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Computer-Mediated Communication. Collective Action and Public Goods. Public Good. The Tragedy of the “Commons”. Cornucopia of the Commons? (Bricklin 2001). Private versus Public Good. The Free-Rider Problem
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Computer-Mediated Communication Collective Action and Public Goods
Public Good Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
The Tragedy of the “Commons” Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Cornucopia of the Commons? (Bricklin 2001) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Private versus Public Good • The Free-Rider Problem Individual interests tend to make non-contribution tempting, especially if other people will do the work. In collective action, we can view this as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma (more on that in a moment…) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action “If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as a member of the community.” (Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp. 946-7) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Public Goods • Non-Rival Goods (Jointness of Supply) • Non-Excludability Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Fallacy of Individuals and Collectives See: Mancur Olson (1965)“The Logic of Collective Action” Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma The situation: 1) Each person has 2 options: cooperate or defect. 2) defection is the dominant strategy. 3) The dominant strategies (defection) intersect at a deficient equilibrium point. T > R > P > S Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Explaining Collective Action • Selective Incentives • Self-Interest Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Repeated Interactions in Public Goods and Collective Action • Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? Respect my authoritaah! Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1651) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
The Emergence of Cooperation • Consider two individuals who interact repeatedly over time • No mechanisms for enforceable commitments. • No way to be sure what the other will do on each ‘turn’. • No way to eliminate the other player or leave the interaction. • No way to change the other player’s payoffs. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Strategizing 101 Always defect! Always cooperate! Randomly cooperate! Do whatever your partner just did! Mostly cooperate, randomly defect! Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
Can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore
For Thursday… • No reading, but please try to show up on time so that we can get started ~ 12:40 • Problem Statements and Advising Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore