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Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Overview

Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network Evolution Global Jihadist Database Project Scott Atran - P.I. Marc Sageman - P.I. Justin Magouirk - Principal Case Architect Ken Ward – Consultant Dominick’ Wright and Darcy Noricks - Contributors. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Overview.

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Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Overview

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  1. Case 1 – Jemaah Islamiyah Network EvolutionGlobal Jihadist Database ProjectScott Atran - P.I.Marc Sageman - P.I.Justin Magouirk - Principal Case ArchitectKen Ward – ConsultantDominick’ Wright and Darcy Noricks - Contributors

  2. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Overview • JI was formed in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar (548) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (10) after Sungkar split with the leadership of Darul Islam • Sungkar and Ba’asyir had been leaders in Darul Islam, a jihadist movement in Indonesia, since the 1970s • Sungkar set JI up as a hierarchical organization with regional heads (mantiqi) reporting to the leader (amir) • Sungkar (548) was the central figure and the source of vision, inspiration, and direction for JI • Sungkar (548) died in 1999 leaving a leadership void • Sungkar’s long-time confidant, Ba’asyir (10), was expected to successfully lead the organization • Ba’asyir (10) took over as amir, but proved to be an extremely weak leader

  3. JI Overview (cont.) • Unlike the centralized Sungkar (548) era, the organization split into two fractious groups under Ba’asyir (10) • Moderate majority wing led by: • 574, the head of Mantiqi II (Indonesia) • 234 and 92, heads of Mantiqi III (Philippines) • 592, head of Mantiqi IV (Australia) • Radical minority wing led by: • Hambali (520), the head of Mantiqi I • Zulkarnaen (244), the head of military affairs for JI • Ba’asyir (10), who was unwilling to provide the vision for the organization, initially sided with Hambali (520) • Hambali (520) radicalized the organization through his pursuit of violent activities and his connections with al Qaeda

  4. JI Overview (cont.) • Hambali’s militant minority was responsible for all of JI’s terrorist attacks from 2000-2003 • With Hambali in hiding in Thailand in 2003 (and later under arrest in August 2003), Noordin Top (261) took over the informal role of attack leader for the radical fringe of the organization • To illustrate the evolution of the network over time, we will focus on changes in the JI leadership • At pivotal points in time, we will “drill down” into the networks of the militant minority, which implemented all of the attacks

  5. Social Network Graph Background • Node size is based on individual reputations. Reputations are based on an algorithm that evaluates: • Organizational role (Mantiqi leadership, key Afghanistan and Philippines trainer, bomb expert, pesantren teacher at key JI school, etc) • Attack activity (participation and role on JI bombing operations) • Larger nodes are more central to the JI attack network • Node color is based on the most important tie group to which the individual belongs. Tie groups are explained in the legend for each graph • Many individuals belong to multiple tie groups (i.e. a jihadist trained in Afghanistan, attended the JI school Lukmanul Hakiem, attended the JI school Ngruki, etc) • In such cases, the individual is assigned the most important tie group for the entire period (1985 - 2006)

  6. Social Network Graph Background • Arrests are signified by a box around the node in question • Depictions of arrests occur in the period following the event • Deaths are signified by a plus sign (+) • Depictions of deaths occur in the period following the event • Tie thickness and color reflect the strength of the tie between two individuals • Thin red lines represent acquaintances and in-laws • Medium blue lines represent friends, non-nuclear relatives, and individuals that have met on operations • Thick black lines represent nuclear family members

  7. 1985-1989: Leadership Network Evolution • Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) are leaders in Darul Islam • Zulkarnaen (244) and 180 attend Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir’s (10) flagship madrassah, Pesantren al-Mukmin (Ngruki) in the 1970s and 1980s respectively • The Ngruki school is one of the founding pillars of JI • 180 becomes Sungkar’s (548) driver • 592 meets Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) in Indonesia • Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), 574, and Hambali (520) form an exile community in Malaysia after the two leaders flee Indonesian authorities in 1985 • 368 meets Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and Mukhlas (26) in Malaysia • Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and 574 recruit a first generation of Afghanistan training volunteers • The majority of initial connections are formed here - 26, 92, 154, 198, 234, 244, 245, 250, 262, 520 • Afghanistan training is one of the founding pillars of JI

  8. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 1985-1989: Leadership Network Evolution

