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What is Geopolitics?. Science dealing with political, economic and strategic equations between countries defined by geography (and geology)Links and causal relationships between political power and geographic (geological) spaceEnergy geopolitics refers to the defining role of energy in shaping political, economic and strategic relationships between nations.
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1. Geopolitics of EnergyIndia Energy ForumNew Delhi July 31, 2008 Sudha Mahalingam
Member, Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board
Member, National Security Advisory Board Sudha Mahalingam 1
2. What is Geopolitics? Science dealing with political, economic and strategic equations between countries defined by geography (and geology)
Links and causal relationships between political power and geographic (geological) space
Energy geopolitics refers to the defining role of energy in shaping political, economic and strategic relationships between nations Sudha Mahalingam 2
3. Factors affecting energy geopolitics Geology
Geography
Degree of Import dependence
Resource Curse
Peak Oil Pessimism
Security of Transit Routes
Political Power
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4. The Haves Traditional players: US, Canada, Middle East, Soviet Union
New players: Africa, Southeast Asia, Caspian
Is Resource Curse aggravating?
53 countries have >5% GDP from mineral exports
Half of them>20% of GDP from mineral exports
Half of OPEC members poorer now than they were in the 1970s. Algeria & Nigeria unraveling
1/3 of all civil wars in oil producing countries – Algeria, Columbia, Sudan, Iraq;
Inequality trap (Malaysia, Botswana, Chile exceptions)
Secessionist conflict in Southern Thailand, Niger Delta
Why does energy breed conflict between and within countries?
Dutch disease – other exports decline. No fiscal discipline, profligate spending on new capital cities (Kazakh, Nigeria, Myanmar), islands etc
Buy rich friends (Beijing) to block UN sanctions Sudha Mahalingam 4
5. Oil as Weapon
No disruptions in the history of oil except for the Arab embargo of 1973 following Yom Kippur war
Sanctions disrupt supplies – Iran, Libya, Syria, Myanmar, Sudan together drive out 6 mbd of oil
Can oil be used as a weapon?
Fungibility blunts the weapon, but tight demand-supply equilibrium could sharpen it
Will Arab states enforce embargo if Iran is attacked by US? Sudha Mahalingam 5
6. The Have-nots Consumption & Imports-2007 USA - 20.6 mbd (23.9%); 10 mbd (48.5%)
China – 7.8 mbd (9.5%); 3.2 mbd (41%)
Japan – 5.1 mbd (6%) ; 4.2 mbd (82.3%)
South Korea – 2.5 mbd (3%) 2.46 mbd (97%)
Germany – 2.39 mbd (2.8%);
India - 2.74 mbd (3.3%); 1.8 mbd (65.6%) (Source: BP)
Acute sense of vulnerability, Perceptions, paramount
Asia emerging as demand heartland Sudha Mahalingam 6
7. Source of Asia’s Crude Imports Sudha Mahalingam 7
8. Why do we believe peak is nigh?-1 Geology of hard minerals - Oil deposits are discrete
World has already consumed 875 bn bbl (>50% acc USGS)
Last major discovery (supergiant) in 1967
Quantum leaps in exploration tech in 1980s and 1990s
Price increases no longer accompanied by substantial new finds. $8bn E&P inv produced only $4bn NPV
Consumption growth outpaces reserve growth since 1980. Now only 20% of demand growth met by new reserves (IEA).
