IPB in Counterinsurgency Part III Threat Analysis- Insurgency Fundamentals

6. (Discuss this slide but don�t cover DIME, etc� unless asked the questions.) Here�s the house structure in a diagram. This is how we do the top down purpose driven analysis. (Click) At the top is the enemy�s desired endstate (strategic). (Click) (Use this slide to cover the model but don�t get into DIME and such unless you�re asked the question.) The next line is operationally how they�re going to do it. We use Political, Military, Social, and Economic (PMSE) blocks in our model. These are what we call the Lines of Operation (LOO) of the enemy. Many here believe in different lines of operation. Some like the DIME method, others PMSEII, some use Gen Casey�s, and others develop their own. Those are fine but remember that these are the ENEMY�s LOO. Therefore, they will not conflict with your LOO�s, as you choose them. (Click) These LOO�s can be derived from any society- political, strategic (military), social, and economic pillars. The LOO�s are derived from societal norms, whether that society lives at the state level or non state level. (Instructor: There are some contrasting examples and explanations that support the use of PMSE vice DIME, PMSEII, and others. Don�t use this unless it helps the students understand.) This enemy does not worry about diplomatic infrastructure, etc�. Thus we go back to using the basic societal pillars as TRIGGERS that allow us to analyze how they may try to achieve their endstate. The enemy does use information operation (psychological) but it is not a separate line. The psychological operations (I/O campaign) will exist in every facet of their four main lines of operation. In future slides we will demonstrate how they do this. In this example, we see that based on their political endstate, their lines of operation may look like this (use chart on slide or wall): politically they will disrupt elections; or militarily they will interdict MNF-I forces moving on MSR Tampa; or socially they will instigate tribal conflicts; or economically they will attack infrastructure. (Click) From here we move to COIN COG analysis. Each one of these operations will have one COG for both FRIENDLY and ENEMY. This chart may demonstrate multiple COG�s but what you are seeing is the overall campaign, i.e... different battles that they fight over a span of time. That is why it may appear that there is more than one center of gravity. Like in the conventional every major battle will have a COG, each of these lines can also be seen as separate battles. Therefore, there is really one center of gravity per battle, but multiple battles. Now, how do we determine the enemy�s most probable or most dangerous courses of action? Well, what are their capabilities? This is where we must understand the insurgents and their organization, phases, nature, and in the end, their strategy. We can draw some conclusions if we can place their movement based on models or strategies. (Instructor: use wall chart with various insurgent models.) For example: if we determine that they are using Urban Terror, or a Foco strategy it will be impractical to assume that one of their most probable or dangerous courses of action is developing a political wing. They don�t have the resources or inclination. If we determine that they are Protracted or Subversive, it is more likely that they will interdict reconstruction effort, form a political wing, or strengthen one we haven�t seen yet, and infiltrate local government IP and IA. They are in this for the long haul. (Click)(Discuss this slide but don�t cover DIME, etc� unless asked the questions.) Here�s the house structure in a diagram. This is how we do the top down purpose driven analysis. (Click) At the top is the enemy�s desired endstate (strategic). (Click) (Use this slide to cover the model but don�t get into DIME and such unless you�re asked the question.) The next line is operationally how they�re going to do it. We use Political, Military, Social, and Economic (PMSE) blocks in our model. These are what we call the Lines of Operation (LOO) of the enemy. Many here believe in different lines of operation. Some like the DIME method, others PMSEII, some use Gen Casey�s, and others develop their own. Those are fine but remember that these are the ENEMY�s LOO. Therefore, they will not conflict with your LOO�s, as you choose them. (Click) These LOO�s can be derived from any society- political, strategic (military), social, and economic pillars. The LOO�s are derived from societal norms, whether that society lives at the state level or non state level. (Instructor: There are some contrasting examples and explanations that support the use of PMSE vice DIME, PMSEII, and others. Don�t use this unless it helps the students understand.) This enemy does not worry about diplomatic infrastructure, etc�. Thus we go back to using the basic societal pillars as TRIGGERS that allow us to analyze how they may try to achieve their endstate. The enemy does use information operation (psychological) but it is not a separate line. The psychological operations (I/O campaign) will exist in every facet of their four main lines of operation. In future slides we will demonstrate how they do this. In this example, we see that based on their political endstate, their lines of operation may look like this (use chart on slide or wall): politically they will disrupt elections; or militarily they will interdict MNF-I forces moving on MSR Tampa; or socially they will instigate tribal conflicts; or economically they will attack infrastructure. (Click) From here we move to COIN COG analysis. Each one of these operations will have one COG for both FRIENDLY and ENEMY. This chart may demonstrate multiple COG�s but what you are seeing is the overall campaign, i.e... different battles that they fight over a span of time. That is why it may appear that there is more than one center of gravity. Like in the conventional every major battle will have a COG, each of these lines can also be seen as separate battles. Therefore, there is really one center of gravity per battle, but multiple battles. Now, how do we determine the enemy�s most probable or most dangerous courses of action? Well, what are their capabilities? This is where we must understand the insurgents and their organization, phases, nature, and in the end, their strategy. We can draw some conclusions if we can place their movement based on models or strategies. (Instructor: use wall chart with various insurgent models.) For example: if we determine that they are using Urban Terror, or a Foco strategy it will be impractical to assume that one of their most probable or dangerous courses of action is developing a political wing. They don�t have the resources or inclination. If we determine that they are Protracted or Subversive, it is more likely that they will interdict reconstruction effort, form a political wing, or strengthen one we haven�t seen yet, and infiltrate local government IP and IA. They are in this for the long haul. (Click)

