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Transparency, secrecy and arms control - fissile materials

Transparency, secrecy and arms control - fissile materials. Annette Schaper Presentation at the Workshop Managing Nuclear Material Stockpiles in the 21 st Century, March 3-4, 2005. Weapon usable materials. tons 47.5 100 3.2 5 4 0.31 0.005 0.51 - 635 470 15 24 20 small 0.69 ? -

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Transparency, secrecy and arms control - fissile materials

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  1. Transparency, secrecy and arms control - fissile materials Annette Schaper Presentation at the WorkshopManaging Nuclear Material Stockpiles in the 21st Century, March 3-4, 2005

  2. Weapon usable materials tons 47.5 100 3.2 5 4 0.31 0.005 0.51 -635 470 15 24 20 small 0.69 ? - 52.5 34 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 -174 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 2 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 96 4-5 30.3 59.8 40.3 0 0.7 59.45 – 10 ~ 9 under IAEA safeguards, country figures not publishedMajour source: ISIS-Website www.isis-online.org * Albright/Berkhout/Walker 1996 Inside weapons, military purpose, or considered excess Declared excess Under IAEA safeguards Already disposed of Civilian (owned) USA Russia UK France China India Pak Israel NNWS

  3. Properties of weapons usable fissile material Quant. Most is HEU,weapongrade most is”reactor-grade”Pu Type • multiplicity of forms • many un-known locations • inventory inhe- rently complex • uncomplete pro- duction records • small number of forms, • well known locations • technically unproblematic • high standards of MPC&A Control properties Safeguards Owner Problems no safe- guards most of it underIAEA orEuratomsafe-guards • great challenge: • inventories must be taken • facilities adapted to MPC&A, • safeguards, • specific technical problems • comparatively few problems: • Pu surplus • civilian use and trade of HEU... a few countries many industri-alized countries smaller quantities By far the largest

  4. Properties of weapons usable fissile material Quant. Most is HEU,weapongrade most is”reactor-grade”Pu Type • multiplicity of forms • many un-known locations • inventory inhe- rently complex • uncomplete pro- duction records • small number of forms, • well known locations • technically unproblematic • high standards of MPC&A Control properties Safeguards Owner Problems no safe- guards most of it underIAEA orEuratomsafe-guards • great challenge: • inventories must be taken • facilities adapted to MPC&A, • safeguards, • specific technical problems • comparatively few problems: • Pu surplus • civilian use and trade of HEU... a few countries many industri-alized countries smaller quantities By far the largest

  5. Increasing the security of fissile materials existing,nonexisting (and partly existing) voluntary measures internationally binding commitments • halt production:NWS have stoppedInd,Pak,Isr ongoing Military:Inside weapons, military purpose, naval fuel, considered excess,declared excess,already disposed of,under IAEA safeguards Civilian • Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty • International Fissile Materials Register with the UN • create transparency:publish inventories & future policy plansUS, UKpublished Pu inventories • International Nuclear Weapons Register with the UN • U.S.-Russian agreement on the disposition of excess weapons Pu implementation pending financing • dispose of materials:HEU disposition startedPu disposition attempt failed so far • Internationally agreed standards for MPC&A • verify disposition and non-military use:negotiations on trilateral initiative • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (only international transports) • improve MPC&A:CTRintensify international efforts • Internationally agreed standards for export controls • convert naval reactors • NPT • Euratom Treaty • INFCIRC/153 • Additional Protocol (I/540) • Guidelines of Pu management (I/549) • phase out Pu use, diminuish stocks of existing separated Pu • stop HEU production and civilian use

  6. Increasing the security of fissile materials existing,nonexisting (and partly existing) voluntary measures internationally binding commitments • halt production:NWS have stoppedInd,Pak,Isr ongoing Military:Inside weapons, military purpose, naval fuel, considered excess,declared excess,already disposed of,under IAEA safeguards Civilian • Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty • International Fissile Materials Register with the UN • create transparency:publish inventories & future policy plansUS, UKpublished Pu inventories • International Nuclear Weapons Register with the UN • U.S.-Russian agreement on the disposition of excess weapons Pu implementation pending financing • dispose of materials:HEU disposition startedPu disposition attempt failed so far • Internationally agreed standards for MPC&A • verify disposition and non-military use:negotiations on trilateral initiative • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (only international transports) • improve MPC&A:CTRintensify international efforts • Internationally agreed standards for export controls • convert naval reactors • NPT • Euratom Treaty • INFCIRC/153 • Additional Protocol (I/540) • Guidelines of Pu management (I/549) • phase out Pu use, diminuish stocks of existing separated Pu • stop HEU production and civilian use

  7. Why transparency? • Best arguments from U.S. “openness initiative” • (formed by thorough and transparent public discussions): • Transparency • promotes peaceful applications of science • enables peer reviews and exchange • disseminates information needed for public discussion • promotes public trust in government • makes the work in the weapons labs more attractive • reduces costs of classification • facilitates arms control, verification, has positive effect on intern. rel. ...

