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Assessment of the Risks and Uncertainties in Eliminating Nuclear Material Stockpiles

Assessment of the Risks and Uncertainties in Eliminating Nuclear Material Stockpiles F. STEINH Ä USLER Div. of Physics and Biophysics University of Salzburg A 5020 Salzburg Austria Email: friedrich.steinhaeusler@sbg.ac.at Topics Source terms and policy issues The need to act

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Assessment of the Risks and Uncertainties in Eliminating Nuclear Material Stockpiles

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  1. Assessment of the Risks and Uncertainties in Eliminating Nuclear Material Stockpiles F. STEINHÄUSLER Div. of Physics and Biophysics University of Salzburg A 5020 Salzburg Austria Email: friedrich.steinhaeusler@sbg.ac.at

  2. Topics • Source terms and policy issues • The need to act • Technical options • Security aspects • Conclusions & recommendations

  3. SOURCE TERMS AND POLICY ISSUES

  4. SOURCES OF MILITARY HEU and Pu • Operational weapons • Weapon-grade material outside operational weapons • Fuel- and thermal-grade Pu in store

  5. MILITARY INVENTORY: HEU/Pu(central estimate (t) in 2003, SIPRI) • US: 635/47.5 • Russia: 470/100 • UK:15/3.2 • France: 24/5 • China: 20/4 • India: “little”/0.31 • Pakistan: 0.69/0.005 • Israel: ?/0.51 • Total: 1 165/160 Production rate: up to 250 kg/GW(th), a

  6. US: 174/52.5 Russia: 500/34 UK:0/4.4 France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel: 0/0 Total: 674/91 MILITARY DECLARED SURPLUS: HEU/Pu(central estimate (t) in 2003, SIPRI)

  7. US: 10/2 Russia: 0/0 UK:0/0.1 France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel:0/0 Total: 10/2.1 UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS: HEU/Pu(central estimate (t) in 2003, SIPRI)

  8. Russia: 96/0 China, France, India, Pakistan, Israel, UK, US: 0/0 Total: 96/0 DISPOSED: HEU/Pu(central estimate (t) in 2003, SIPRI)

  9. CIVILIAN Pu INVENTORY • In spent nuclear fuel • Separated in store • In fast-reactor fuel cycle • In thermal MOX fuel cycle

  10. Civilian Pu Production • Typical annual Pu production rate in nuclear power reactors: 180 kg /GW(e) • Civilian facilities in UK and France can reprocess fuel elements of all nuclear power plants in EU and Japan 6-10 kg Pu/t of spent fuel

  11. US: 5-10/4-5 Russia: …/30.3 UK: ca. 4/59.8 France: ca. 5/40.3 China: …/0 India: …/0.7 Pakistan: …/- Israel: …/- Others: …/59.4 Total: 16-22/195 CIVILIAN OWNERSHIP:HEU/Pu(central estimate (t) in 2003, SIPRI)

  12. Past, Present and Future Pu Stockpiles (central estimates)

  13. Weapon-usability ofReactor Pu* - Higher rate of spontaneous fission - Increased heat production - Higher probability for pre-detonation explosive yield: 1 to several kt ** * E. Kankeleit, C. Kuppers, U. Imkeller, Report on the weapon-usability of reactor plutonium, IANUS-Arbeitsbericht 1/1989 ** Compacting speed of 2-4 km/s

  14. Theft of separated Pu, whether weapons-grade or reactor-grade, is a major security risk US National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Plutonium, Vol. 1+2, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994 and 1995

  15. 2. THE NEED TO ACT

  16. Inadequate protection States can no longer claim to be able to protect 100% military nuclear material stockpiles: • US: Force-on-Force exercises (>50% success rate) • FSU: several hundred illicit trafficking incidents since 1991 (at least 27 cases involving weapons-usable fissile material)