8. Leadership. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Ideology. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent�s desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal the movement presents. Operational objectives are those the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; for example, the dissemination of PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives. Environment and Geography. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and admirable. Political: Active promotion of the insurgents� strategic goals in international forums. Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary: Secure training plus operational and logistical bases. Phasing and Timing. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government. Leadership. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Ideology. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent�s desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal the movement presents. Operational objectives are those the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; for example, the dissemination of PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives. Environment and Geography. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and admirable. Political: Active promotion of the insurgents� strategic goals in international forums. Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary: Secure training plus operational and logistical bases. Phasing and Timing. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government.

9. Leadership. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Ideology. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent�s desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal the movement presents. Operational objectives are those the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; for example, the dissemination of PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives. Environment and Geography. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and admirable. Political: Active promotion of the insurgents� strategic goals in international forums. Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary: Secure training plus operational and logistical bases. Phasing and Timing. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government. Leadership. Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Ideology. To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains what is wrong with society and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after the government is overthrown. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent�s desired end state; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. The replacement of the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It may be the only clearly defined goal the movement presents. Operational objectives are those the insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired end state. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; for example, the dissemination of PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. These actions accomplish tactical objectives that lead to operational goals. Tactical objectives can be psychological as well as physical in nature. For example, legitimacy is the center of gravity for both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Legitimacy is largely a product of perception; consequently, it can be the principal consideration in the selection and attainment of tactical objectives. Environment and Geography. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: Acknowledgement of the insurgent as just and admirable. Political: Active promotion of the insurgents� strategic goals in international forums. Resources: Money, weapons, food, advisors, and training. Sanctuary: Secure training plus operational and logistical bases. Phasing and Timing. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Organizational and Operational Patterns. Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government.

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13. DoctorDoctor

24. Ability to address root causes (IPB II � Effects): Provide for vulnerable Population Provide leadership for direction Provide Government control Ability to address root causes (IPB II � Effects): Provide for vulnerable Population Provide leadership for direction Provide Government control