  9. 1990-1994: Leadership Network Evolution • JI is formed in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar (548) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (10) after Sungkar split with the leadership of Darul Islam • First documented ties between Hambali (520) and al Qaeda core (650) • 234, 92, and 250 set up a JI training camp in the Philippines at Zulkarnaen’s (244) request • Mukhlas (26) founds Lukmanul Hakiem, the most important JI madrassah in exile in Malaysia, at the request of Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) • Lukmanul Hakiem is one of the founding pillars of JI • 592 accompanies Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir (10) on a recruitment trip to Australia

  10. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 1990-1994: Leadership Network Evolution

  11. 1995-1999: Leadership Network Evolution • Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem in Malaysia becomes the center of radical activity for JI • Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), Mukhlas (26), 245, 358, Noordin Top (261), and Hambali (520) live or commute there on a regular basis • Zulkarnaen (244) and 198 visit often • JI leadership ties are strengthened • Sungkar (548) – Amir • Ba’asyir (10) – Deputy Amir • Hambali (520) – Mantiqi I • 574 – Mantiqi II • 92 – Mantiqi III • 592 – Mantiqi IV • Mukhlas (26) – Head of Lukmanul Hakiem, Central Command • Zulkarnaen (244) – Central Command • 154, 234, Zulkarnaen (244), 245, 250 – Lead trainers for the organization • 368 – Treasurer for Mantiqi I (de facto treasurer for JI)

  12. 1995-1999: Leadership Network Evolution • Sungkar (548), Ba’asyir (10), and Zulkarnaen (244) formalize strong ties with the al Qaeda core (650) • Sungkar (548) and Ba’asyir’s (10) ties are based on a letter from Sungkar / Ba’asyir to Darul Islam commanders stating that they are the representatives of Bin Laden in Southeast Asia (August 3, 1998) • Zulkarnaen’s (244) ties are based on his tenure as lead trainer in Afghanistan • Hambali (520) strengthens ties with al Qaeda core (650) • Hambali (520) brokers a trip to Afghanistan for 368 • 368 outlines one of the Singapore terrorist plots for the al Qaeda core (650) • 368 and Hambali (520) strengthen their ties through their Mantiqi I leadership roles • 368 acts as a liaison for Hambali for the Singapore cell • Noordin Top (261) and 358 enter the network • Sungkar (548) remains the dominant JI figure with unquestioned authority until his death in 1999

  13. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 1995-1999: Leadership Network Evolution

  14. 2000: Leadership Network Evolution • The death of Sungkar (548) and the weak leadership of Ba’asyir (10) results in multiple centers of power within JI • Hambali (520) rises to prominence based on his ties and funding with al Qaeda (650) • Mukhlas (26) becomes prominent as the de facto leader of Lukmanul Hakiem and as one of the few legitimate Islamic scholars within JI • Faiz Bafana (368) rises to prominence as Hambali’s (520) key aid and treasurer of JI • First documented ties between Mukhlas (26) and al Qaeda core (650)

  15. 2000: Leadership Network Evolution • The moderate majority faction of JI leadership (92, 234, 574, 592) is sidelined by Ba’asyir’s (10) decision to side with the militants led by Hambali (520) • Hambali cultivates the Afghan training and Lukmanul Hakiem radical networks • Hambali (520) directs three attacks within six months in the latter part of 2000 • Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing in August 2000 • Christmas Eve Bombings in December 2000 • Rizal Day Bombings in December 2000

  16. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 2000: Leadership Network Evolution

  17. 2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing Network (Militant Minority) • The Philippines Ambassador Residence (PAR) bombing is envisioned by Hambali as revenge for the Philippines government’s decision to overrun the JI / MILF training camps, Camp Abu Bakar and Camp Hudaibiyah • The PAR bombing network is cultivated by Hambali (520) from former Afghan trainees and Lukmanul Hakiem members • Funding stems from Hambali’s (520) connection with al Qaeda (650) • The PAR bombing is approved by Ba’asyir (10) and planned by Hambali and his Mantiqi I aids – Mukhlas (26), 368, and 584 • In what would become a standard operating procedure, Hambali (520) “borrows” Al-Ghozi (521), a Mantiqi III member to help lead the bombing

  18. 2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing Network (Militant Minority) • Hambali chooses two separate groups to implement the bombing • The first group, consisting of 226 and future Bali bombers 27, 29, 167, 209, 522, constructs and delivers the bomb and the car that would be used for the bombing • 29 buys the explosives from 587, a non-jihadist who was later arrested after the Bali I bombing • The second group, consisting of 4, al-Ghozi (521), and 55, detonates the bomb • The bombing occurs on August 1, 2000, injuring the ambassador and killing his security guard and an innocent bystander

