This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija

1. This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija TOPICS ADDRESSED IN DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLANS (EEP) IN GREECEAntony ThanosPh.D. Chem. Eng.antony.thanos@gmail.com Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum

2. Basic framework on External Emergency Planning • Developed in last half of 90s, for 3 major industrial areas of Greece, included : • Main structure of External Emergency Plan Document • Emergency Zones definition and extent • Development of External Emergency Plans • During 2004-2005, 100 External Emergency Plans developed with EU funding, at 24 different prefectures • Development by consortium of private companies in close collaboration with Authorities and Seveso establishments

3. Emergency Zones definition and extent • Typically, standardized endpoints(usually up to 3 levels at EU members)defined by Authorities for Emergency Zones, different per accident effects categories: • thermal radiation • overpressure • toxic dispersion • Definition of Emergency Zones endpoints must take into account expected extents : • Unrealistic situations with huge emergency zones must be avoided (unrealistic emergency response) • Most hard case: toxics dispersion

4. Emergency Zones Extent calculation (Safety Report) Emergency Zones Endpoints External Emergency Plan • Emergency Zones definition and extent (cont.) • Basic element of EEP as providing the basis for expected effects and protection actions

5. Emergency Zones definition and extent (cont.) • Extent of Emergency Zones to be calculated in Safety Report • Requirement by Authorities for Presentation of Emergency Zones and Domino effects Zone in maps in Safety Reports

6. Emergency Zones example (Greece case)

7. Emergency and Domino Zones Maps example in Safety Report

8. Sources required for EEP Preparation • Safety Reports (establishment and potentially Safety Reports from neighbouring establishment) • Area information • maps • information on special interest/vulnerable places (schools, hospitals, elderly houses, campings, hotels, prisons, sport installations- stadiums etc.) • location (for inclusion in maps), contact personnel, phone • operating time, period • capacities

9. Sources required for EEP Preparation (cont.) • Authorities information • Involved agencies (location, contact points, 24-hour phones) • Resources available (quantities per type) • Very important topic. Facilities for temporarily shelter of people, in case of evacuation, have to be defined.

10. Structure of EEP Document • Section I - Introduction • Section II - Establishment Data • Section III - Accident Mitigation Plan • Appendixes

11. EEP Section I – Introduction I.1 Distribution Table I.2 Revisions Table I.3 Classified material statements I.4 Abbreviations/Definitions

12. EEP Section II – Establishment Data (cont.) ΙΙ.1 Establishment identity (address, contact points/personnel along with 24-hour phones, number of personnel present –daily/ shift personnel-, working hours etc.) ΙΙ.2 Establishment location and surrounding area (dwellings, industries, transportation routes etc.) ΙΙ.3 Hazardous substances (substances –identity, quantities - in Upper Tier limits) ΙΙ.4 Units and storage areas ΙΙ.5 Buildings – Aux. areas – other installations ΙΙ.6 Detection and mitigation measures, medical facilities ΙΙ.7 Fire-fight water (sources, pumps) ΙΙ.8 Information on Safety Report (revision table) ΙΙ.9 Hazards from Establishment (list of scenarios, including location, substance involved, effects type)

13. EEP Section II – Establishment Data (cont.) • High standardized form/template • Basic material for completion: Safety Report • Could be asked to be filled by the Establishment

14. EEP Section ΙΙΙ – Accident Mitigation Plan(cont.) III.xAccident category x (x=1, 2,..) III.x.1 Accident Description III.x.2 Consequences estimation III.x.3 Early warning for accident to Authorities and Authorities activation sequence III.x.4 Operations Command & Control III.x.5 Public protection actions III.x.6 Alert to public / Information to public III.x.7 Safety of Emergency Responders III.x.8 Public Health and Medical Support III.x.9 Technical Support III.x.10 Accident Log III.x.11 Post-accident actions III.x.12 Short Action List

15. EEP Appendixes • A Emergency Agencies (address, phones/FAX day/24-hour for agencies and phones day/24-hour for agencies heads and adjuncts) • Agencies for Emergency Operations (scene/field) • Civil Protection Secretariat (central government) • Fire Brigade (region, local level departments) • Police (region, local level departments) • Port Police (region, local level departments) • Ambulance Services • 2. Regional/prefectural/municipal administration departments • 3. Medical services • Administration at central government, and regional levels • Hospitals/Clinics (state and private).