28. DoctorDoctor

34. (Discuss this slide but don�t cover DIME, etc� unless asked the questions.) Here�s the house structure in a diagram. This is how we do the top down purpose driven analysis. (Click) At the top is the enemy�s desired endstate (strategic). (Click) (Use this slide to cover the model but don�t get into DIME and such unless you�re asked the question.) The next line is operationally how they�re going to do it. We use Political, Military, Social, and Economic (PMSE) blocks in our model. These are what we call the Lines of Operation (LOO) of the enemy. Many here believe in different lines of operation. Some like the DIME method, others PMSEII, some use Gen Casey�s, and others develop their own. Those are fine but remember that these are the ENEMY�s LOO. Therefore, they will not conflict with your LOO�s, as you choose them. (Click) These LOO�s can be derived from any society- political, strategic (military), social, and economic pillars. The LOO�s are derived from societal norms, whether that society lives at the state level or non state level. (Instructor: There are some contrasting examples and explanations that support the use of PMSE vice DIME, PMSEII, and others. Don�t use this unless it helps the students understand.) This enemy does not worry about diplomatic infrastructure, etc�. Thus we go back to using the basic societal pillars as TRIGGERS that allow us to analyze how they may try to achieve their endstate. The enemy does use information operation (psychological) but it is not a separate line. The psychological operations (I/O campaign) will exist in every facet of their four main lines of operation. In future slides we will demonstrate how they do this. In this example, we see that based on their political endstate, their lines of operation may look like this (use chart on slide or wall): politically they will disrupt elections; or militarily they will interdict MNF-I forces moving on MSR Tampa; or socially they will instigate tribal conflicts; or economically they will attack infrastructure. (Click) From here we move to COIN COG analysis. Each one of these operations will have one COG for both FRIENDLY and ENEMY. This chart may demonstrate multiple COG�s but what you are seeing is the overall campaign, i.e... different battles that they fight over a span of time. That is why it may appear that there is more than one center of gravity. Like in the conventional every major battle will have a COG, each of these lines can also be seen as separate battles. Therefore, there is really one center of gravity per battle, but multiple battles. Now, how do we determine the enemy�s most probable or most dangerous courses of action? Well, what are their capabilities? This is where we must understand the insurgents and their organization, phases, nature, and in the end, their strategy. We can draw some conclusions if we can place their movement based on models or strategies. (Instructor: use wall chart with various insurgent models.) For example: if we determine that they are using Urban Terror, or a Foco strategy it will be impractical to assume that one of their most probable or dangerous courses of action is developing a political wing. They don�t have the resources or inclination. If we determine that they are Protracted or Subversive, it is more likely that they will interdict reconstruction effort, form a political wing, or strengthen one we haven�t seen yet, and infiltrate local government IP and IA. They are in this for the long haul. (Click)(Discuss this slide but don�t cover DIME, etc� unless asked the questions.) Here�s the house structure in a diagram. This is how we do the top down purpose driven analysis. (Click) At the top is the enemy�s desired endstate (strategic). (Click) (Use this slide to cover the model but don�t get into DIME and such unless you�re asked the question.) The next line is operationally how they�re going to do it. We use Political, Military, Social, and Economic (PMSE) blocks in our model. These are what we call the Lines of Operation (LOO) of the enemy. Many here believe in different lines of operation. Some like the DIME method, others PMSEII, some use Gen Casey�s, and others develop their own. Those are fine but remember that these are the ENEMY�s LOO. Therefore, they will not conflict with your LOO�s, as you choose them. (Click) These LOO�s can be derived from any society- political, strategic (military), social, and economic pillars. The LOO�s are derived from societal norms, whether that society lives at the state level or non state level. (Instructor: There are some contrasting examples and explanations that support the use of PMSE vice DIME, PMSEII, and others. Don�t use this unless it helps the students understand.) This enemy does not worry about diplomatic infrastructure, etc�. Thus we go back to using the basic societal pillars as TRIGGERS that allow us to analyze how they may try to achieve their endstate. The enemy does use information operation (psychological) but it is not a separate line. The psychological operations (I/O campaign) will exist in every facet of their four main lines of operation. In future slides we will demonstrate how they do this. In this example, we see that based on their political endstate, their lines of operation may look like this (use chart on slide or wall): politically they will disrupt elections; or militarily they will interdict MNF-I forces moving on MSR Tampa; or socially they will instigate tribal conflicts; or economically they will attack infrastructure. (Click) From here we move to COIN COG analysis. Each one of these operations will have one COG for both FRIENDLY and ENEMY. This chart may demonstrate multiple COG�s but what you are seeing is the overall campaign, i.e... different battles that they fight over a span of time. That is why it may appear that there is more than one center of gravity. Like in the conventional every major battle will have a COG, each of these lines can also be seen as separate battles. Therefore, there is really one center of gravity per battle, but multiple battles. Now, how do we determine the enemy�s most probable or most dangerous courses of action? Well, what are their capabilities? This is where we must understand the insurgents and their organization, phases, nature, and in the end, their strategy. We can draw some conclusions if we can place their movement based on models or strategies. (Instructor: use wall chart with various insurgent models.) For example: if we determine that they are using Urban Terror, or a Foco strategy it will be impractical to assume that one of their most probable or dangerous courses of action is developing a political wing. They don�t have the resources or inclination. If we determine that they are Protracted or Subversive, it is more likely that they will interdict reconstruction effort, form a political wing, or strengthen one we haven�t seen yet, and infiltrate local government IP and IA. They are in this for the long haul. (Click)

