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Transforming Defense Corporate Strategy

Transforming Defense

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Transforming Defense Corporate Strategy

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    3. Candidates for Action Now …Identify issues of regret

    4. Transforming Defense … Corporate Strategy Part I: Continuous small steps Part II: Many exploratory jumps Urban Operations Vertical Battlefield Lift for Operational Maneuver Robotics Tactically Responsive Space Part III: A few big bets Demand-Centered Intelligence Sea-Basing Joint, Demand-Centered Logistics Directed Energy/Re-directed Energy Battlefield Medicine Non-Lethals “If you are not making big bets, you are a fixed strategic target and at risk.”

    5. Total Force Balance …Security = Defense

    6. Total Force Balance …Security = All Else + Defense

    7. Total Force Balance … Security = All Else + Defense

    8. Total Force Balance …Security = All Else + Defense

    9. Strategic Posture …Exporting Security

    10. Top Level Issues …Culture: Values, Beliefs, Attitudes

    11. Warfare: The Big Trends

    12. Strategic Posture …Exporting security

    13. The Collection – Analysis Gap …Managing the inevitable

    14. The Advance to Baghdad Rate of Advance outruns logistics communications and transportation 2. Logisticians shift to “push” system – use models, SitReps, to “sense” supply needs 3. Tactical Units shift to cross-supply to fill gaps The operational concept emphasized early seizure of Baghdad. That promised to end the combat quickly, assure early collapse of the regime, reduce chances of WMD use, and cut coalition and Iraqi civilian casualties. The advance was so rapid that the communications links between the combat units and the rear supply points could not keep up. Requests for supply did not reach the depots in the rear. This generated two adaptations. At the theater level, the logisticians shifted to a “push” system. Using sitreps, operational and intelligence data, and working closely with the J-3 staffs, the J-4 staffs in effect “sensed” supply needs and responded accordingly. (This process was largely ad hoc and not systematic. The logisticians used requests where they were available, filling in the gaps with their estimates of needs from the general flow of information and from models of combat expenditures.) The estimates of needs were not completely accurate (because of gaps and lags in the information on which they were made). The resulting surpluses and shortages at the tactical level generated the second adaptation by the combat units. This involved cannibalization and cross-unit supply to fill shortages. The overall effect was the emergence of a proto-Sense and Respond Logistics Capability. It was unplanned, unsystematic, and of limited effectiveness. But it demonstrated a number of SRLC attributes and the fact that a more systematic application would work and be seen as effective by operators at both the operational and tactical levels.The operational concept emphasized early seizure of Baghdad. That promised to end the combat quickly, assure early collapse of the regime, reduce chances of WMD use, and cut coalition and Iraqi civilian casualties. The advance was so rapid that the communications links between the combat units and the rear supply points could not keep up. Requests for supply did not reach the depots in the rear. This generated two adaptations. At the theater level, the logisticians shifted to a “push” system. Using sitreps, operational and intelligence data, and working closely with the J-3 staffs, the J-4 staffs in effect “sensed” supply needs and responded accordingly. (This process was largely ad hoc and not systematic. The logisticians used requests where they were available, filling in the gaps with their estimates of needs from the general flow of information and from models of combat expenditures.) The estimates of needs were not completely accurate (because of gaps and lags in the information on which they were made). The resulting surpluses and shortages at the tactical level generated the second adaptation by the combat units. This involved cannibalization and cross-unit supply to fill shortages. The overall effect was the emergence of a proto-Sense and Respond Logistics Capability. It was unplanned, unsystematic, and of limited effectiveness. But it demonstrated a number of SRLC attributes and the fact that a more systematic application would work and be seen as effective by operators at both the operational and tactical levels.

    15. Approaches to Logistics Military model is different than the commercial model – need to adapt not adopt commercial model. Military model is different than the commercial model – need to adapt not adopt commercial model.

    17. Understanding of Network Relationships is Critical

    19. Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will become a central feature of military operations. Much more skepticism here over the last survey, but three out of four still agree. Is the shift statistically significant?Much more skepticism here over the last survey, but three out of four still agree. Is the shift statistically significant?

    20. Within the next 20 years, attacks upon computer networks will be as important as delivery of munitions to military operations. Strength of agreement is a little surprising. Is there some evidence of this, or just rhetoric?Strength of agreement is a little surprising. Is there some evidence of this, or just rhetoric?

    21. Operationally Responsive Space

    22. TacSat-1 Attributes Responsive < 1 Yr concept to on-orbit capability Low Cost Total cost of experiment less than $15M including launch Experiment UAV Components in Space Space/Air Horizontal Integration Designer Payloads TCP/IP Based: SIPR Net Accessed New commercial launch vehicle Operationally relevant capability Integrated into Combatant Commanders Exercises/Experiments Time / Capability Trade Off

    23. Within the next 10 years, some adversaries will likely have the ability to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to deny our use of fixed military infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites.

    24. Within the next 10 years, some adversaries will likely have the ability to use long-range precision strike weapons such as ballistic and cruise missiles to deny our use of fixed military infrastructure, such as ports, airfields, and logistical sites.

    25. Security System Balance? …Major Movements

    26. Trends in Security Competition

    27. Elements of Transformation

    28. Transformation Down at the grange they’re teachin’ a new way of plowin’ Ya’ goin’? Nope! I already don’t plow as good as I know how ...

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