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Chapter 2. The Common Criteria - Merkow & Berithaupt. CC and Security Assurance. CC is used for evaluating security properties of IT products and services CC results are meaningful to buyers and users CC provides a common set of requirements for security functions of IT products and services
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Chapter 2 The Common Criteria - Merkow & Berithaupt
CC and Security Assurance • CC is used for evaluating security properties of IT products and services • CC results are meaningful to buyers and users • CC provides a common set of requirements for security functions of IT products and services • CC establishes a level of confidence
Key Components of the CC • Protection Profile (PP) • Target of Evaluation (TOE) • Security Target (ST)
Protection Profile (PP) • PP is a document that details the security requirements for a given class of products offering similar functions (e.g. firewalls, anti-virus) • PP written by either vendor or customer • Security requirements are expressed in implementation-independent statements required to meet the security objectives of TOE. • Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) designates a specific level of assurance
Target of Evaluation (TOE) • The object being evaluated • Could be a product or a CC document • Threats to TOE’s security, security objectives, requirements and summary specification become input to Security Target (ST)
Security Target (ST) • ST is the basis for complete product and systems evaluation • May claim that the TOE conforms to one or more PP’s • The TOE Security policy (TSP) includes rules that define the security behavior of TOE
Security Framework • Security Environment – Defines laws, organizational policies, environmental issues and threats in which the TOE operates • Security Objectives – Measures that will respond to the identified threats • TOE Security specifications – technical requirements for security functions and assurance based on security objectives • Installation of TOE according to its specifications
Security and CC • Functional requirements – describe what a system should do by design • Assurance requirements – how well the functional requirements must be implemented and tested
Security Functional Requirements • Functional components are used for identifying security functional requirements • Functional requirements are expressed in classes, families and components • Each class may contain one or more families • Name – first 3 characters identify the functional class e.g. FAU_ = Functional class security audit
Classes - Continued • Class introduction describes the common approach and intent of families to satisfy security objectives • Relationships between classes and components are indicated in a Class decomposition diagram
Family Structure • Family addresses a specific security problem that its components will solve • See figure 2.8 pg 41 • Family names – seven character. First 3 identify the class and last 3 family e.g. FAU_GEN FAU = Family Security Audit GEN = Data generation family of components
Components • Each component has a name that describes class, family and other components to which it is hierarchal. • Components are further broken down into functional elements • Functional components are dependent on other components and dependencies must be stated e.g. FAU_GEN.1.1
Assurance Requirement – Assurance Class/Family/Component/Element • Assurance classes resemble functional classes • Name – ACM_CAP.1.1 = Configuration management assurance class, change management capabilities family .1 first component .1 first element of component
Evaluation of Assurance Levels (EAL) • EAL is a scale for evaluation of PPs and STs • There are seven levels. See pg. 53 • The Higher the level the greater the assurance