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Session Recording Protocol Requirements. IETF 75, Stockholm (Leon Portman on behalf of the team). Requirements Draft Authors. R. Jain, IPC Systems L. Portman, NICE Systems V. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent H. Kaplan, Acme Packet
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Session Recording Protocol Requirements IETF 75, Stockholm (Leon Portman on behalf of the team)
Requirements Draft Authors • R. Jain, IPC Systems • L. Portman, NICE Systems • V. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent • H. Kaplan, Acme Packet • A. Hutton, Siemens Enterprise Communications • K. Rehor, Cisco Systems Other contributors to this presentation • A. Johnston, Avaya • D. Wing, Cisco Systems
Main use cases for recording • Trading floor compliance • Contact Center quality management • Customer analytics • Financial institution transactions • Insurance and healthcare regulations • Emergency services regulations In many cases it’s not a legal requirement, it’s a user requirement – users wanting to protect themselves (i.e., non-repudiation)
Reasons for Standardization • Lack of well defined and standard protocol for the recording currently limits or even blocks adoption of IP telephony in the enterprises • There is a strong demand from customers and communications systems vendors for such protocol • Transforming multiple implementations of proprietary protocols to non-proprietary standard
Main Definitions • Recording Server (RS): A Recording Server (RS) is a specialized media server or collector that acts as the sink of the recorded media and metadata events • Recording Client (RC): A Recording Client (RC) is a SIP User Agent (UA), SIP Media Server or a Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) that acts as the source of the recorded media and metadata events, sending it to the RS.
Requirements Overview • Support for recording control both from RC to RS and from RS to RC • Loss-less delivery of the media from RC to RS • Support for RS and RC failures • Security • Mixed and separated recordings • Pause and resume of the recordings • Support for Session Metadata events • Correlation between media and SIP sessions • Silent and visible recording
General Overview- Example 1 RC • Middle-box as Recording Client • IP-PBX, MS, SBC, Mixer, Gateway UA-A B2BUA UA-B Call Call Session Recording Protocol Recorder RS
General Overview- Example 2 RC • End Point as Recording Client UA-A UA-B Call Call . . . Session Recording Protocol Recorder RS
Required SRP interfaces • Recording Control (RC-> RS or RS->RC) • Recorded Media (RC->RS) • Call Metadata (RC->RS) (not covered yet)
Why use SIP for SRP? • Recording session (SRP) is a media session • Call Control functionality: JOIN, REFER • SIP Events framework already available • Reuse of existing mechanisms: • Codec and transport negotiation • Security mechanisms • Firewall traversal
Scope logical or physicalB2BUA (the RC) Session Recording Protocol and Call Metadata events A/S Recorder (RS) SIP SIP MEDIACTRL UA-B Media Server UA-C RTP RTP Recorded media
Other approaches • MEDIACTRL and XCON focus on how actually to implement RC and not on the interface between RS and RC • Lacks support for integrated signaling and media B2BUA, nor UA/Endpoint acting as RC • Does not address all requirements • Recording transparency • Persistent mode • RS invoking recording (instead of RC invoking it)
SRTP Support – current plan • If RC has cleartext RTP, it can negotiate/use SRTP for the SRP interface • SRP is an independent RTP/SRTP layer connection • If RC only has encrypted SRTP, it can send them as raw “media” payload to RS, to be recorded • Providing any keys to decrypt it is out-of-scope of this work • SRP media layer would not be “RTP” or “SRTP” – it’s a new “raw” or “mirrored” media-layer
Next Steps • Is there interest in this? • Dispatch to charter a new WG? • This document as the starting-point for a charter?
Security Considerations • Authentication, authorization, eavesdropping protection, and non-repudiation • The RC needs to know the RS it is communicating with is legitimate, and vice-versa, even if they are in different domains. • Both the signaling and media for the SRP needs the ability to be authenticated and protected from eavesdropping and non-repudiation.