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VOLCEX 12-01 FURNAS

VOLCEX 12-01 FURNAS. INTRODUCTION. proposed scenario. DATE: 26 th & 27th April fm 06:00 to 18:00. eruption : at Furnas Volcano , VEI 4, column height FL390, lasting more than 24h.

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VOLCEX 12-01 FURNAS

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  1. VOLCEX 12-01FURNAS

  2. INTRODUCTION • proposed scenario • DATE: 26th & 27th Aprilfm 06:00 to 18:00 • eruption: at Furnas Volcano, VEI 4, columnheight FL390, lasting more than 24h • DISPERSAL: moving eastward to Magreb and Mediterranium til Greece and than inflecting northward to Russian Federation and Finland

  3. INTRODUCTION 1 - Test the current regional volcanic ash contingency plans noting the activation of the EACCC that would promote the use of safety risk assessment approach • proposed main goals • 2 - Test the production, handling and use of special AIREP on volcanic ash

  4. INTRODUCTION Promote participation of Maghreb countries and other States influenced by the simulated volcanic ash plume Assess the potential impact of eruptive crisis events on air navigation operations and call the attention for the need of good awareness and preparedness to deal with

  5. PREPARATION • ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL • remarks • Directive Core Staff was a first experiment • Still missing the participation of airport authorities

  6. PREPARATION • Exerciseadvisories AIM was issued by Eurocontrol NM to inform aviation community of the exercise. Complementing and reinforcing that information many FIRs also issued NOTAM with similar content and same purpose.

  7. PREPARATION To activate the dispersal models, the Azorean Volcanic Observatory, Santa Maria ACC, VAAC-T and Lisbon NOF drilled the Initial Phase of the Contingency Plan through the issuance of VONA, and the issuance of a NOTAM to declare a R-area of 80NM circle around the volcano. • COMPLEMENTAREXERCISE • That R-area would have no real impact on traffic as no flights were scheduled through it. Exercise ended 1 hr after start.

  8. ASSESSMENT - • to avoid constraints due to 1800 characters limit in AFTN messages, consider to split info on 2 bulletins: a 1st VAA/VAG for the 1st 6 hours (to support tactical decisions and provide info for MWOs SIGMET production (and a 2nd VAA/VAG to cover the remaining hours (for flight planning and strategic long-term decisions) - VAAC-T • A) Test the regional VACP • VAA/VAG products and Ash Concentration forecasts need to be synchronized (time issuance intervals) and harmonized (level layers)

  9. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • It is desirable that ICAO better define in Annex 3 how to represent VA Clouds in respect to FIR borders inside VA-SIGMET-Italy • A) Test the regional VACP (cont.) • Clarify the normative aspect regarding the use of VAAs as main source of ash cloud extent when establishing NOTAM or ATFCM measures -Morocco

  10. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • SRAs are mostly based on VACC less reliable than VAG. Direct modelled concentration info for users is being discouraged by ICAO IVATF. SRA should be based on the concept of visible or detectable ash, which is a fundamental for VAGs. Also, this would be consistent with the current procedures in all other air navigation regions and help to achieve a globally harmonized approach. VAAC-T • A) Test the regional VACP (cont.)

  11. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • France did not receive any Press release. Coordination for communication matters is needed. FRANCE • b) Test the role of EACCC • Should consider European common processes for the crisis management. FINLAND • EACCC was activated and SRA approach was promoted. At the AO crisis level, the AOCCC was successfully activated and operational in the NMOC (former CFMU opsroom) on both days. IATA

  12. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • Almost all countries applied an SRA strategy on both exercise days. 1.c) Test the use of SRA approach • Exceptions were: • GERMANY (High Concentration areas closed to traffic) • MOROCCO (applied No-Fly Zones at the beginning but moved to SRA methodology by 15:00 UTC in 2nd day) • RUSSIAN FED. (implemented D- Areas and rerouted traffic out of it) • It was noted a significant step towards the establishment of a harmonized approach in EUR/NAT based on the SRA method

  13. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • Air Report “NO ASH” was produced by Riga MWO as special AIREP and disseminated via AFTN; that was not in accordance with Annex 3 provisions, which do not include “no ash” at the template for special AIREP. A change should be considered to take into account non phenomena at a place where phenomena are predicted. 2. Test the use of Special AIREP (cont.) • should be defined for how long AIREP remain valid

  14. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • VAAC-T received 34 air reports from 7 Airlines (Air France, KLM, Alitalia, Lot Polish, Blue Panorama, United Airlines and Egyptair) 2. Test the use of Special AIREP • All AIREPs came via e-mail; no AIREP issued by the normal dissemination ways (via ACC) reach VAAC-T (because airlines and ACCs did not played through their real operations)

  15. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • Maghreb countries were invited to participate. While Morocco took part, it was unclear whether Algeria and Tunisia also did. 3. Promote participation of newcomer States • Very significant participation of States from the Balcan: all the invited provided a positive answer and showed a good level of preparedness

  16. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT 3. Promote participation of newcomer States (cont.) • Regarding States from Eastern Europe, Russian Federation, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Baltic countries took active part but it was unclear the participation of Ukraine, Bulgaria and Belarus.

