An Example of Applied Research

1. An Example of Applied Research Reducing Crime Through Street Closures

2. Does Reducing Street Access Reduce Crime? • Used by numerous cities in an effort to reduce crime in high crime areas. • Has important policy and practice implication for policing • If asked-what would you advise about closing streets? • What is your experience with closing streets to control and reduce crime?

3. What Does Research Reveal About Street Access and Crime? • Offenders find targets in familiar territory. • Offenders are quick to recognize a closely knit neighborhood and the presence of people who might notice them. • Burglars avoid cul-de-sacs and prefer corner sites where neighbors are less likely to see them.

4. What Does Research Reveal About Street Access and Crime? Reducing through-traffic by closing streets or alleys means: • Criminal outsiders are less likely to be familiar with the area; • Residents learn who doesn’t belong in the neighborhood, which helps them keep watch near their homes; • Residents committing crime in their own neighborhood cannot easily blame outsiders and thus deflect suspicion from themselves;

5. What Does Research Reveal About Street Access and Crime? Reducing through-traffic by closing streets or alleys means: • Burglars cannot so easily gain access to properties, especially from alleys behind houses; • Escape routes for robbers are blocked off; and • Drive-by shootings are prevented because cars cannot easily enter a street, or because they have to backtrack to escape, exposing them to retaliation.

6. How Should You Meet the Concerns of Those Who Oppose Street/Alley Closures? • Residents • Nearby neighborhoods • City Officials and Essential Service Providers (sanitation, fire, EMS) • The public at large, the media, and politicians

7. How Should You Meet the Concerns of Those Who Oppose Closures?

8. The SARA Process and Street Closures • Identify and Select the Problem Area • Analyzing the Problem • Getting Support • Implementing the Closures • Assessing Effectiveness

9. Analyzing the Problem • Are the neighborhood’s boundaries clearly defined? • Is there reliable data about types of crime or disorder that are the concern? • What proportion of crimes are committed by outsiders? • How do they reach the neighborhood (by car or on foot)? • Do you know whether they go to the neighborhood specifically to commit crimes, or whether they just do so when passing through?

10. Analyzing the Problem • How much crime will the barriers prevent? • What are the alternatives to street closures (e.g., CCTV, neighborhood watch, crackdowns, target-hardening)? • Why could these alternatives not adequately substitute for closures?

11. Getting Support • Is there support from police district commanders, the chief, and other key city officials (e.g., traffic engineer)? • Is there a clear mandate from residents and elected representatives to proceed? • Are residents content with the barriers’ appearance? • Are there resident concerns about neighborhood stigmatization? • Who will have keys (if keys are needed)? • What about the concerns of nearby communities about displaced traffic and crime?

12. Getting Support • Are there concerns from emergency service providers (fire, ambulance, and police)? • Is the plan acceptable to garbage pickup, snow removal, and mail delivery service providers? • Does the plan accommodate any special needs of public transport or school buses serving the neighborhood? • Will the plan avoid excessive difficulties for delivery and cab drivers? • Is the local media briefed about the need for closures? • Is there a plan for dealing with public opposition?

13. Implementing the Closures • How many streets and/or alleys will be closed? • Is there a map showing where the closures will be made? • Is there an explanation regarding the effect on neighborhood access and traffic patterns? • What kind of barriers will be installed? • How much will the barriers cost?

14. Implementing the Closures • How long will it take to install the barriers once agreement has been reached? • Who will install the barriers? • Does the plan include a trial period? If so, is it long enough to assess the closures’ effect on crime? • How will it be decided whether to make the closures permanent? • Does the plan ensure that any legal requirements for implementing closures can be met?

15. Assessing Effectiveness • Is it possible to compare neighborhood crime or disorder before the closures with that after the closures? • Will the before-and-after time periods be comparable? • Is it possible to directly compare the proportions of crime committed by outsiders in the before-and-after periods?

16. Assessing Effectiveness • Is it possible to compare before-and-after crime trends in the neighborhood with those in nearby neighborhoods? • Is it possible to examine possible displacement/diffusion? • Is it possible to estimate barrier cost-effectiveness?

