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Workshop on the certification of e-voting systems Council of Europe Strasbourg, 26 November 2009

Workshop on the certification of e-voting systems Council of Europe Strasbourg, 26 November 2009. Certification of the e-voting software used at the Austrian Student Union elections 2009. Daniel Konrad. About A-SIT. Public funded non-profit association (since 1999),

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Workshop on the certification of e-voting systems Council of Europe Strasbourg, 26 November 2009

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  1. Workshop on the certification of e-voting systems Council of Europe Strasbourg, 26 November 2009 Certification of the e-voting software used at the Austrian Student Union elections 2009 Daniel Konrad

  2. About A-SIT • Public funded non-profit association (since 1999), • Established as competence center for IT-security • Members • Federal Ministry of Finance • OeNB (Austrian Central Bank) • Graz University of Technology Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  3. Activities • Technical evaluations • Confirmation body (Article 3(4) of EU-directive on el. signatures) • Inspection body (ISO 17020) • Advising the public sector on IT-security • e-government, e-health, … • Observing existing and emerging technologies • Cryptography, SmartCards, e-ID, etc. Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  4. A-SIT & e-voting • 2001: e-voting defined in laws • Austrian Student Union • Chamber of Commerce • Laws define that a confirmation body (signature law) has to certify the compliance with security requirements • Technology observation • Participation in CoE‘s multidisciplinary ad hoc group • Participation in Austrian working group on legal, technical and international aspects (Federal Ministry of Interior) Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  5. Certification Requirements • Law (2001): • Security level equal to qual. el. signatures, • Basic requirements (secrecy, identity verification, privacy, integrity, prevent overhasty casting of votes) • Ordinance (issued Oct. 2008): • Client & voting-server software to be certified 60 days before the election • Certification based on CoE Rec2004(11) • Right of access to source code & certification reports for electoral commission & observers Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  6. The Main Players • Federal Ministry of Science and Research • Responsible authority • Scytl • Software (pnyx-austria) • Federal Computing Centre • Operation, infrastructure • INSO (research group for industrial software at Vienna University of Technology) • Security-concepts, testing, etc. Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  7. Certification Procedure • Kick-off with main players in Dec. 2008 • Definition of timetable and requirements: • existing evaluation reports • no formal CC evaluation & certification • provided documentation should follow CC catalog • CC-based risk analysis of CoE Rec2004(11) Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  8. Provided documentation (developer evidence) • Security Compliance • Conformance between sec. functionalities & sec. objectives (based on CoE Rec) • Development: • Threat Analysis • Security Architecture • Functional Specification • Architectural Design • Guidance Documents • Deployment Guide Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  9. Provided documentation (developer evidence) • Life-Cycle Support • CMS documentation • ISO 90003 certification • Testing • Software development testing proofs • Vulnerability Analysis • penetration testing • Source code • Access to Scytl‘s bugzilla-system • Contact developers (Q&A) • View test results Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  10. Confirmation („Bescheinigung“) • issued and published on 27 March 2009 • detailed evaluation report available for electoral commission & observers • at source-code review event (8 Mai 2009) • one maintanance report (minor changes, issued 15 Mai 2009) Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  11. Constraints • Configuration of keylengthes • equal to requirements for qual. signatures • Client-PCs • free of malicious software • prevent residual information • Voting Server Software • audited compiling & installation • Electronic Ballot Box & Keys • handling in post-voting stage Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  12. Additional tasks • Auditing of security relevant procedures (together with certified IT professional engineer) • compiling • deployment • key ceremonies • pre-mixing • mixing • secure data destruction Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  13. Statistics • E-voting period: 18 May 2009 – 22 May 2009 • Paper: 26 May 2009 – 28 May 2009 • Eligible voters: 230.749 • Votes: 58.502 • „Eligible“ E-voters: ~14.000 • E-Votes: 2.161 • No security incidents or hacking attacks • some „unfriendly“ activities • „availability-check“ tool • Persiflage e-voting site Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  14. Lessons learned • CoE Rec2004(11) provided a good basis for our confirmation • Traceability of installation, compiling, etc. raised confidence of electoral authorities • A reuseable and broadly accepted certification of core functionalities would be very useful • Some residual risks could not be directly adressed (unsecure client PCs) • Public debate in Austria was much more fundamental than technical Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

  15. Thank you for your attention… Daniel Konraddaniel.konrad@a-sit.at Secure Information Technology Center AustriaWeyringergasse 35, A-1040 Wien, www.a-sit.at Strasbourg, 23 November 2009

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