One view of the war . . .

1. One view of the war . . . • “It’s really a tragic problem . . . The hatred between all three groups – the Bosnians, the Serbs, and the Croations – is almost unbelievable. It’s almost terrifying, and it’s centuries old. That really is a problem from hell.” - Warren Christopher, Secretary of State under President Clinton

2. Geography and Demographics • 6 republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovinia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia • 2 autonomous regions in Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo

3. Geography and Demographics • Many ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc. • Serbs largest in country, but not majority • Complications: boundaries of ethnic groups not the same as boundaries of republics!

4. Geography and Demographics

5. Geography and Demographics

6. Ancient History • Prior to WWI: Area dominated by Austro-Hungarian (in NW) and Ottoman (in SE) Empires. • No history of fighting, groups not enemies. • At times, groups cooperated to oppose foreign occupying powers.

7. First Yugoslav State • Formed at the end of WWI. • Marriage of convenience, entered into willingly by all parties.

8. First Yugoslav State • BIG challenges: • Economic • Political: what would this new state look like? • Serbs: wanted strong, centralized state to protect Serb minority populations in other regions. • Others: wanted decentralized state to protect against Serb domination.

9. First Yugoslav State • Solution: a strong, centralized state • Serb preferences won out (this time). • Other groups not happy, but try to work together to iron out problems.

10. WWII • Hitler invades Yugoslavia in 1941 • Installs puppet regimes in Serbia and Croatia. • Croat state (Ustasha): cleanse Croatia of Serbs. • Serb paramilitaries (Chetniks) organize and fight Ustasha. • Horrific fighting, bitter memories. Irony: Ustasha not popularly chosen.

11. WWII • Tito and the Partisans • Communists. • Integrating force. • Fought with Allies • Fought civil war against Ustasha and Chetniks • Won, took power at close of WWII

12. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Inherited a tough situation: • Economic devastation • Bitter memories of civil war • Demographic snake pit: what to do about Serbia?

13. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Use the CP as an integrating force. • Promote ideology of growth and development. • Stomp out nationalism. • Not a democracy. Dissent and opposition not tolerated. CP only game in town. • Rely on personal popularity and charisma.

14. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Give republics autonomy over own affairs, veto power over central decisions. • Make Vojvodina and Kosovo autonomous regions, give them veto power also. • Consociationalism: keep the power of the largest group (Serbs) in check.

15. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Happy Days: • Country experienced economic growth into the 1970s. • Peace! • But: costs of stifling alternative political voices, vacuum when Tito died.

16. Post-Tito • 1980s: Economic slowdown, population distressed, unhappy. • CP bureaucrats paralyzed by crisis: • What was good for one region was bad for another. • Regions used veto in Federal Presidency to block any policy that hurt them. • Stalemate!

17. Post Tito • Political crisis also: • Serbian leaders unhappy about status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. • Tried to address problem legally, but were blocked by veto power of other republics. • Deadlock!

18. Moves by Serbia • Serb politicians look for way around the deadlock: appeal to Serb grievances in Kosovo. • Kosovo: historical significance to Serbs. • Serbs a minority in Kosovo (largely for economic reasons), felt discriminated against. • Politicians: Serbs are being run out of their homeland! (exaggerated claim, but effective).

19. Moves by Serbia • Enter Slobodan Milosevic • 1988: President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolic, sends Milosevic to Kosovo to hear out the complaints of the Kosovo Serbs • Was supposed to stick to CP anti-nationalist line.

20. Moves by Serbia • Instead, took the side of the nationalists. • Famous words, addressing crowd: “You will not be beaten again.”

21. Moves by Serbia • “Rallies for Truth” • Orchestrated by politicians • Demanded end of autonomy of Vijvodina and Kosovo • Dramatized situation of Serbs in Kosovo • Non-Serb leaders continue to refuse to negotiate with Milosevic.

22. Moves by Serbia • Milosevic topples leaders in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro, installs men loyal to him. • Radical effect on balance of power in Yugoslavia: Milosevic now controls 4 out of 8 votes in the Federal Presidency.

23. Response of Slovenia and Croatia • Leaders of Slovenia and Croatia very nervous, set about trying to weaken the federal authority of Yugoslav state. • Slovenia: • Backed Albanian resistance in Kosovo • Refused to allow rally for truth • Pulled out of Yugoslav CP

24. Response of Slovenia and Croatia • Croatia: • At first: try to broker compromise, preserve Yugoslavia • Strategy changed abruptly with election of Franjo Tudjman in May 1990.

25. Response of Slovenia and Croatia • Tudjman and cronies: provocative nationalists. • Checkerboard flag. • Serbs: secondary minority status. • Talked big about taking Croatia out of Yugoslavia.