2% increase in demand vs 3% decline in production (Cheney)
OPEC production declining; non-OPEC dwindling
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9. Why do we believe peak is nigh? - 2 Many Indications
Shell downgraded reserves by 35% in 2004
Ghawar (Matthew Simmons) Field-wise Saudi data unavailable; not a public company
OPEC reserve claims questioned
Depletion of North Sea oil (Britain – 1999, Norway -2001)
Indonesia to exit OPEC; Net importer
Offshore production now >50%
Caspian reserves less than anticipated
(4500 tonnes of sulphur daily in Tengiz)
M&A and ‘Big oil’ cannibalism
(BP-Amoco, Chev-Texaco-Unocal, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon-Mbl, Philips-Conoco)
Sudha Mahalingam 9 December 1998: BP and Amoco merge;
April 1999: BP-Amoco and Arco agree to merge;
December 1999: Exxon and Mobil merge;
October 2000: Chevron and Texaco agree to merge;
November 2001: Phillips and Conoco agree to merge;
September 2002: Shell acquires Penzoil-Quaker State;
February 2003: Frontier Oil and Holly agree to merge;
March 2004: Marathon acquires 40% of Ashland;
April 2004: Westport Resources acquires Kerr-McGee;
July 2004: Analysts suggest BP and Shell merge;
April 2005: Chevron-Texaco and Unocal merge;
June 2005: Royal Dutch and Shell merge;
July 2005: China begins trying to acquire Unocal
December 1998: BP and Amoco merge;
April 1999: BP-Amoco and Arco agree to merge;
December 1999: Exxon and Mobil merge;
October 2000: Chevron and Texaco agree to merge;
November 2001: Phillips and Conoco agree to merge;
September 2002: Shell acquires Penzoil-Quaker State;
February 2003: Frontier Oil and Holly agree to merge;
March 2004: Marathon acquires 40% of Ashland;
April 2004: Westport Resources acquires Kerr-McGee;
July 2004: Analysts suggest BP and Shell merge;
April 2005: Chevron-Texaco and Unocal merge;
June 2005: Royal Dutch and Shell merge;
July 2005: China begins trying to acquire Unocal
10. When will oil peak? Most optimistic forecasts – 2025
Paul Roberts
Mathew Simmons – 2007-09
Hirsch Study - 2025
Deffeyes & King Hubbert - 2009
World Energy Council – After 2010
Campbell - 2010
CERA – 2017 (800 oilfields studied)
BP- Can go upto 100 mbd. No peak (Peter Davies, Chief Econ)
Yergin – Plateau in 2040 or 2050
EIA – 2016
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11. Trade Routes 1.9 billion tons of petro products or 62% through tankers, rest through pipelines, trains or trucks
30 mbd flow thru Hormuz and Malacca
Saudi pipeline to Yanbu on Red Sea: 4.8 mbd
1983 Tanker War – only 2% affected
Blocking Hormuz would block Iran’s gasoline imports Sudha Mahalingam 11
12. Geopolitics of Energy -1US Policy post 9/11 “For too long our nation has been dependent on foreign oil. And this dependence
leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists – who could
cause huge disruptions of oil shipments, and raise the price of oil, and do
great harm to our economy”. State of the Union address by Bush in 2007
US: 5% of world population, 25% of world energy consumption
Total global oil consumption: 85 mbd
The single largest consumer – 21 mbd Energy Profligacy difficult to contain/reverse
Funding both sides of the war in Iraq? Wahabis, Hezbollah, Al qaida
US Energy Policy Act 2005 – Tax breaks, Diversification, Federalization
Drilling in the Arctic (90 bnbl oil, 1670 tcf gas, 144 bn bl natgas liquids)
Rethink on nuclear energy(20,000 mw), corn to ethanol
Imports from Gulf, 22%(Canada, S.Arabia, Venezuela ,Mexico & Nigeria make up 62% of US imports
US troops out of Saudi Arabia – no longer buddies?
Military Bases in Central Asia – Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan???
BTC, Nabucco pipelines to ferry oil and gas from Central Asia
US turning away from West Asian suppliers Sudha Mahalingam 12
13. Geopolitics of Energy - 2Rise of the Russian Petrostate 5%(or is it more?) of Global Oil Reserves
11 mbd production in 2007. Largest producer in the world
>12.9% of Global Oil Production; 7 mbd exported
32% of Global Gas Reserves (Gulf 39%)
670 bcm gas Production in 2006. 40% exported
Importance of Energy in Russia’s Economy
40% of GDP,60% of Export Income,40% of Tax Revenues, Low Domestic Prices Incentivise Exports,Oil Revenues Fuel Economic Boom
Energy-fascism – Energy as Patrimony and Instrument of foreign policy – Heads I win, tails you lose
Yukos, Sakhalin-2, Shtokman, Gazprom’s growing monopoly
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14. Geopolitics of Energy -2Rise of the Russian Petrostate (contd)
Infrastructure Determines Destination
Europe, the Biggest Beneficiary – Black Sea & Baltic terminals, CPC, Baltic Pipeline System for oil. Bluestream, Nordstream and South Stream for gas Germany & Greece breaking ranks with rest of EU? Nabucco and South Stream compete with each other.