43. From captured Official Manual 208 Iraqi Counter-insurgency Warfare Manual � Phases of an Insurgency An insurgency movement begins with minor acts of sabotage, passes through the phase of small armed guerrilla groups, and reaches the final stage of civil war. Insurgency is a long-term issue that normally progresses through a preliminary stage, a stage of equilibrium, and then the final stage. Preliminary Stage Insurgency movement begins to crystallize, gaining popular support and momentum because people are discontented and the government is weak. Intelligence network is established at the same time as the insurgents' organization. Acts of sabotage and infiltration into the ranks of security forces and the intelligence network are carried out. The insurgents organize themselves into small bands of guerrillas engaging in combat to establish and maintain their presence. The basic problem at this stage is political. It can be resolved by a strong, effective government able to isolate hostiles from the populace supporting them. This is a formative period in which the movement changes from being a potential threat to carrying out organized acts of sabotage. It activities include the following: A. Political and Organizational 1. Recruiting members loyal to the objective. 2. Establishing a cell-type organization. 3. Strengthening and expanding the leadership and political organization. 4. Expanding opposition control to untroubled areas. 5. Strengthening control over previously captured areas to remove government influence and create secure sites for headquarters, camps, and bases in the area. 6. Destroying lines of communication and government institutions. 7. Forcing security forces to deploy across a wide front. B. Control of the Population 1. Use of propaganda. 2. Setting up a parallel government and issuing orders. 3. Distorting the government's reputation. 4. Eliminating opposition through threats, intimidation, and selected acts of terrorism. C. Hostile Operations. These take the following forms: 1. Attacks on villages loyal to the government. 2. Sabotaging communications and institutions. 3. Operations of deceit to avoid clashes with security forces. 4. Establishing a command structure. 5. Mobilizing popular support through political and psychological propaganda. 6. Categorizing the population into elements: Active supporters, sympathizers, passives, and hostiles. 7. Establishing bases and sources of equipment. 8. Seeking and obtaining external support. The indicators of the preliminary phase are as follows: A. Growing activity hostile to the government. B. Strikes, riots, and disturbances among the populace. C. Propaganda designed to distort the reputation of the civil administration and police. D. Political robberies, assassinations, and troubles among ethnic and regional minorities. E. Gathering and hiding food in small caches. F. Emergence of a parallel government made up of bands of guerrillas. G. Infiltration of agents into the government's civil administration. H. Plundering of arms and ammunition. I. Increased applications for weapons permits. The Equilibrium Stage Hostiles adopt guerrilla tactics in their operations and try to create a feeling of hopelessness among security forces. Insurgents resort to swift attacks followed by a quick withdrawal, and will not enter deliberate battles. They try to acquire the reputation of invincibility by using hit and run tactics and to show that security forces have failed to protect the public. The political and military objectives of this stage are as follows: A. Destruction of administrative apparatus by offensive means. B. Preparations for area operations. This includes carrying out the following activities: 1. Storing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food in selected locations. 2. Conducting intelligence surveys of security force capabilities in proposed operations areas. 3. Preparing secret routes for ingress and egress. Final Stage Lengthy battles between security forces and well-organized insurgent forces take place during this stage. The insurgency movement may last for years before this stage is reached, at which time it becomes primarily a military problem. Victory will only be achieved through traditional military operations. One may say that this stage has been reached when the following conditions exist: A. Support and following of the majority of the population has been attained. B. Civilian administration has collapsed. C. The battle area is fully prepared. D. Government intelligence agencies have been neutralized and are unable to control hostile intelligence agencies. E. A stage is reached where the government is forced to react the way the hostiles wish. F. When security forces are in a position in the battle area whereby their destruction would lead to total loss of the area. G. Security forces outside the area are unable to save those inside. H. Opposing forces possess a superior force for achieving their objectives. There is no clear dividing line between stages: one may dissolve into the next. The method of warfare at every stage depends on support of the masses. Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres. � Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups. � Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks. � Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. � Solicits and obtains funds. � Develops sources for external support. An insurgency movement begins with minor acts of sabotage, passes through the phase of small armed guerrilla groups, and reaches the final stage of civil war. Insurgency is a long-term issue that normally progresses through a preliminary stage, a stage of equilibrium, and then the final stage. Preliminary Stage Insurgency movement begins to crystallize, gaining popular support and momentum because people are discontented and the government is weak. Intelligence network is established at the same time as the insurgents' organization. Acts of sabotage and infiltration into the ranks of security forces and the intelligence network are carried out. The insurgents organize themselves into small bands of guerrillas engaging in combat to establish and maintain their presence. The basic problem at this stage is political. It can be resolved by a strong, effective government able to isolate hostiles from the populace supporting them. This is a formative period in which the movement changes from being a potential threat to carrying out organized acts of sabotage. It activities include the following: A. Political and Organizational 1. Recruiting members loyal to the objective. 2. Establishing a cell-type organization. 3. Strengthening and expanding the leadership and political organization. 4. Expanding opposition control to untroubled areas. 5. Strengthening control over previously captured areas to remove government influence and create secure sites for headquarters, camps, and bases in the area. 6. Destroying lines of communication and government institutions. 7. Forcing security forces to deploy across a wide front. B. Control of the Population 1. Use of propaganda. 2. Setting up a parallel government and issuing orders. 3. Distorting the government's reputation. 4. Eliminating opposition through threats, intimidation, and selected acts of terrorism. C. Hostile Operations. These take the following forms: 1. Attacks on villages loyal to the government. 2. Sabotaging communications and institutions. 3. Operations of deceit to avoid clashes with security forces. 4. Establishing a command structure. 5. Mobilizing popular support through political and psychological propaganda. 6. Categorizing the population into elements: Active supporters, sympathizers, passives, and hostiles. 7. Establishing bases and sources of equipment. 8. Seeking and obtaining external support. The indicators of the preliminary phase are as follows: A. Growing activity hostile to the government. B. Strikes, riots, and disturbances among the populace. C. Propaganda designed to distort the reputation of the civil administration and police. D. Political robberies, assassinations, and troubles among ethnic and regional minorities. E. Gathering and hiding food in small caches. F. Emergence of a parallel government made up of bands of guerrillas. G. Infiltration of agents into the government's civil administration. H. Plundering of arms and ammunition. I. Increased applications for weapons permits. The Equilibrium Stage Hostiles adopt guerrilla tactics in their operations and try to create a feeling of hopelessness among security forces. Insurgents resort to swift attacks followed by a quick withdrawal, and will not enter deliberate battles. They try to acquire the reputation of invincibility by using hit and run tactics and to show that security forces have failed to protect the public. The political and military objectives of this stage are as follows: A. Destruction of administrative apparatus by offensive means. B. Preparations for area operations. This includes carrying out the following activities: 1. Storing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food in selected locations. 2. Conducting intelligence surveys of security force capabilities in proposed operations areas. 3. Preparing secret routes for ingress and egress. Final Stage Lengthy battles between security forces and well-organized insurgent forces take place during this stage. The insurgency movement may last for years before this stage is reached, at which time it becomes primarily a military problem. Victory will only be achieved through traditional military operations. One may say that this stage has been reached when the following conditions exist: A. Support and following of the majority of the population has been attained. B. Civilian administration has collapsed. C. The battle area is fully prepared. D. Government intelligence agencies have been neutralized and are unable to control hostile intelligence agencies. E. A stage is reached where the government is forced to react the way the hostiles wish. F. When security forces are in a position in the battle area whereby their destruction would lead to total loss of the area. G. Security forces outside the area are unable to save those inside. H. Opposing forces possess a superior force for achieving their objectives. There is no clear dividing line between stages: one may dissolve into the next. The method of warfare at every stage depends on support of the masses. Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres. � Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups. � Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks. � Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. � Solicits and obtains funds. � Develops sources for external support.

