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CHINA

CHINA. “ There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep, for when he wakes, he will shake the world. - Napoleon Bonaparte. INTRODUCTION. AIM. To Suggest Strategies to Counter and Contain China’s Influence and Incursion into the Indian Ocean. SCOPE. China’s Grand Strategy

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CHINA

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  1. CHINA “ There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep, for when he wakes, he will shake the world. - Napoleon Bonaparte

  2. INTRODUCTION

  3. AIM To Suggest Strategies to Counter and Contain China’s Influence and Incursion into the Indian Ocean

  4. SCOPE • China’s Grand Strategy • Chinese Maritime Strategy • PLAN: • As Evolved Thus Far • Expansion Plans and Future Shape • Implications for India and Indian Navy • Counter Strategies

  5. Chinese Grand Strategy

  6. OBJECTIVES GRAND STRATEGY • Preservation of domestic order and well being • Defence against persistent external threats • Attainment of geopolitical influence as a major state.

  7. Orientation of Security Strategy • Maintenance of Internal Stability and Prosperity • Attainment of Chinese Pre-Eminence Along a Far Flung and Vulnerable Geographic Periphery

  8. Historical Context • Imperial Era • Tribes, Kingdoms, States • Political Entities in Japan, Taiwan, and SE Asia • Modern Era • Aggressive Imperial Powers • Highly Industrialized States

  9. CHINESE HEARTLAND

  10. CHINESE PERIPHERY

  11. Chinese Grand Strategy in Modern Era Hybrid ‘Weak-Strong’ Strategy • ‘Strong State’ : Efforts through Mil and Pol Means • ‘Weak State’ : High Level of Diplomatic Balance and Maneouvre

  12. Chinese Grand Strategy in Modern Era • Market-led economic growth • Amicable international political relations • Restraint in use of force • Modernize and incrementally streamline Chinese military • Expanded involvement in regional and global interstate politics and various international, multilateral fora ‘Calculative’ Strategy

  13. Will the Calculative Strategy Survive?

  14. Chinese Economy

  15. Chinese Political System

  16. PERSONALISTIC PATTERN OF RULE Derives from Power and Beliefs of Leaders Legal and Orgn Norms and Processes not much of a role RESOLUTION OFLEADERSHIP CONFLICT AND SUCCESSION Informal Process Of Contention among complex Patron-Client Alliances POLITICAL STRUCTURE

  17. NEW REGIME • Election Of Hu Jintao In Mid Mar 03 As President In Place Of Jiang Zemin • Orderly transition of power • Role of Jiang -Chief of the Central Military Commission supervision of defence and foreign policy • Pre-eminence Of Jiang Not Same As Deng • Hu's brief limited to domestic matters?

  18. IMPACT ON STABILITY? • No doubts on Deng’s control • Real division of power • Hu to resent constraints ? • Lack of congruence between responsibility and actual power

  19. POLICY-TERRITORIAL DISPUTES • Pursues a good-neighbour policy • Peripheral areas important for Chinese security • Incapable of altering structure of relations without further increase in relative power

  20. Disputes with Russia, Japan, Vietnam, and India Date back to colonial era Current disputed territories insignificant compared to historic holdings Central Asia, Vietnam, Mongolia and large portions of the Russian far east Acceptance of borders inherited in 1949 POLICY-TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

  21. Russia- border area West of Mongolia India- Aksai chin, status of McMahon line and Arunachal Pradesh in East South China Sea-SouthEast Asian states have claims on the Spratly islands Japan, over the Senkakus Taiwan Current Disputes

  22. Two-pronged approach Resolve it amicably to pursue its larger goals Border disputes settled to facilitate pol/ mil reqts Indefinite postponement of the basic issue India, Japan, and ASEAN states. May change in future ? Settling boundary disputes

  23. Threat Appreciation – Calculative Strategy • Natural longevity of strategy largely a function of long-term economic, military, and domestic political developments • As per present trends by 2015-2020 China could work towards a new security strategy

  24. Collapse of China? Unlikely that China's political, economic, and social order will disintegrate into chaos Unlikely that a more cooperative China will emerge during this period Can China Survive the Calculative Strategy? An Assertive China seems almost imminent

  25. Augment its military commensurate with its increased power Develop sphere of influence Acquiring new allies Underwriting protection of others Acquire new or reclaim old territory for China's resources Redress past wrongs it believes it may have suffered Attempt to rewrite prevailing "rules of the game" to better reflect own interests READY ITSELF TO THWART PREVENTIVE WAR OR TO LAUNCH PREDATORY ATTACKS ON ITS FOES. Elements of An Assertive China

  26. CHINAS MARITIME STRATEGY

  27. EVOLUTION • LAND AS PRIMARY SEA AS SECONDARY • EQUAL CONSIDERATION TO LAND & SEA • STRATEGIC FOCUS TO SEA • COASTAL DEFENCE TO ACTIVE OFFSHORE DEFENCE