  19. Leadership Group Reconnaissance / Detonator Group = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Misc. Other Material Sourcing / Bomb-making Group = al Qaeda Core + = Dead = Arrest 2000: Philippines Ambassador Residence Bombing Network (Militant Minority) = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core

  20. 2000: Christmas Eve Bombings Network (Militant Minority) • The Christmas Eve bombings involve perhaps JI’s most ambitious operational planning. Envisioned by Hambali (520) and approved by Ba’asyir (10), the bombings were planned by Hambali and his hand-picked team of jihadists • Imam Samudra (1), Mukhlas (26), 55, 368, 538, and 584 • Hambali (520), Imam Samudra (1), 55, 336, and 538 are in charge of the actual bombing teams • Some bombing teams hit more than one city • The teams strike 38 churches in 11 cities in Indonesia in an effort to foment conflict between Christians and Muslims • Batam, Bekasi, Bandung, Ciamis, Jakarta, Mataram, Medan, Mojokerto, Pekanbaru, Pematang, and Siantar • 19 people are killed and 120 injured • The bombs are crude, often killing the jihadists who try to detonate them, including Hambali’s friend 538 • Jihadists are spatially positioned in the graphs based on their bombing teams

  21. = Lukmanul = Afghan Ties = GAM = Misc Other = Arrest + = Dead = Ngruki Ties = Darul Islam = al Qaeda Core 2000: Christmas Eve Bombings Network (Militant Minority) Pekanbaru Group Medan Group Batam Group Leadership Group Ciamis Group Sukabumi Group Bandung Group Jakarta Group Mojokerto Group Mataram Group

  22. 2000: Rizal Day Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • The Rizal Day bombing is a joint venture between JI and the MILF • The origins of the bombing lay with Hambali’s (520) direction to al-Ghozi (521) to buy explosives from the MILF. Al-Ghozi approaches his former Philippines training member, 513 about purchasing explosives • 513 is willing to help but wants JI to help him implement an attack in the Philippines as revenge for the Philippines army’s decision to overrun the MILF militant training camps • Hambali (520) approves the bombing and provides funding through 368 • Al-Ghozi (521) and 513 successfully implement five simultaneous explosions in Manila on December 30, 2000, the Rizal Day holiday

  23. 2000: Rizal Day Bombing NetworkMilitant Minority = Lukmanul Group = Afghanistan Training

  24. 2001: Leadership Network Evolution • 234 takes over the Mantiqi III leadership from 92 • 245, 250, 262 rise to prominence within the JI leadership structure • Hambali (520) flees Indonesia after the Christmas Eve bombings • Hambali (520) directs church bombings through Imam Samudra (1) and the Singapore terror plots through 368 and al-Ghozi (521) • Ba’asyir (10) approves all of the 2001 plots and bombings • The 2001 Singapore terror plots are foiled by Singapore authorities

  25. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 2001: Leadership Network Evolution

  26. 2001: HKBP / Santa Ana Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • The HKBP / Santa Ana church bombings are a continuation of Hambali’s strategy of bombing churches to foment conflict between Christians and Muslims • Imam Samudra (1) directs a six-person cell that includes Christmas Eve and PAR bomber, 55 • Funding occurs through 368, the treasurer of Mantiqi I • The cell simultaneously hits the Santa Ana Catholic church and the HKBP Protestant church on July 22nd

  27. = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Ngruki Pesantren = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core 2001: HKBP / Santa Ana Bombing Network (Militant Minority)

  28. 2001: Atrium Mall Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • The Atrium Mall bombing is a continuation of Hambali’s strategy of fomenting conflict between Christians and Muslims • The target is a group of charismatic Christian worshippers on the upper floor of the Atrium Mall • Imam Samudra (1) directs a five-person cell. The cell is the same as the HKBP / Santa Ana bombings, minus one jihadist, 547 • Funding occurs through 368, the treasurer of Mantiqi I • The bomb prematurely explodes, injuring 196 • 196 is immediately captured and his leg amputated • 55, who took part in the Christmas Eve bombings, PAR bombing, and the HKBP / Santa Ana Church bombings, is arrested

  29. = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Ngruki Pesantren = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core 2001: Atrium Mall Bombing Network(Militant Minority)