16. EEP Appendixes (cont.) A Emergency Agencies (cont.) 4. Central government ministries and other support agencies (power, water supply providers, public transportation agencies –buses/trains etc.) 5. Military headquarters in region, military installations in accident area 6. Television stations 7. Radio stations

17. EEP Appendixes (cont.) • B Accident Mitigation Resources per agency at local/prefecture level • Human resources • Equipment • emergency response vehicles (per type especially for fire brigade vehicles) • scene remote surveillance media (helicopters, airplanes etc.) • personnel protection media • accident mitigation media • transportation media (buses etc.) • support equipment (water supply road tankers , excavators, trucks) • Other support resources (locations for temporary shelters)

18. EEP Appendixes (cont.) • C Maps/Drawings • Establishment Layout (from Safety Report) • Close area Map • Wide area Map • Accident Scenarios Maps (one per worst case accident examined) • D Safety Data Sheets for substances under concern

19. Safety Reports to be used in EEP Preparation • Safety Reports of establishment related to EEP • Establishment data • Accident scenarios • Potentially Safety Reports from neighbouring establishment • due to Domino effects from establishment to neighbours • Assessment of potential escalation of initial accident

20. Safety Reports to be used in EEP Preparation (cont.) • Problems encountered: • Unrealistic differences in results for specific type of accidents (dispersion of SO2 due to fire in fuel installations). Judgement necessary to assess who provides realistic estimation. • Some scenarios were based on outdated IDLH values. New Emergency Zones calculated by primary data of concentration (table/graph) in Safety Reports)

21. Important !!! For EEP preparation (and implementation) the accident is considered as happened and can potentially escalate • Do not mix EEP with requirements to the establishment for additional prevention/mitigation measures. • Other regulatory procedures deal with this point

22. Collection of data on Authorities • Big challenge to obtain data from several Authorities agencies • Contradictory information available, need to check out data • Hardest challenge to keep data updated

23. Collection of data for Area (mapping up to where ?) • One guidance is provided by Emergency Zones extent ... but Emergency Zones must have been defined • Emergency Zones are prone to uncertainty of consequence analysis. Additional area must be covered. • Additional area required also for facilitating decisions on: • traffic control • access routes • selection of shelters after evacuation • etc.

24. Collection of data for Area (cont.) • Approach adopted for wide area map: • Mapping up to radius of 150% of higher Emergency Zone (Zone 3) • Minimum case: 4 km radius around establishment • Typical scale 1:2.500-1:5.000 • Approach adopted for close area map: • Mapping up to radius of 120% of higher Emergency Zone (Zone 3) • Minimum case: 2 km radius around establishment • Typical scale 1:25.000

25. Collection of data for Area (cont.) • Problems encountered: • No central Authority for mapping data available • Poor area maps available in Safety Reports, as typical maps available to public by State (usually Army Geography Service) were quite outdated • In some maps, areas depicted in black (military installations or critical infrastructure installations such refineries) (the public eye in the sky –Google Earth - was not available at that time) • In some areas close to borders, quite limited maps at all available, due to military restrictions

26. Collection of data for Area (cont.) • Problems encountered: (cont) • No unified GIS-background information available • No special requirements for indication of vulnerable places in Safety Report maps, neither on mapping extent • No organized collection of vulnerable places data by Authorities, contradictory information available • Gathering of data required also area surveys and data verification

27. Collection of data for Area (cont.) • Wide/Close area maps build by GIS application in which all cartographic background information were introduced, along with collaborating database (MS Access) in which information were stored for: • establishment (location of tanks/units, content, scenarios, emergency zones) • vulnerable places (location, contact information, capacities, working hours) • authorities agencies (location, contact information)

28. Vulnerable places Sports facilities Schools Elderly houses Public service Other Vulnerable places Sports facilities Schools Elderly houses Public service Other Agencies Ministry Police Fire Brigade Health service Municipality office Army Other Agencies Ministry Police Fire Brigade Health service Municipality office Army Other Agencies Ministry Police Fire Brigade Health service Municipality office Army Other Road network Primary Secondary Other • Extract of map developed Seveso sites Accident Locations (tanks etc.)