45. How can phases help us detect the presence of the insurgency? Phases of an Insurgency An insurgency movement begins with minor acts of sabotage, passes through the phase of small armed guerrilla groups, and reaches the final stage of civil war. Insurgency is a long-term issue that normally progresses through a preliminary stage, a stage of equilibrium, and then the final stage. Preliminary Stage Insurgency movement begins to crystallize, gaining popular support and momentum because people are discontented and the government is weak. Intelligence network is established at the same time as the insurgents' organization. Acts of sabotage and infiltration into the ranks of security forces and the intelligence network are carried out. The insurgents organize themselves into small bands of guerrillas engaging in combat to establish and maintain their presence. The basic problem at this stage is political. It can be resolved by a strong, effective government able to isolate hostiles from the populace supporting them. This is a formative period in which the movement changes from being a potential threat to carrying out organized acts of sabotage. It activities include the following: A. Political and Organizational 1. Recruiting members loyal to the objective. 2. Establishing a cell-type organization. 3. Strengthening and expanding the leadership and political organization. 4. Expanding opposition control to untroubled areas. 5. Strengthening control over previously captured areas to remove government influence and create secure sites for headquarters, camps, and bases in the area. 6. Destroying lines of communication and government institutions. 7. Forcing security forces to deploy across a wide front. B. Control of the Population 1. Use of propaganda. 2. Setting up a parallel government and issuing orders. 3. Distorting the government's reputation. 4. Eliminating opposition through threats, intimidation, and selected acts of terrorism. C. Hostile Operations. These take the following forms: 1. Attacks on villages loyal to the government. 2. Sabotaging communications and institutions. 3. Operations of deceit to avoid clashes with security forces. 4. Establishing a command structure. 5. Mobilizing popular support through political and psychological propaganda. 6. Categorizing the population into elements: Active supporters, sympathizers, passives, and hostiles. 7. Establishing bases and sources of equipment. 8. Seeking and obtaining external support. The indicators of the preliminary phase are as follows: A. Growing activity hostile to the government. B. Strikes, riots, and disturbances among the populace. C. Propaganda designed to distort the reputation of the civil administration and police. D. Political robberies, assassinations, and troubles among ethnic and regional minorities. E. Gathering and hiding food in small caches. F. Emergence of a parallel government made up of bands of guerrillas. G. Infiltration of agents into the government's civil administration. H. Plundering of arms and ammunition. I. Increased applications for weapons permits. The Equilibrium Stage Hostiles adopt guerrilla tactics in their operations and try to create a feeling of hopelessness among security forces. Insurgents resort to swift attacks followed by a quick withdrawal, and will not enter deliberate battles. They try to acquire the reputation of invincibility by using hit and run tactics and to show that security forces have failed to protect the public. The political and military objectives of this stage are as follows: A. Destruction of administrative apparatus by offensive means. B. Preparations for area operations. This includes carrying out the following activities: 1. Storing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food in selected locations. 2. Conducting intelligence surveys of security force capabilities in proposed operations areas. 3. Preparing secret routes for ingress and egress. Final Stage Lengthy battles between security forces and well-organized insurgent forces take place during this stage. The insurgency movement may last for years before this stage is reached, at which time it becomes primarily a military problem. Victory will only be achieved through traditional military operations. One may say that this stage has been reached when the following conditions exist: A. Support and following of the majority of the population has been attained. B. Civilian administration has collapsed. C. The battle area is fully prepared. D. Government intelligence agencies have been neutralized and are unable to control hostile intelligence agencies. E. A stage is reached where the government is forced to react the way the hostiles wish. F. When security forces are in a position in the battle area whereby their destruction would lead to total loss of the area. G. Security forces outside the area are unable to save those inside. H. Opposing forces possess a superior force for achieving their objectives. There is no clear dividing line between stages: one may dissolve into the next. The method of warfare at every stage depends on support of the masses. Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres. � Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups. � Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks. � Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. � Solicits and obtains funds. � Develops sources for external support. An insurgency movement begins with minor acts of sabotage, passes through the phase of small armed guerrilla groups, and reaches the final stage of civil war. Insurgency is a long-term issue that normally progresses through a preliminary stage, a stage of equilibrium, and then the final stage. Preliminary Stage Insurgency movement begins to crystallize, gaining popular support and momentum because people are discontented and the government is weak. Intelligence network is established at the same time as the insurgents' organization. Acts of sabotage and infiltration into the ranks of security forces and the intelligence network are carried out. The insurgents organize themselves into small bands of guerrillas engaging in combat to establish and maintain their presence. The basic problem at this stage is political. It can be resolved by a strong, effective government able to isolate hostiles from the populace supporting them. This is a formative period in which the movement changes from being a potential threat to carrying out organized acts of sabotage. It activities include the following: A. Political and Organizational 1. Recruiting members loyal to the objective. 2. Establishing a cell-type organization. 3. Strengthening and expanding the leadership and political organization. 4. Expanding opposition control to untroubled areas. 5. Strengthening control over previously captured areas to remove government influence and create secure sites for headquarters, camps, and bases in the area. 6. Destroying lines of communication and government institutions. 7. Forcing security forces to deploy across a wide front. B. Control of the Population 1. Use of propaganda. 2. Setting up a parallel government and issuing orders. 3. Distorting the government's reputation. 4. Eliminating opposition through threats, intimidation, and selected acts of terrorism. C. Hostile Operations. These take the following forms: 1. Attacks on villages loyal to the government. 2. Sabotaging communications and institutions. 3. Operations of deceit to avoid clashes with security forces. 4. Establishing a command structure. 5. Mobilizing popular support through political and psychological propaganda. 6. Categorizing the population into elements: Active supporters, sympathizers, passives, and hostiles. 7. Establishing bases and sources of equipment. 8. Seeking and obtaining external support. The indicators of the preliminary phase are as follows: A. Growing activity hostile to the government. B. Strikes, riots, and disturbances among the populace. C. Propaganda designed to distort the reputation of the civil administration and police. D. Political robberies, assassinations, and troubles among ethnic and regional minorities. E. Gathering and hiding food in small caches. F. Emergence of a parallel government made up of bands of guerrillas. G. Infiltration of agents into the government's civil administration. H. Plundering of arms and ammunition. I. Increased applications for weapons permits. The Equilibrium Stage Hostiles adopt guerrilla tactics in their operations and try to create a feeling of hopelessness among security forces. Insurgents resort to swift attacks followed by a quick withdrawal, and will not enter deliberate battles. They try to acquire the reputation of invincibility by using hit and run tactics and to show that security forces have failed to protect the public. The political and military objectives of this stage are as follows: A. Destruction of administrative apparatus by offensive means. B. Preparations for area operations. This includes carrying out the following activities: 1. Storing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food in selected locations. 2. Conducting intelligence surveys of security force capabilities in proposed operations areas. 3. Preparing secret routes for ingress and egress. Final Stage Lengthy battles between security forces and well-organized insurgent forces take place during this stage. The insurgency movement may last for years before this stage is reached, at which time it becomes primarily a military problem. Victory will only be achieved through traditional military operations. One may say that this stage has been reached when the following conditions exist: A. Support and following of the majority of the population has been attained. B. Civilian administration has collapsed. C. The battle area is fully prepared. D. Government intelligence agencies have been neutralized and are unable to control hostile intelligence agencies. E. A stage is reached where the government is forced to react the way the hostiles wish. F. When security forces are in a position in the battle area whereby their destruction would lead to total loss of the area. G. Security forces outside the area are unable to save those inside. H. Opposing forces possess a superior force for achieving their objectives. There is no clear dividing line between stages: one may dissolve into the next. The method of warfare at every stage depends on support of the masses. Recruits, organizes, and trains cadres. � Infiltrates key government organizations and civilian groups. � Establishes cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks. � Organizes or develops cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities. � Solicits and obtains funds. � Develops sources for external support.

