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Mechanism Design for Airport Traffic Planning. Geert Jonker, John-Jules Meyer, Frank Dignum Utrecht University. Airport Traffic Plan Repair. Properties. Incentive-compatibility: motivate agents to be honest. Clark Tax: pay if you change the outcome. Efficient and incentive-compatible.
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Mechanism Design for Airport Traffic Planning Geert Jonker, John-Jules Meyer, Frank Dignum Utrecht University
Properties • Incentive-compatibility: motivate agents to be honest. • Clark Tax: pay if you change the outcome. • Efficient and incentive-compatible. • Fairness: remember histories.
Pay-off accounts solution 1 vs. solution 2
Summary • Need for efficient, fair and incentive compatible resource allocation mechanism. • Conjecture: fairness and incentive compatibility are incompatible.
Issues • Is it fair to make agents express their utility in money? • Do agents know their utility? • How should we measure fairness?