  17. Vulnerability of US DOE Pu Storage Sites* • Interim Pu storage (26 t) for 10 to 20 a • Pu stored in 166 facilities at 35 sites** 299 vulnerabilities identified at 13 sites: Inadequate facility conditions Incomplete safety analysis Degradation of Pu packaging, etc. *Related to safety, environment and health (Nov. 1994) **Excluding Pantex Plant, Texas

  18. Imperfect state security networks States cannot rely exclusively on less than perfect state security networks to protect military and civilian Pu stockpiles: • Corruption of security forces, customs and politicians (www.transparency.org) • Politically/religiously/financially motivated insider threat (extremism, blackmail) • Criminal nuclear supply networks (Pakistan-Malaysia-Libya)

  19. Personnel performance and misuse of new equipment* at Russian nuclear facilities 9 sites investigated; three of them had inter alia the following deficiencies: • Gate to central facility left open and unattended • Nuclear material portal monitor not operational • No access control at nuclear material storage site * Security-related activities, February 2001

  20. Personnel performance and misuse of new equipment* at Russian nuclear facilities • No response when metal detector was set off upon entry • Wide spread drug and alcohol related problems * Security-related activities, February 2001

  21. Potential for political instability • Internal political stability of nuclear weapon states is not guaranteed (Pakistan?) • Act of despair: deployment of nuclear weapon as the last resort (Israel?)

  22. Strong Man Policy Failed international crisis management, using the Strong Man-Global Policeman Policy, e.g., identification ofanexternal enemy, who will be threatened or contained with a nuclear weapon (DOD Nuclear Posture Review*) *US Strategic Nuclear Forces (2003): 14 Trident Submarines, 450 Minuteman III ICBM, 66 B-52H bombers, 20 B-2 Stealth bombers

  23. 3. TECHNICAL OPTIONS

  24. Disposition Programme: Short-term Objectives • Make it harder for individuals to steal the material • Increase the difficulty for rogue nations and terrorists to reuse the material

  25. Disposition Programme: Long-term Objectives • Prevent contamination of the environment and uncontrolled radiation exposure of man • Signal to others that there is a path to the irreversible reduction of materials stockpiled • Progress towards nuclear arms reduction

  26. Disposition Principle(e.g., for surplus weapon-grade Pu) : Create a substantial barrier to the recovery of the nuclear material

  27. Pu 238: 0.01 Pu 239: 93.80 Pu 240: 5.80 Pu 241: 0.13 Pu 242: 0.02 Am 241: 0.22 *Age: 20 years in percent (by weight) Weapon-grade Pu *

  28. 4 Theoretical Disposition Options, only 2 Realistic Choices 1. Pu dilution in oceans (environmental risk?) 2. Pu transport into space (risk of major accident?) 3. Immobilization of Pu 4. Reactor/accelerator methods using Pu

  29. 1. Operational time scale 2. Material throughput 3. Physical security 4. Self-protection 5. Long-term stability 6. Criticality issues 7. Safeguards & Proliferation resistance 8. Suitability for final depository 9. State of development 17 Evaluation criteria:

  30. 10.Costs for start up 11. Costs for routine operation 12. Long-term neutron stability 13. Long-term chemical durability 14. Environmental impact 15. Local acceptance 16. National acceptance 17. International acceptance 17 Evaluation criteria:

  31. Example for Open Issues: Proliferation Resistance • Are all the technical methods deployed proliferation resistant? • Does the method allow the pursuit of weapon-relevant technology options? • Is it possible to covertly divert nuclear material?

  32. Example for Open Issues: Operational time scale • How long does the Pu have to remain in an interim storage area? • When will the industrial-scale version of the disposition method be available? • What is the time period required to totally eliminate Pu?

  33. Example for Open Issues: Costs • Costs for R & D? • Investment costs for constructing the facilities in US/Russia/EU? • Operational costs of facility? • Costs for final deposition of resulting waste products?

