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Threat modelling. A short introduction and stories from end user involvement SRM Seminar Luxembourg 22.06.2010. Per Håkon Meland - SINTEF ICT, Trondheim, Norway http://www.sintef.com/. Motivation and background. Hospital systems (2005 ) Integration and access control of EPRs
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Threat modelling A short introduction and stories from end user involvement SRM Seminar Luxembourg 22.06.2010 Per Håkon Meland - SINTEF ICT, Trondheim, Norway http://www.sintef.com/
Hospital systems (2005 ) • Integration and access control of EPRs • Models used to communicate processes and threats
SHIELDS • EU project • 2008-2010 • 8 partners • Sharing of security knowledge • Models • Methods • Tools and tool input • End user evaluations • Sevaral iterations • Real end-users • Case studies and commercial products
Threat modelling • Misuse cases and attack trees • Understand potential security threats and vulnerabilities • Understand attackers • Find security design issues before code • Determine countermeasures • Guide the code review /testing/configuration /deployment • Highly reusable • Easy to grasp
Main functionality: • Download data (application, codecs, skins, ...) • Play local media file • Play media stream • Actors: • Software developer • User
Search for existing misuse case diagrams: • “Media”, “player”, “Movie”
Hide the details • Link to attack patterns • Used to identify mitigations
Create textual description to accompany the diagram • A document elaborating the diagram • Threat descriptions can be fetched from the SHIELDS SVRS • Gives an understanding of the possible attacker motivation • There can be several different mitigations • Input to risk analysis and security activity planning
Approach Phase 1: Tutorial 2:Threat model created by experts 4:Model consolidated by experts 6:Threat model endorsed by experts 5:Threat model updated by developers 1:Application description 3:Threat model created by developers Phase 2: Parallel modelling Phase 3: Serial modelling
Pre-visit, plan: • Hotels • Route • Experiences • Virtually explore • Post-visit, share • Pictures/videos • Route • Recommendations • Blog • Bad stuff?
Warehouse information system • Dock loading • RFID tracking • Picking lists • Advanced shipping notifications • Bad stuff?
Electronic newspaper • Aimed for the Paris metro • Shared from distribution points • User relays • Bad stuff?
Feedback and lessons learned • New threats and mitigations were identified in all case studies • Misuse cases and attack trees: Easy to learn, easy to use • Important with diversity while doing threat modelling • Keep the size of the models down • Need more models from other application areas
Share models through the SVRS! • Now contains >200 free security models • 18 misuse case models • 29 attack trees • Use the free tools, or integrate your own • Add your own, get feedback (and possibly revenue) • http://www.shields-project.eu