  30. 2002: Leadership Network Evolution • After the United States attack on Afghanistan, connections between the al Qaeda core (650) and Zulkarnaen (244) and Mukhlas (26) are severed • Hambali (520) continues to work through Khalid Sheikh Mohammed • 368, the treasurer for Mantiqi I, is arrested in late 2001 after the Singapore terror plots are foiled • 358 takes over responsibility for JI finances • Hambali (520) calls a meeting of his Mantiqi I followers and redirects their focus to soft targets • Top (261) is charged with creating a proposal for al Qaeda funding • 358 is charged with handling the transfer of funds • Mukhlas (26) is charged with directing the bombing

  31. 2002: Leadership Network Evolution • Because much of the Mantiqi I leadership structure is dispersed and in hiding after the 2000 bombings, the Mantiqi I leader, Mukhlas (26), turns to the Mantiqi II administrative structure for help • Mukhlas (26) works through the militant Zulkarnaen (244), rather than the Mantiqi II moderate leadership led by 574 • 574 quits his Mantiqi II leadership post in protest of Ba’asyir’s (10) weak leadership • 262 takes over the Mantiqi II leadership • 198 ascends to the post of caretaker amir when Ba’asyir (10) is arrested after the Bali I bombing

  32. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 2002: Leadership Network Evolution

  33. 2002 Bali Bombing Network (Militant Minority) • The Bali I bombing is the culmination of a series of events • Death of JI’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar • Weak leadership of Ba’asyir (10) • Establishment of Lukmanul Hakiem as the center of JI radicalism in Malaysia • Rise of the militant minority within the ranks of JI • Hambali (520) orders the bombing from Thailand, dispatching his small group of radical followers to carry out his orders • The director of the operation, Mukhlas (26) bypasses the moderate Mantiqi II leadership and plans the bombing through the Central Command Military Affairs chief, Zulkarnaen (244)

  34. 2002 Bali Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • Mukhlas (26) chooses Imam Samudra (1), one of the most violent and radical members of JI, to carry out the bombing • Samudra recruits the most radical JI members, the majority of which have already taken part in previous bombings – 27, 29, 127, 167, 202, 209, 249, 265, 522 • Samudra is also cultivating a small group of Darul Islam members as potential suicide bombers, including the eventual suicide bomber, 524

  35. 2002 Bali Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • In mid-August, Zulkarnaen (244), Mukhlas (26), and Imam Samudra (1) convene a meeting at 81’s house that is attended by the majority of the bombing participants • The plans for the Bali bombing are announced and roles are delegated • 27, 167, 202, 265, 522 mix and build the bomb with the guidance of Azhari Husin (249) • 127 handles all logistical issues • Samudra (1) is only able to convince one of his DI protégées, 524, to become a suicide bomber • 522 is forced to recruit one of his own protégées, 588, to be the second suicide bomber

  36. 2002 Bali Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • On October 12th, 524 and 588 detonate the bombs at Paddy’s Bar and Sari Club, killing 202 people and injuring another 209 • The Bali bombing is implemented by a militant minority of JI, with no input from the majority of the organization, including high-level leadership • In the October Markaziyah (Central Command) meeting shortly after the Bali bombing, there is no discussion of the bombing • 234, head of Mantiqi III, asked Zulkarnaen (244) at this meeting who had carried out the bombing. He is told that it is “none of his business”

  37. = Serang Group = Lukmanul Group = Afghan Ties = Ngruki Ties = Misc. Other = al Qaeda Core + = Dead = Arrest 2002 Bali Bombing Network Serang Group

  38. 2003: Leadership Network Evolution • The first round of Bali I bombing arrests weaken the leadership structure • Ba’asyir (10), Mukhlas (26), and 358 are arrested in late 2002 • 245 and 250 are promoted to the JI Central Command • In his final act, Hambali (520) arranges for al Qaeda funding of the Marriott bombing • Because Hambali (520) is on-the-run (and eventually captured), Noordin Top (261) gains stature within the organization as a developing strategist • There is no longer coordination from JI leadership for attacks • 262 plans an attack on the Bank Central Asia Plot in Jakarta (foiled by police) at the same time that Top (261) plans the Marriott bombing • Zulkarnaen (244) and 92 create a JI special forces group • The two do not get along (Zulkarnaen is from the militant group and 92 is from the moderate group of JI) • 180 takes over the leadership of Mantiqi I • 198 continues his role as caretaker Amir