  8. Why transparency? • Interests of the international community concerning nuclear information: • participation in nuclear arms control (NPT, CTBT, Cutoff, Safeguards...) • nucl. disarmament (deployments, tactical NW, excess weapons-Pu, ...) • nonproliferation (situation in Iraq, Iran, N.korea,..) • risk reduction (securing the nuclear complex in Russia and other NWPS) • decisions in export controls (dual-use-technologies, international guidelines...) • interests in NATO context

  9. Openness Initiative rules: ”in no case shall information be classified ... in order to - Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, corruption...; - Prevent embarrassment; - Restrain competition; - Prevent or delay the release of information that is not specially protected; - Assign an improper classification level; - or prevent release of information on the physical environment or health and safety”

  10. Why secrecy? • Nonproliferation:- technical details on nuclear weapons - on the fabrication of materials - on the fabrication of tools - ... • national security: - uncertainties of capabilities and intentions as part of stratgies (Cold War) - uncertainties of arsenals for deterrence (China) - uncertainties of locations to maintain second strike capabilities, and their protection - hide weaknesses and vulnerabilities

  11. Why secrecy? • status: - secrecy is associated with privileges - uncritical perception of a status attribute by certain politicians and military - replaces appreciation of scientists in the open scientific community • democratic deficiencies: - concealment of mismanagement and corruption - protection of certain interests - setting of political agendas - preservation of autonomy in decision-making - avoid scrutiny by the public

  12. Why secrecy? • conservative inertia and historic traditions:- passive non-action has no immediate consequence - preserving status quo is often unreflected attitude - no way of starting a process in favour of change • rejection of the NPT:- avoid outside pressure

  13. (3) Nuclear materials and production • a) Information: • - quantities, - political status (civilian, excess military, in mil. use, future use..), - chemical and isotopic composition, production facilities, - storage sites and their security, - weapons usability of different kinds of materials • b) reasons for secrecy: • national security • status?, conservative inertia ?? • nonproliferation ?? • c) Advantages of transparency: • triggers better “control culture” which reduces diversion risks • adds to the preparation for universal international safeguards • gives realistic assessment of rearmament potential • facilitates disarmament of weapons materials

  14. (3) Nuclear materials and production • d) arms control: • follow-up of NW register • facilitates Cutoff verification • e) country comparison: • US: the most transparent, publication of Pu production, no HEUCutoff without verification! (Others: „focused approach“) • Russia far less transparent • UK: documentation on Pu • F: rejects transparency, as others • f) what should a NNWS know? • should try to get all this information

  15. (1) Deployments • a) Information: • - absolute stockpiles, - identification names, - yield, -types, - ranges, - operational status, - locations • b) reasons for secrecy: • deterrence • status?, conservative inertia ?? • c) Advantages of transparency: • creates confidence, avoids unnecessary arms race • gives a realistic image of capabilities • motivates transparency in other NWS • d) arms control: • could enable arms control on TNW • German proposal 1993: NW-Register at the UN

  16. (1) Deployments • e) country comparison: • US: the most transparent, but no. of active warheads not published, NGOs can find sources, opposed to NW register • Russia: less transparent, especially on TNW • UK: some infos on gov. web site • F: some infos hidden in special gov. documents • China: almost completely intransparent • Ind, Pak, Isr: intransparent • f) what should a NNWS know? • should try to get all this information

  17. (2) Warhead dismantlement • a) Information: • technical infos to enable warhead identification • b) reasons for secrecy: • nonproliferation, • national security • status?, conservative inertia ?? • c) Advantages of transparency: • verification measures would be facilitated: „fingerprinting“, „information barriers“, „attribute identification“ • d) arms control: • verification of disarmament beyond START, incl. TNW • NWFZ

  18. (2) Warhead dismantlement • e) country comparison: • US: the most transparent, detailed lists: „Restricted Data Declassification, RDD-7“ • Russia and U.S. in difficult working processUK: some infos on gov. web site • UK has conducted feasibility study • others: no known information • f) what should a NNWS know? • should be able to understand the significance of this information, to develop political positions on verification • but details beyond RDD not necessary

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