  17. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • DAY 1: • 20 NOTAM notified Areas 4. Assess impact on operations • 2 No Fly Zones (NFZ) • 17 AIREP • 131 EVITA external users • 20 EVITA internal users • total delay–4 496 982 minutes • 49 regulations • 18 974 flights compared to 20 149 flights in the live system

  18. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • DAY 2: 4. Assess impact on operations (cont.) • 37 NOTAM notified Areas • 2 No Fly Zones (NFZ) • 24 AIREP • 90 EVITA external users • 12 EVITA internal users • total delay–4 583 276 minutes • 29 regulations • 19 728 flights compared to 21 055 flights in the live system

  19. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • In some FIRs where D-Areas and NFZ were notified from surface up to FL350, the upper airspace was fully available for flights operation and so traffic affection was not relevant except for local flights and airports 4. Assess impact on operations (cont.) • That was clearly the case of Santa Maria Oceanic where, even the few traffic which route projection would cross the “VA cloud” (mostly T16 route), would safely overfly it at economically acceptable altitudes.

  20. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • Most reported negative points: 1. Teleconferences (cont.) • Teleconferences procedures were not communicated to all participants prior to exercise date. • Operational Telecon were too long; Chairman should be more strict with time speech usage from participants

  21. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • Most reported negative points: 1. Teleconferences (cont.) • At the end of the operational telecon it would be useful to summarize detailed information and recommendations from Eurocontrol NM • Conferences were sometimes hard to follow due to great back noise caused by wrong use of mute/unmute functionalities

  22. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • Unanimous positive points: 1. Teleconferences (cont.) • Teleconferences were very helpful, providing information and solutions and bringing awareness to all parties and a global picture of the situation. • Teleconferences also revealed to be a good tool to work on harmonized risk mitigation strategies.

  23. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT 2. EVITA tool • it should be able to update charts more dynamically with improved information provided by all involved including airliners. • Not easy to manipulate as it opens various windows to reach requested info.

  24. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • The appearance needs to be more “Windows-like” and the map more “Google-like”; zoom, pan and move functions are awkward to use; query and plotting functions should be fully integrated into the map 2. EVITA tool (cont.) • Better familiarization is required from AO/ANSP operational staff. • A special training program for EVITA users is required

  25. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT 2. EVITA tool (cont.) • Ash Conc. Charts are not easily or even possible to modify in order to include qualitative info; recommendation is to allow EVITA to display VAG (which support the induction of new qualitative info, such as AIREP).

  26. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • EVITA can become an important planning tool for AOs, but needs basic developments for operational use. A read-only access was provided to external AO participants because of the lack of appropriate support (operational and technical support, detailed user manual). A read-write access was provided to AOCCC carriers in the NMOC for further testing which lead to a detailed feedback for required developments (provided directly to the Network Manager during the exercise). 2. EVITA tool (cont.)

  27. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • NOTAM code such as “Temporary Danger Area” do not exist; so, it is suggested to amend ICAO Doc 8126 Ammendment B 3. Communications • Offices issuing SIGMET and NOTAM should cooperate more closely • SIGMET sent by Zagreb with wrong coordinates had to be corrected by B&H employees which implied a delay of 30m related to Croatian SIGMET

  28. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT POSITIVE • efficient handling of messages by Eurocontrol NP 3. Communications (cont.) • when available NOP Portal brought valuable info by updating headlines on the exercise progress • VAAC-T info regularly updated • much improved response capability and proficiency from the majority of MWOs

  29. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • good response from Morocco NOF to SIGMET and AIMs incoming 3. Communications (cont.) • some MWOs are using much more efficient plotting automated tools; VOLCEX–SG should inquest those MWOs about those tools and invite them to prepare specific presentations for future awareness events, so that other Met Agencies may work on similar improvements

  30. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • National Regulators should issue AIC with national procedures for volcanic ash (including SRA submission and approval) 4. Regulatory Issues • also should work on the implementation of strategic plans for VA procedures at national level • more participation of airport authorities is lacking; VOLCEX-SG should work together with National Regulators to ensure better participation in future

  31. VOLCEX 12-01 ASSESSMENT • there is a need for clarification on how to establish standard efficient procedures to check SRA approvals of international flights 4. Regulatory Issues (cont.) • as pointed before, there is a need to clarify the normative aspect regarding the use of VAAs as main source for determining the ash cloud extent when establishing NOTAM or ATFCM measures

  32. VOLCEX 12-01 • In general, VOLCEX 12-01 was considered successful: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS • there was a massive participation of players from all potentially involved areas (except for airports) • most of the main goals were achieved • communications and messages handling was effective most of times

  33. VOLCEX 12-01 • It was noticed a considerable improvement on the specific proficiency of many players GENERAL CONCLUSIONS (cont) • most of the players showed a good level of awareness regarding the Contingency Plans procedure • the strategic response given from EUR States to volcanic risk is much more harmonized and evolving to a SRA methodology

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