48. Command Group. The command group is composed of the authorized resistance commander and representatives of the guerrilla forces in the area. This group organizes a staff if necessary. The command group is usually located with the guerrilla group, so that it can exercise optimal control of the resistance movement. � Guerrilla unit: each unit consists of 10-15 persons, and is divided into two or three sub-units, each of 5-6 persons. � Auxiliary forces. a. The active support from a sector of the civilian population.� These include sympathizers, "fence sitters", the paid off, the coerced, those directed by tribal or religious leaders, etc. They are a very important�combat multiplier for the�guerrilla operations, just as combat support and combat service support are a vital element of US/Coalition armed forces. � Auxiliary forces�typically provide:�� 1.��� Security and Warning for guerrilla forces. 2.����Intelligence.�Provide active and passive intelligence of troop movements, record movement, location,�and schedules of HVTs, 3.����Counter Intelligence.�Watching for those that enter areas and neighborhoods that aren't locals.� Possibly MNF HUMINT and/or their assets. 4.��� Logistics.� Transportation, food, equipment, clothes, documents, medical aid to wounded guerrillas, hide�AIFs. 5.����Recruitment/screening of�guerrilla forces to prevent infiltrators and replenish WIA/KIA guerrillas 6.����Psychological Warfare.�(Extremely important)�Distribute propaganda, newsletters, rumors to energize population and/or mislead enemy. 7.����Control over the Civilians.�Law and order, control black market, intimidate, bribe, extort, give impression of guerrilla control 8.����Deception and Desertion.�Promote and assist ISF deserters. * Failure to factor in the Auxiliary (generally the bulk of the force) is analogous to disregarding a military�s CS & CSS in strength and as a combat multiplier. * This list is not exhaustive.� It is a vital part of the insurgencies and should not be dismissed since they are not "trigger pullers." � Secret Element: ��� Those elements that act unilaterally in areas where�joint guerrillas/auxiliary activities are nonpermissible or outside the normal reach of the insurgent AO.� These operations tend to be covert in sense that�no responsibility is claimed in order to cause confusion while still supporting broader insurgent goals.� These missions are specifically tasked organized depending on the mission.� � Command Group. The command group is composed of the authorized resistance commander and representatives of the guerrilla forces in the area. This group organizes a staff if necessary. The command group is usually located with the guerrilla group, so that it can exercise optimal control of the resistance movement. � Guerrilla unit: each unit consists of 10-15 persons, and is divided into two or three sub-units, each of 5-6 persons. � Auxiliary forces. a. The active support from a sector of the civilian population.� These include sympathizers, "fence sitters", the paid off, the coerced, those directed by tribal or religious leaders, etc. They are a very important�combat multiplier for the�guerrilla operations, just as combat support and combat service support are a vital element of US/Coalition armed forces. � Auxiliary forces�typically provide:�� 1.��� Security and Warning for guerrilla forces. 2.����Intelligence.�Provide active and passive intelligence of troop movements, record movement, location,�and schedules of HVTs, 3.����Counter Intelligence.�Watching for those that enter areas and neighborhoods that aren't locals.� Possibly MNF HUMINT and/or their assets. 4.��� Logistics.� Transportation, food, equipment, clothes, documents, medical aid to wounded guerrillas, hide�AIFs. 5.����Recruitment/screening of�guerrilla forces to prevent infiltrators and replenish WIA/KIA guerrillas 6.����Psychological Warfare.�(Extremely important)�Distribute propaganda, newsletters, rumors to energize population and/or mislead enemy. 7.����Control over the Civilians.�Law and order, control black market, intimidate, bribe, extort, give impression of guerrilla control 8.����Deception and Desertion.�Promote and assist ISF deserters. * Failure to factor in the Auxiliary (generally the bulk of the force) is analogous to disregarding a military�s CS & CSS in strength and as a combat multiplier. * This list is not exhaustive.� It is a vital part of the insurgencies and should not be dismissed since they are not "trigger pullers." � Secret Element: ��� Those elements that act unilaterally in areas where�joint guerrillas/auxiliary activities are nonpermissible or outside the normal reach of the insurgent AO.� These operations tend to be covert in sense that�no responsibility is claimed in order to cause confusion while still supporting broader insurgent goals.� These missions are specifically tasked organized depending on the mission.� �

49. Cellular. Small, decentralized groups operate independently of each other. A cellular organization may be combined with any of the other organizational structures to enhance security. Political. Extensive complex political structure develops before military actions are initiated. Military. Armed insurgents serve as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition against existing regime. Ethnic. This organization is organized along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. It perceives that government has denied rights of their group. Cellular. Small, decentralized groups operate independently of each other. A cellular organization may be combined with any of the other organizational structures to enhance security. Political. Extensive complex political structure develops before military actions are initiated. Military. Armed insurgents serve as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition against existing regime. Ethnic. This organization is organized along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines. It perceives that government has denied rights of their group.

56. Urban (terrorist) strategy: This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas. The object is to create instability and crisis in both the government's ability to react and attacks the government�s credibility directly. In this case the insurgents are counting on the government�s overly harsh treatment of the people (search, imprisonment, torture, death, etc) in their attempt to defeat the insurgents to support the Enemy. The strategy exploits the complexity and anonymity of urban areas. On the other hand, guerilla operations in urban areas are less independent than those in rural areas because the governments vigilance is greater and the possibilities of betrayal and government reprisals greater. * This strategy is the easiest to initiate, requires less organization, and popular support. Urban (terrorist) strategy: This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas. The object is to create instability and crisis in both the government's ability to react and attacks the government�s credibility directly. In this case the insurgents are counting on the government�s overly harsh treatment of the people (search, imprisonment, torture, death, etc) in their attempt to defeat the insurgents to support the Enemy. The strategy exploits the complexity and anonymity of urban areas. On the other hand, guerilla operations in urban areas are less independent than those in rural areas because the governments vigilance is greater and the possibilities of betrayal and government reprisals greater. * This strategy is the easiest to initiate, requires less organization, and popular support.

57. Foco (Cuban �Che Guevara�) Strategy: this focal point is an armed organization or nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. Relies on pristine conditions to succeed. Commonly insurgencies begin as Foco and mature into a more protracted/political type Subversive and Mass-oriented * Note: Since the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolution Che Guevara�s �foco� strategy has been tried over 200 times. None have succeeded. Foco (Cuban �Che Guevara�) Strategy: this focal point is an armed organization or nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. Relies on pristine conditions to succeed. Commonly insurgencies begin as Foco and mature into a more protracted/political type Subversive and Mass-oriented * Note: Since the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolution Che Guevara�s �foco� strategy has been tried over 200 times. None have succeeded.