  28. PLAN STRATEGY(1949 – 1960) • YOUNG SCHOOL - SOVIET NAVAL ADVISORS & GEN XIAO • COASTAL DEFENCE – SMALL SURFACE CRFT & SUBMARINES • DEFENSIVE, INEXPENSIVE, QUICKLY MANNED & TRAINED • BROWN WATER DEFENSIVE STRATEGY • NUCLEAR WEAPONE & SUBMARINES

  29. PLAN STRATEGY(1960 – 1976) • RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS & US • LARGE GROUND FORCES SUPPLEMENTED BY COASTAL NAVY • GORSHKOV’S THINKING • SEABORNE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

  30. PLAN STRATEGY(1980 – 2050) • LIU HUAQING’S VISION • OFFSHORE ACTIVE DEFENCE • STUBBORN DEFENCE • MOBILE WARFERE • GUERILLA ATTACKS • FIRST ISLAND CHAIN – 150 TO 500 NM BY 2000 • SECOND ISLAND CHAIN – 1350 TO 1500 NM BY 2020 • GLOBAL MARITIME FORCE BY 2050 1st Is CHAIN 2nd Is CHAIN

  31. CHINAS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES • REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN • CLAIMS ON SOUTH CHINA SEA • SEABASED DETERRENCE AGAINST US, RUSSIA, JAPAN & INDIA • PROTECTION OF SLOCS • DIPLOMATIC FORCE

  32. EMERGING PLAN • IMPROVED MR, PRECISE TARGETTING & WEAPON-SENSOR INTEGRATION • INCREASED LETHALITY • INCREASED MOBILITY • IMPROVED PROTECTIVE & SURVIVAL • EW • ALL DIMENSIONAL NAVAL WARFARE

  33. MAJOR HURDLES • US WITHDRAWAL • JAPANESE MARITIME SUPERIORTY • BUDGETITARY CONSTRAINTS • TECHNOLOGICAL & INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE • OVERALL GRAND STRATEGY • AIRCOVER AT SEA • ASW & AAW • LOGISTIC BACKUP • AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY

  34. HOW DOES CHINA MEASURE UP? • INCREASED ATTENTION TO TRAINING • MODERNISATION FOCUS • NATIONMAL SCIENTIC & INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE • DOCTRINE & TACTICS – JOINT OPS • INTELLIGENCE • NATIONAL LEADERSHIP

  35. CHINA’S INTEREST IN INDIAN OCEAN

  36. Quest For Oil • Oil Catalyst for conflict • Early 1980s predictions of China as potential oil power? • Could meet needs of its rapidly expanding market ? • Could export surplus to neighbors, especially Japan?

  37. Quest For Oil • 1989 reports 130 billion barrels (bb) in the Spratly island region • Compares with 112 bb in Iraq • Yet to be independently confirmed

  38. Quest for Oil • Production 672 MTOE • Consumption 677 MTOE Consumption 67% 50 % Million Barrels per Day 36% Demand

  39. Energy Security • Bulk oil imports from Middle East and SE Asia • Iran • Iraq • Saudi Arabia • Syria • Libya • Safety of SLOCs and choke points paramount Middle East South East

  40. Energy Security • Strategic Choke points • Straits of Malacca and Hormuz • Gulf of Aden and Suez canal • Islands in South China Sea • 15% of world trade through Malacca strait Suez Hormuz Islands S China Sea Gulf of Aden Malacca • 50% of world oil through Hormuz to West via Suez canal. • Large vessels of of 160000 DWT transit through Hormuz

  41. Energy Security • Accords strategic importance to Myanmar, Maldives and Pakistan • Consolidates position in region by close ties with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh • Strategic encirclement of India IRAN Pakistan Maldives Saudi Arabia Bangladesh Iraq Myanmar

  42. Myanmar • Developed • Roads • Communication & intelligence network • Military bases • Reconnaissance/Electronic Surveillance in Great Coco Island • Ability to mount maritime contingency affecting SLOCs

  43. Maldives • New entrant in Chinese security calculations • Acquired basing facility at Marao • Strategic interest to • Monitor US activities at Diego Garcia • Indian Naval activities

  44. Pakistan • Building Gwadar deep draft port • EDC Mar 05 • Cost $ 248 million • $ 178 mill aid by China • Accommodate 100,000 & 200,000 DWT oil & cargo vessels respectively • Transshipment of cargo/gas from/to CAR & Xingjian province in China

  45. Pakistan • Strategic aim of Gwadar: • Watching SLOCs • Monitoring US Naval activities in Persian gulf • Monitoring Indian naval activities in Arabian Sea

  46. Iran • Supplied Weapons of Mass Destruction including Silkworm missiles • Foot hold in Iranian port Bandar Abbas • Could assist Iran develop nuclear capability

  47. Saudi Arabia/Gulf Countries • Exploiting deteriorating US – Saudi relations post 11 Sep • Branded `` Kernel of Evil’’ by Rand Corp , American think tank • Consolidating position in Gulf & Saudi Arabia

  48. Saudi Arabia/Gulf Countries • Trade increased • from $ 5 billion in 1995 • to $ 10.2 billion in 2000 • Saudi Arabia a major investor in China • China Supplied 120 units of DF-3 ballistic missiles to Saudis

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