26. Escalation • Serb minority in Croatia: scared. Fears played up by Serb politicians. • Summer 1990: Serbs in Krajina (area of Croatia) armed themselves and declared self-rule. • Tudjman: formed own paramilitaries

27. Escalation • June 1991: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. • Serbia lets Slovenia go without fight.

28. Escalation • Not so Croatia. Serbia, plus Yugoslav National Army (JNA), fight to keep it in. • Large-scale war erupts in Croatia. Fighting spread from there to Bosnia.

29. Implications for Ethnicity Theories • Contrary to expectations of Primordialism, war in Yugoslavia not the result of ancient hatreds. Peace, not conflict, was norm. • And yet, the population responded quickly to the provocations of politicians. Hard for instrumentalism to explain why. • Also difficult for instrumentalism: the brutality and emotion of the fighting.

30. Implications for Conflict Theories • Yes, grievances existed. However, they were nothing new. Why did they suddenly flower into conflict? Societal explanations important, but insufficient.

31. Implications for Conflict Theories • Politicians played a critical role: whipped up emotions, initiated conflict. • At national level, change in political leadership important: Tito suppressed nationalism, his successors encouraged it.

32. Implications for Conflict Theories • But also key: the weakness of the Yugoslav state after Tito. • Communist Party: unable to cope with challenges. • Veto power of republics => deadlock. • State unable to contain nationalist politicians, gave them critical window of opportunity.

33. For the rest of the course… • How do we explain democratic stability? Why is democracy the “only game in town” in some countries but not others? • Different answers: • Level of economic development • Culture • Institutions

34. And culture is? • Political culture = the set of attitudes, beliefs, and norms held by a population toward politics.

35. And culture is? • Attitudes = dispositions towards politics (political leaders, events, institutions, governments, policies, etc.). • Examples: support for the government, tolerance for opposing view points, trust in political institutions, feelings of political efficacy and so on.

36. And culture is? • Beliefs: cognitive ideas about cause and effect. • Example: the “domino theory” in the 1950s.

37. And culture is? • Norms: evaluative ideas about the world, judgments about good and bad. • Example: “Democracy is good.”

38. Liberalism • Liberalism arose in Western Europe response to feudalism, which was very hierarchical and involved very little social mobility. • Feudalism = individuals at the mercy of the social hierarchy. • Liberalism = individuals over social hierarchy.

39. Liberalism’s Key Norms • The protection of individual rights from powerful groups and governments. • Competition and disagreement versus harmony and consensus. • Tolerance of dissent rather than unanimity. • Egalitarianism over hierarchy. • Society should have a separate, protected realm from the state.

40. Liberalism and democracy • Historically, liberalism was a precedent to democracy in Western Europe and the US. • This has lead some to see liberalism as a necessary condition for democracy.

41. Liberalism and democracy • Why? • Norms like egalitarianism and tolerance of dissent may improve the quality of competition. • Emphasis on individual rights may make majority rule less frightening for minorities.

42. Huntington’s cultural argument • Samuel Huntington: liberal norms are associated with some religions (Protestantism) but not others (Catholicism, Confucianism, Islam). • No democracy where these “non-liberal” religions are found.

43. Huntington’s cultural argument • Catholicism: hierarchical, emphasizes a single, collective good. Values harmony and consensus. • Confucianism: authority, hierarchy, responsibility, harmony. Sees conflict as dangerous. Merges state and society. • Islam: rejects separation of religion and state.

44. Huntington’s cultural argument: problems • Religions and cultures are dynamic, not static. • All religions have aspects that conform with liberal norms and others that contradict them. • Consensus building may be as important to democracy as competition. • And the empirical record is bad!

45. Liberalism and Democracy • Do we throw the baby out with the bathwater? • Even if we do not buy Huntington, perhaps specific liberal norms – eg. tolerance – none-the-less matter for democratic consolidation?

46. Political Tolerance in Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and South Africa

47. Liberalism and Democracy • But what comes first, the chicken or the egg? Democracy or liberalism, liberalism or democracy? Can living in a healthy democracy teach people to be liberal? • More generally: correlation is not the same as causation! Just because x and y are often found together, doesn’t mean x causes y. Maybe y causes x?

48. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba • Two components: • A participatory attitude toward politics. Individuals value participation and become involved in their communities (not just their own narrow self interest). Communities therefore have a rich associational life. • Trust in other people and a willingness to cooperate.

49. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba • In contrast to “Amoral Familism.” • All loyalty and trust is centered in the family. • People are not public-spirited: they don’t participate in community life, are not informed about politics, etc. • No trust of “outsiders,” no willingness to cooperate. • Maximize material, short-run advantage of family. • Communities lack much associational life.

50. The Civic Culture: Almond &Verba • Hypothesis: • Civic Culture => Stable Democracy • Amoral Familism => Unstable Democracy