  39. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 2003: Leadership Network Evolution

  40. 2003 Marriott Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • Hambali is still in hiding in Thailand during the initial preparations for the bombing, but remains in communication with JI’s chief bomb-maker, Azhari (249) • Hambali promises to send money for the operation, eventually using his brother (66) to funnel money from al Qaeda (650) • Noordin Top (261) serves as the chief strategist and Azhari (249) serves as the field commander for the bombing • This would be the first of three partnerships between Azhari (249) and Top (261) • The bombing starts in earnest when 200 contacts Noordin Top (261) about leftover explosives from the Christmas Eve bombing • Top has 129 and 200 coordinate a group of JI members to move the bombing materials including 54, 127, 151, 166, 173, 530

  41. 2003 Marriott Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • In May 2003, 200 robs a bank in Medan to help fund the bombing • The Marriott bombing differs slightly from previous bombings in that there is a wave of arrests before the bombing actually takes place • 127, 129, 166, 200 are all arrested from late April to August 2003 • 245 and 250, both members of the JI Central Command, meet with the core bombers before and after the bombing • The bombing occurs on August 5, killing 12 people and injuring 150 • 324, the suicide bomber, dies during the operation

  42. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = Misc Other = al Qaeda Core + = Dead = Arrest 2003 Marriott Bombing Network(Militant Minority) Bomb Material Movers

  43. 2004: Leadership Network Evolution • Hambali (520) is arrested in August 2003, terminating all known links with the al Qaeda core • 234 is arrested in 2003 and jailed for 10 months • Upon release in 2004 he repudiates JI and loses all contacts • 92 is arrested in 2003 in the wake of the police crack down on the JI special forces unit • 198, the caretaker emir, is arrested in 2003 for his role in hiding Bali bombers after the operation • Noordin Top (261) takes over the informal role of attack leader for the radical wing of JI • With the help of Azhari Husin, Top (261) directs the bombing of the Australian Embassy

  44. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 2004: Leadership Network Evolution

  45. 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • The Australian Embassy is the first JI bombing led entirely by Top (261), without funding from Hambali (520) • Azhari (249) again serves as the second-in-command • This is the second of three bombings that Top (261) and Azhari (249) lead • The Australian Embassy bombing involves an extensive network of jihadists that are not part of JI • This results from Top’s (261) direct appeals to Ring Banten and Kompak, two jihadist organizations in Indonesia

  46. 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • The Australian Embassy network results from several key introductions across multiple different groups • 243, an instructor at the radical, madrassah-style university an-Nur, introduces his students 117, 183, 203 to Noordin Top (261) • 203 then introduces Top to 99 • Top recruits 99 to the network • 99 immediately sets up a training camp to train the bombers that would take part in the operation • Top has his assistant 117 meet with 204, the assistant of Kompak leader 9, to obtain explosives for the operation • 9 agrees and Top (261) has a source of explosive materials • 250, the Central Command member who had met with Azhari (249) and Top (261) before and after the Marriott bombing, and the Mantiqi I leader, 180, provide explosives

  47. 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network(Militant Minority) • The Australian Embassy operation suffers a series of arrests before the bombing is ever implemented • 117, 175, 180, 183, 203, 206, 243 are arrested between June and August 2004 • The Australian Embassy bombing occurs on September 9, killing 11 and wounding approximately 140 people • 577, the suicide bomber, dies in the operation

  48. Ring Banten Group An-Nur Group Kompak Group Accommodations Group = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = an-Nur Group = Ring Banten Group = Kompak Group = Afghan Ties = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest Core Bombing Group 2004 Australian Embassy Bombing Network(Militant Minority)

  49. 2005: Leadership Network Evolution • 154 is arrested in June 2004 • 180 is arrested in June 2004 in the wave of Australian Embassy bombing arrests • 358 is released from Malaysian detention • No resumption of ties as he is monitored by Malaysian authorities and barred from contact with former jihadists • 198 is released from jail and reconnects with former contacts • 198 does not ascend to his former position of caretaker emir • Top (261) continues his role as the attack leader for the militant minority of JI • Top (261) and Azhari successfully direct their third bombing together – the 2005 Bali II bombings • Azhari Husin is killed in a police raids following the bombing in late 2005

  50. = Lukmanul Group = Ngruki Ties = Afghan Ties = al Qaeda Core = Misc Other + = Dead = Arrest 2005: Leadership Network Evolution

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