29. Accident Categories • Categories selected based on top events (final accidents) included in Safety Report • Generic list of top events expected : • Pool fire • Fireball (BLEVE) • Jet flame (only for pipelines) • UVCE (vapour cloud explosion) • Toxic dispersion • No flash fire, as typically ignited before EEP can be activated • No jet flame for vessels/tanks, as considered to lead to fireball

30. Accident Categories (cont.) • For each category of top event, different scenarios included for : • tank farm (both tank and dike fire -if applicable-) • process units area • pipelines from/to establishment • movement facilities (road/rail tankers stations, ports) • usually not for LPG depots, as accidents in road/rail tankers can trigger tank accident (even worse)

31. Accident Categories (cont.) • For each scenario included, the worst-case one was examined based on : • consequence (protection zones) extent and • proximity to fence (affecting external area affected), especially if vulnerable objects are close and • worst case atmospheric conditions • For large establishments (petroleum refineries, petrochemicals, chemical complexes), multiple worst-cases examined for different areas of establishments (due to different affected areas)

32. Accident Categories (cont.) • Multiple worst-case (BLEVE) example, refinery with LPG/propylene tanks at different areas of refinery

33. Accident Categories (cont.) • Different worst-case scenarios examined for different toxics (for example in refineries : SO2 dispersion from tank fire, and H2S dispersion from failures in sulphur recovery units –Claus) • Different worst-case scenarios examined for different storage types of same toxic (for example ammonia), due to inherent difference in dispersion mechanisms : • refrigerated gas • semi-refrigerated or pressure liquefied gases toxics

34. Accident Description • Standardised generic description for accident in such type of establishment (very useful for general overview of accident characteristics) • Accident expression (causes, duration, evolution) • Effects to people/structures (qualitative) • Domino effects/escalation (qualitative) • Appropriate mitigation strategy/means/actions

35. Consequence estimation • Scenario data • Substance involved • Equipment involved (dimensions) • Duration • Other scenario characteristics such as : • BLEVE : fireball radius • pool fire : flame length, angle • atmospheric conditions, • Important assumptions (for example: full tank considered)

36. Consequence estimation (cont.) • Basis of zones definition, zones extent, BLEVE example

37. Affected area identification • Standardized table for each Protection Zone including: • Area description • Transportation routes • Industries • Vulnerable places • Affected authorities places • Contact information, capacity, operating hours included • For Domino Zone, comment of equipment, industries included

38. Affected area identification (cont.) • Example for LPG depot XYZ

39. Affected area identification (cont.) • Example for LPG depot XYZ

40. Affected area identification (cont.) • Example for LPG depot XYZ

41. Accident Map • Build by the former GIS application, along with the collaborating database (MS Access) • Both protection and Domino Zones presented • Pre-defined ready layouts for the worst case scenarios examined in EEP • Every accident scenario included in Safety Report can be presented in GIS application

42. Early warning of accident • Crucial point, as initiating event for triggering activation of External Emergency Plan • One-call approach adopted : call to Fire Brigade emergency service number • Exception: only one prefecture where authorities insisted on multiple calls (to Fire Brigade, Police and Ambulance emergency numbers) • Please take into account that the caller has the fire running after him, no time for multiple calls • Standardised template for early warning message to be provided

43. Early warning message template

44. Early warning message template accident (cont.)

45. Authorities activation sequence • First step, verification of call with call-back and/or checking of caller data in EEP • Description of sequence of calls (who calls who) for activation of all involved agencies in order to : • activate all involved agencies • start of operation of administrative instruments (prefectural coordination committee) • multiple level sequences, initially spread through different services, then top to down • sequence of calls presented in tables

46. Authorities activation sequence (cont.) • 1st level

47. Authorities activation sequence (cont.) • 2nd level

48. Authorities activation sequence (cont.) • 3nd level

49. Command and Control • Typically, hierarchy structure and mission defined by legislation • Major gap encountered: No scene (operations) commander (commander of all emergency responders in accident area) foreseen in legislation. • Considered as absolutely necessary for coordination of actions in accident area between emergency responder teams (fire brigade, police, medical services etc.)

50. Command and Control • Proposal for scene commander: Top officer of Fire Brigade on scene. • Why Fire Brigade ??? Most probably the most knowledgeable from emergency responders on hazards from accident and potential escalation risks • Operations Command and Control centres • Central government (Civil Protection Secretariat premises) • Regional (prefectural level where Prefectural Coordination Committee operates, prefecture premises)