planned in advance.

14. The vulnerables • 2/3 of deaths occurred among people over 60 years old. • Severe damage of elderly care facilities (52 out of 1,165 facilities in the three prefectures) • Very few welfare evacuation centers for special needs care established in the affected area. • No relief items for the elderly (i.e: soft food and diapers, etc.) • No gender sensitive management in emergency shelters.

15. Disabled • A lesson learned from the Kobe Earthquake in 1995 was that special centers should be established for older people and the disabled. • In 2008, the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued guidelines stating that Welfare Evacuation Centers for special care needs should be established within seven days of a disaster emergency. Only 20 percent of municipal governments in the Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefectures prepared them. • Many disabled people faced challenges accessing evacuation centers; and there were some reports of mentally ill and autistic people leaving centers because they were not properly cared for.

16. Elderly people • People over 60 make up 30 percent of the population in the affected area, but local authorities were unprepared to respond to their needs. • Evacuation for elderly people with dementia and their family members was challenging. • While long-term care facilities organize regular evacuation drills, local government were not well prepared to support them. • Older people also faced accessibility issues at evacuation sites and temporary housing sites

17. Problems Encountered During Residence at Evacuation Sites Immediately after the Disaster

18. Comparison of Male and Female Casualties in the Great East Japan Earthquake by Age Composition

19. Gender • No gender sensitive management in emergency shelters. Lack of privacy for women and children,especially for adolescentgirls, pregnant women, women with infants and children. Allowing anyone free access to shelters at night, increasing fear and risk of sexual harassment, and stress. Women needed to change their clothes under blankets or in a toilet. • No gender sensitive relief items and distribution. Lack of women specific items such as napkins, underwear, and skin lotions, and no consideration for the distributionmethods.

20. Gender According to the Gender Equality Bureau at the Cabinet Office, In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, 96-97% of leaders of community organizations were men who were charged with the design and operation of evacuation sites. It has been pointed out that there was not sufficient awareness of the need to consider the requirements of women.

21. Survey on the Disaster Response from a Gender Equality Perspective The Cabinet Office conducted ‘Survey on the Disaster Response from a Gender Equality Perspective’, between November 2011 and March 2012. According to the survey, lack of female involvement in evacuation and shelter management because: • there was a tendency not to place any importance on the requests and opinions of women; • there was a tendency among women to hesitate to request those items required by/for women when they were in short supply. Stereotypical perceptions of traditional gender role perpetuated the idea that men should clear rubble while women should prepare meals for the evacuation site. In many cases, daily allowance was provided for clearing rubble while no such compensation was provided for working on food preparation.

23. Evacuation

24. Evacuation Inabe City, Mie Prefecture

25. Lessons learnt • Successful evacuations depend on prior measures such as hazard mapping, warning systems, and ongoing education, all of which proved essential in the evacuation that followed the GEJE. • During the GEJE, local governments and communities in affected areas served as first responders, managed evacuation centers, and promptly began post-disaster reconstruction. • Partnerships with the private sector were also critical. Rehabilitation could begin the day after the earthquake because agreements with the private sector were already in place. • Quick payment of insurance claims allowed individuals and businesses to contribute fully to the rehabilitation effort.

26. Lessons learnt • These measures call for empowering marginalized groups for long-term recovery and including a gender perspective in planning and managing shelters, which will require women to be more deeply involved in shelter management. • Children are in particular need of support that will provide them with a certain sense of security and normality; they can also be meaningfully engaged in rebuilding their communities. • When planning evacuation sites, it may be beneficial to reexamine how care facilities for the elderly and disabled are designed and integrated into neighborhood and city planning. • National and local DRM policies and strategies should be reviewed from a gender perspective.

27. Coordination The GEJE drew an unprecedented level of assistance from 163 countries and 43 international organizations. In all, Japan received $720 million from other countries, almost half of all humanitarian disaster funding dispensed around the globe in 2011. The weakness of coordination observed on the ground during the GEJE demonstrates that coordination mechanisms should be established through advance agreements and clear definitions of responsibility.

28. Relief Good Delivery Delivery of relief goods was planned to be executed through depots at two levels—prefectural and municipal. Especially in the first two weeks, fuel shortages made downstream deliveries from prefectural depots very difficult. Manpower shortages and the inconvenient building specifications of depots were the main causes of unnecessary stockpiling in depots. Telecommunications disruptions furthered mismatches between real needs and supplies.

29. By April 20, the national goods distribution component had mobilized 26 million meals, 8 million bottles of beverages, and 410,000 blankets in more than 2000 shelters using 1,900 trucks, 150 aircraft, 5 helicopters, and 8 ships.

30. Bottlenecks • Fuel shortage • Lack of personnel and knowledge among municipal officials • No logistic management plan • Telecom disruption • Lack of info about where the goods were stored • Spontaneous (not managed) goodwill

31. Nutritional Problems For Evacuees • At some of the larger evacuation centers many evacuees became frustrated with the constant menu of cold meals, with some suffering health problems due to the bland diet. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, “A shortage of volunteers to prepare meals from relief supplies has meant that people staying in large shelters in the Tohoku region tend to have less chance of getting served a hot meal than evacuees staying in smaller evacuation centers. • There was an alarming number of malnutrition cases caused by lack of electricity and water and poor nutrition of food distributed at the evacuation centers, which consisted mostly of rice and bread, sometimes with meat, fish and vegetable only available ne meal a day

32. Relief Good Delivery - Recommendation • Public facilities can be used as logistics depots as they are well designed with strong-enough floors, wide-enough entrances and exits, and good accessibility for cargo handling. • Prior agreements can be put in place between the government and logistics companies specifying the terms and conditions and payment methods for hiring logistics professionals, machinery, and depot facilities. • There should be prior identification and training of local government staff who will be tasked with responding to large-scale disasters. • There should be prior formulation of a list of goods and a standard format for shipments and orders for smooth and seamless activation of the disaster response.

33. Key messages • Vulnerable groups must be protected and engaged. A gender perspective should be included in all DRM activities in normal times. Women should be encouraged to participate in DRM committees, center management, and risk assessment. • When planning evacuation sites, it may be beneficial to reexamine how care facilities for the elderly and disabled are designed and integrated into neighborhood and city planning. • Coordination mechanisms, such as relief good supply must be developed and tested in normal times, so that they are ready for use in an emergency.

34. Key messages • It is important that a system of coordination between disaster and risk management departments and health departments be created and maintained to provide nutritional and dietary support in disasters. • In disasters, food and relief supplies are supplied by NGOs and private companies, not solely by the government. Fundamentally it is the affected government’s role to coordinate disaster responses of assisting organizations, working together for maximum efficiency, coverage and effectiveness. Therefore, local governments should not only improve nutritional and dietary support but also provide coordination for disaster responses as a whole.

35. Key messages • In the interest of strengthening the disaster management systems of local governments, it is suggested that nutritional and dietary support and the roles of nationally registered dieticians be included in disaster management and preparedness plans. • A need for nationally registered dieticians to coordinate nutritional and dietary support in evacuation shelters during disaster.

36. Thank you http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/megadisasters