Japan to get oil & LNG from Sakhalin - 2. Now Oil Pipeline from Tayshet to the Pacific ESPO – Looking Beyond.
China Gets Oil in Railway Tankers, possibly LNG from Kovykta and piped gas from Sakhalin-1
S.Korea a possible beneficiary
By 2030, >50% of Europe’s gas needs to be supplied by Russia
Russia to supply lion’s share of incremental energy demand – of Europe, Northeast Asia
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15. Geopolitics of Energy -3The Caspian Darkhorse? Sea or Lake?
Caspian as big as North Sea
(15-40 bbl to 70-150 bbl - IEA) 5 to 6 mbd production capacity –
3-5% of world supply now. Maximum 10% of global supply by 2030
The elephant fields
Tengiz, Karachaganak & Kashagan
(9-18 bbls of oil, 1.2 Tcm of gas)
Energy Charter Treaty
History & Geography determine transportation routes, but new ones planned.
BTC operational -1 mbd 2010
Now Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline
Nabucco gas pipeline (3300 km, 30 bcm/y) from Central Asia to Austria
Caspian no longer the dark horse –out of the box solutions for tapping Caspian oil
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16. Geopolitics of Energy - 4Enter the Dragon – The Rise & Rise of China GDP growing around 9.5%
7.8 mbd of oil in 2007; Projected to increase to 11 mbd by 2020 acc NDRC (IEA=12 mbd)
50% imported; Oil imports growing at 7.5%
Building SPR
Aggressively acquiring oil acreages -15% to come from overseas acreages
Oil Industry Restructuring, Price Reforms
Diplomatic, Strategic, Political Initiatives
Oil pipeline to Yunnan from Sittwe (2380 kms)
West-east gas pipeline, Shwe-Yunnan gas pipeline, LNG projects
Quantum jumps in trade with Middle East ($20b in 2005 to $135 bn in 2006)
Devt of Gwadar and Sittwe ports
Emerging Non-GCC Options to supply China’s incremental demand Sudha Mahalingam 16
17. Geopolitics of Energy – 5Kyoto & Its Implications Kyoto clock ticking away for EU
Combustion, the biggest polluter
(coal-based generation & oil refining=83% of CO2)
Kyoto, Asia and Life after 2012
Nuclear as a clean fuel option?
Coal to drive Asian economies
Gas competing with nuclear, coal in Asia
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18. Transparency Initiatives EITI 2002 – 24 signatories. But compliance voluntary
PWYP also publish what you pump
National Resources Charter –credit ratings
Barter trade for infrastructure? Sudha Mahalingam 18
19. Energy Independence Neither feasible nor necessary
Two thirds of oil and a quarter of gas consumed in the world supplied by imports. No disruptions in the history of oil
Countries cannot carve out protected supply through bilateral contracts
Are foreign supplies more risky than domestic supplies? What about local disruptions?
Can there be local energy security without global energy security? If the global markets fail, can one country be secure?
For suppliers, national independence is linked to allowing global players access to their energy sources through the market. Interdependence is ineluctable Sudha Mahalingam 19
20. Unscrambling Risks Most risks are local, not global especially in gas and electricity, but also for oil - Katrina
Diversification of supply will mitigate risk only when supply disruption is localised and there is spare capacity elsewhere.
Overseas oil equity may mitigate risks if one is also operator?
SPR will mitigate risk only when disruption is of short duration
Reducing energy use through efficiency measures will reduce all risks considerably
Distributed generation will confine risks to localised users
Ability to switch fuels will mitigate risk of supply disruption to some extent
Policing SLOCs could mitigate disruption
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21. Mitigating energy risks Short-term risks – Operational responses
Medium term risks – Capital investments
Long-term risks – Structural Changes in economy Sudha Mahalingam 21