17. How Effective Are Street and Alley Closures?

18. How Effective Are Street and Alley Closures?

19. How Effective Are Street and Alley Closures?

20. An Example of Applied Research One Versus Two Officer Patrol Units

21. Deployment of One-Versus Two Officer Patrol Units-Research to Answer Practical Questions • Are there differences in response travel time for one versus two officer units? • Are two officer units more effective at reducing crime than one officer units? • Do two officer units generate more citizen complaints or fewer citizen complaints than one officer units? • Do two officer units result in greater use of force when compared to one officer units? • Are one or two car units more cost effective?

22. Research Findings • One study found that one-officer units were safer and more cost-effective • But, another study found that two-officer units were safer, cost less since there half as many patrol cars needed, and better quality service since most calls required two officers on the scene • Another study found that one-officer units put twice as many units into the field –increasing visibility, preventive patrol time, great area covered by patrols • Still another study recommended using a mixture of one and two officer units during day shifts and two officer units during night shifts

23. Applied Research-–Prosecutors

24. Applied Research for Prosecutors • What types of cases have highest and lowest rates of successful prosecution and what explains these differences? • Do these results suggest a need for more training, better investigations by the police, or other changes in policy/practice? • Over time, have there been changes in rates of successful prosecution of crimes such as homicide, sexual assault, domestic violence? • If so, what might account for these changes? • If not, what changes in policies/practices might increase rates?

25. Question: Are specialized prosecution units more “effective” than non-specialized units? • Advocates argue that assigning cases to specialized units makes sense in cases—such as sexual assault, domestic violence, and cases involving gang members—with reluctant or fearful victims and complex evidentiary issues • Prosecutor will have a greater understanding of evidentiary issues common to these types of cases and will be better able to manage the victims and witnesses whose testimony will be needed to obtain a conviction. • Also, prosecutors who specialize are able to develop skills needed to successfully prosecute these types of cases

26. Research Findings • Very limited research on effectiveness • Specialized unit for sexual assaults • Study of two jurisdictions—one with a specialized unit and one without such a unit—found no differences in likelihood that charges would be filed; but jurisdiction with specialized unit more likely to take cases to trial rather than settle through plea bargaining

27. Research Findings • Specialized Domestic Violence Units • Study of a specialized domestic violence unit found no differences in dismissal rate, conviction rate, or sentence length (compared to DV cases not handled by the unit) • Specialized Units for Gang-Related Crimes • Operation Hardcore—Los Angles County DA’s Office • Tasked with prosecuting serious violent crimes involving hardcore gang members • Study found that gang cases screened by the non-specialized unit were more than 4 times more likely than those screened by the specialized unit to be rejected for prosecution

28. Applied Research for Courts/Judges • Are convicted offenders receiving sentences that are proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the offender? • Why are cases dismissed by the judge after the prosecutor has filed charges? • witness or victim intimidation,failureto appear for trial, length of time between filing charges and taking the case to court, evidence seized by illegal means • Why are cases dismissed by the judge after the prosecutor has filed charges? • witness or victim intimidation, failure to appear for trial, length of time between filing charges and taking the case to court, evidence seized by illegal means • How long does it take to adjudicate various types of cases? Where are the bottlenecks? • Do citizens trust the courts to do justice? To treat all defendants fairly and without prejudice?

29. Question: Failure to Appear • In what percentage of cases do defendants fail to appear for court appearances? How can courts reduce the FTA rate? • Does reminding defendants of date/time of court appearance reduce FTA rate and does the nature of the reminder matter?

30. Research Findings • Experimental study in which defendants were assigned to one of four conditions • No reminder • Reminder with date/time/place of court hearing • Reminder that also includes negative consequences of not appearing • Reminder that also includes both negative consequences of not appearing and positive consequences of appearing

31. Research Findings • FTA rate was 12.6% for those who received no reminder and 8.4% for those who received one of three reminders • FTA rate also reduced for those who received one of two reminders with consequences (compared to those who received reminder with date/time/place only)