58. Mass-Oriented (Protracted Popular War) Strategy: Achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Create a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Challenge the system and then destroy or supplant it. Patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. Protracted Popular War Mass-Oriented (Protracted Popular War) Strategy: Achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Create a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Challenge the system and then destroy or supplant it. Patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. Protracted Popular War

60. Subversive: Penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purposes (Legitimate Political Wing with a Illegitimate Military Wing) They seek elective and appointed offices. They employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system to be incompetent. It may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response�which further undermines its legitimacy. A highly compartmented armed element normally carries out insurgent violence. A political element guides the armed element and also maneuvers for control of the existing political structure. A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. Subversive insurgences can quickly shift to the foco strategy when conditions dictate. Avoid alienating public, who is against violence, and foreign support who is reluctant to openly back illegal insurgents. Use the political wing to send message while military wing coerces local leaders, destroys resources (infrastructure) to damage government legitimacy, assassinates political opponents, etc.Subversive: Penetrate the political structure to control it and use it for their own purposes (Legitimate Political Wing with a Illegitimate Military Wing) They seek elective and appointed offices. They employ violence selectively to coerce voters, intimidate officials, and disrupt and discredit the government. Violence shows the system to be incompetent. It may also provoke the government to an excessively violent response�which further undermines its legitimacy. A highly compartmented armed element normally carries out insurgent violence. A political element guides the armed element and also maneuvers for control of the existing political structure. A subversive insurgency most often appears in a permissive political environment in which insurgents can use both legal and illegal methods. The typical subversive organization consists of a legal party supported by a clandestine element operating outside the law. Subversive insurgences can quickly shift to the foco strategy when conditions dictate. Avoid alienating public, who is against violence, and foreign support who is reluctant to openly back illegal insurgents. Use the political wing to send message while military wing coerces local leaders, destroys resources (infrastructure) to damage government legitimacy, assassinates political opponents, etc.

72. Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. Phase III: War of movement. When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, then he will progressively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls. Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism. Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. Phase III: War of movement. When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, then he will progressively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls.

73. Urban (terrorist) strategy: This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas. The object is to create instability and crisis in both the government's ability to react and attacks the government�s credibility directly. In this case the insurgents are counting on the government�s overly harsh treatment of the people (search, imprisonment, torture, death, etc) in their attempt to defeat the insurgents to support the Enemy. The strategy exploits the complexity and anonymity of urban areas. On the other hand, guerilla operations in urban areas are less independent than those in rural areas because the governments vigilance is greater and the possibilities of betrayal and government reprisals greater. * This strategy is the easiest to initiate, requires less organization, and popular support. Urban (terrorist) strategy: This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas. The object is to create instability and crisis in both the government's ability to react and attacks the government�s credibility directly. In this case the insurgents are counting on the government�s overly harsh treatment of the people (search, imprisonment, torture, death, etc) in their attempt to defeat the insurgents to support the Enemy. The strategy exploits the complexity and anonymity of urban areas. On the other hand, guerilla operations in urban areas are less independent than those in rural areas because the governments vigilance is greater and the possibilities of betrayal and government reprisals greater. * This strategy is the easiest to initiate, requires less organization, and popular support.

74. Foco (Cuban �Che Guevara�) Strategy: this focal point is an armed organization or nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. Relies on pristine conditions to succeed. Commonly insurgencies begin as Foco and mature into a more protracted/political type Subversive and Mass-oriented * Note: Since the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolution Che Guevara�s �foco� strategy has been tried over 200 times. None have succeeded. Foco (Cuban �Che Guevara�) Strategy: this focal point is an armed organization or nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents build new institutions and establish control based on that support. For a foco insurgency to succeed, government legitimacy must be near total collapse. Timing is critical. The foco must mature at the same time the government loses legitimacy and before any alternative appears. Relies on pristine conditions to succeed. Commonly insurgencies begin as Foco and mature into a more protracted/political type Subversive and Mass-oriented * Note: Since the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolution Che Guevara�s �foco� strategy has been tried over 200 times. None have succeeded.

75. Mass-Oriented (Protracted Popular War) Strategy: Achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Create a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Challenge the system and then destroy or supplant it. Patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. Protracted Popular War Mass-Oriented (Protracted Popular War) Strategy: Achieve the political and armed mobilization of a large popular movement. Create a political and armed legitimacy outside the existing system. Challenge the system and then destroy or supplant it. Patiently build a large armed force of regular and irregular guerrillas and construct a base of active and passive political supporters. Protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. Political leadership normally is distinct from their military leadership. Normally establishes a parallel government that openly proclaims its own legitimacy. Insurgents have a well-developed ideology and choose their objectives only after careful analysis. Highly organized, they mobilize forces for a direct military and political challenge to the government using propaganda and guerrilla action. Protracted Popular War