  34. IMMOBILIZATION OF Pu

  35. Direct glass vitrification Direct ceramic vitrification Can-in-canister vitrification Geologic disposal Electro-metallurgical treatment Immobilization technologies

  36. Direct glass vitrification:Principle • Pu and n-absorbing material*, mixed with molten glass** and high level radwaste • Pu concentration: about 5 to 8% (by weight) • Cooled into large logs (weight: 2 t; height: 3 m) • Large base of experience for industrial scale vitrification (B, F, UK since 1986 or longer) • *e.g., gadolinium ** lanthanide borosilicate

  37. Direct glass vitrification:Open technical issues • Optimal glass formulation for not immobilized Pu? • Optimal level of solubility of Pu in glass? • Prevention of accumulation of critical mass in processing equipment? • Solubility of n absorber potentially higher than that of Pu, i.e., criticality possible after 10³ years?

  38. Direct glass vitrification:Open technical issues • Radiation creates helium and oxygen bubbles in glass, increasing the volume: impact of additional cracks? • There is no natural analog of glass containing alpha-emitters: long-term material behavior expose to internal alpha radiation exposure?

  39. Direct glass vitrification:Open security issues Is subsequent Pu recovery from glass feasible? • Ground glass, dissolve in nitric acid, remove Pu (PUREX process) • Bench-top solvent removal process extracts about 25% of Pu analog from a glass host Covert operation requires little additional equipment, no obvious new activity noticeable

  40. Direct ceramic vitrification:Principle • Pu and n-absorber mixed in ceramic material with high level radwaste • Pu concentraion: <10% (by weight) • Radioactive ceramic material placed inside steel canister • Limited large-scale industrial experience

  41. Direct ceramic vitrification:Open technical and security issues Remaining technical and security issues: Similar to glass vitrification

  42. Can-in-canister vitrification:Principle • Pu and n-absorbing material mixed with molten glass or ceramic material in steel cans (2.5 kg of Pu/can) • 20 stainless steel cans loaded onto a rack within a larger steel canister(3 m long) • Filled with molten, glassified high level radwaste from reprocessing • Cooled (weight: 2 t)

  43. Can-in-canister vitrification:Open technical and security issues • Technical issues: similar to glass vitrification • Security issues: - 1 spent fuel assembly from BWR/PWR: 1.5/4.2 kg Pu - 1 canister (20 cans): 12.5 kg Pu* canister contains 400% more Pu than spent fuel assembly * Equivalent to 3 nuclear weapon pits

  44. Geologic Disposal:Principle • Deep borehole (several km) • Enclose Pu or Pu mixed with high level radwaste within physical barrier (e.g., glass, ceramics) • Transport enclosed pure Pu or mixture to borehole • Close borehole to (a) minimize direct access; (b) allow defined access at a later stage

  45. Geologic Disposal:Open technical and security issues • Pu leaching models: Pu solubility is low (10E-8 g/cm³) and glass surface area increases by a factor of 5 due to fracturing • Fracturing due to quenching 10 times higher?* • Does crack growth continue throughout lifetime of glass(water, tectonic stress)? • Intentional “Pu Mining” desirable at a later stage? *B. Grambow (Materials Research Soc. Symp. Proc. 333, 167-180 (1994)

  46. Electrometallurgical treatment:Principle • Pu mixed with monolithic mineral form • Result: glass-bonded zeolite (GBZ)

  47. Electrometallurgical treatment:Open Technical and Security Issues • Less technically mature than other disposition methods • Several key steps not demonstrated yet at industrial scale • Political concerns due to its similarity to nuclear fuel reprocessing

  48. REACTOR/ACCELERATOR TECHNOLOGIES USING Pu

  49. Transmutation:Principle • Origin: in the 1970’s • Concept: using high n fluxes, long-lived isotopes, particularly transuranics, can be transmuted • Product: stable or relatively short-lived radioactive substances

  50. Transmutation:Open technical and security issues • High energy linear accelerator needed (p(GeV) • High n flux required (>10E16 n/cm²,s) over Pb or Bi spallation target • High R&D risk: accelerator technology chemical separation methods

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