Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment and Prevention and Mitigation Strategies

1. June 11, 2004 Teaching Nonproliferation Summer Institute University of North Carolina, Asheville Dr. Charles D. Ferguson Scientist-in-Residence Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment and Prevention and Mitigation Strategies Different Faces Project: Mention that this study is the first part of a larger, comprehensive project assessing all major aspects of nuclear and radiological terrorism Co-directing that project with Dr. William Potter, CNS Director Team Effort: Thank Bill Potter, Sandy Spector (help on research, writing, and editing of the report), Tahseen Kazi, Judith Perera, Alex Tiersky, Kristin Thompson, Alexia Treble, and other CNS staff support. Also, thank the numerous colleagues � some of whom are in the audience who provided comments on drafts of the report. Funding: Thank MacArthur and Ploughshares for support. Different Faces Project: Mention that this study is the first part of a larger, comprehensive project assessing all major aspects of nuclear and radiological terrorism Co-directing that project with Dr. William Potter, CNS Director Team Effort: Thank Bill Potter, Sandy Spector (help on research, writing, and editing of the report), Tahseen Kazi, Judith Perera, Alex Tiersky, Kristin Thompson, Alexia Treble, and other CNS staff support. Also, thank the numerous colleagues � some of whom are in the audience who provided comments on drafts of the report. Funding: Thank MacArthur and Ploughshares for support.

3. Assumptions Unlike Cold War, today the main nuclear threat comes more from non-state actors, i.e. terrorists. Terrorists could not launch multiple numbers of nuclear weapons at U.S., but if they had one, we cannot rule out them having many. Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable, would only be able to build low-yield device, but cannot rule out acquisition of intact nuclear weapon from a state.

4. Elementary, My Dear Watson Motive Means Opportunity

5. Assessing Risk Risk = Probability X Consequence Large uncertainties Lack of data Alternatively: Risk = Motivations X Intentions X Capabilities X Consequence Need to understand terrorist group motivations, capabilities, and dynamics

6. Key Security Principles Understanding and Reducing Risks Practicing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-layered Security Approach Leveraging Assets Both Nationally and Internationally Understanding the Chain of Necessary, but not Sufficient, Conditions to Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Nuclear Assets

7. How to Become a Nuclear Terrorist? Highly-Motivated Terrorist Group Desiring Extreme or Unconventional Levels of Violence Technically Skilled or Can Hire Such Skills Acquire Needed Materials Smuggle Materials to Safe Haven Build/Acquire or Hire Other Group to Build or Acquire Deliver Weapon to Target Detonate/Use Weapon at Target

8. Terrorist Motivations Why haven�t there been any RDD or crude nuclear weapon terrorist attacks? Those who study terrorist motivations are �underwhelmed by the probability of such an event [radiological or nuclear terrorism] for most � but not all � terrorist groups.� � Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001 Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups

9. Terrorist Motivations (Cont.) Post identified two groups that might engage in large scale radiological dispersal: Non-traditional religious extremists (closed cults) Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious] Several groups might be motivated to use limited radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes: The above two, and Social-revolutionary* Nationalist-separatist* Right-wing *Would not want to alienate their constituencies.

10. Worst-Case Nuclear Threat: Terrorists with Nuclear Weapons Even a crude nuclear weapon could destroy the heart of a city. 100,000 or more could die immediately. Devastating political and economic effects. $2 Trillion or more in immediate costs. Global economic depression?

11. Terrorist-Constructed Nuclear Weapon (Improvised Nuclear Device) Terrorists must be motivated to conduct extreme violence using nuclear weapons. They must have or hire the technical expertise to build an IND. They must acquire the necessary amounts of fissile material (HEU or plutonium). They must be able to transport the material without being detected and caught. They must deliver the IND to a target. They must be able to detonate it.

12. Ease of Building Gun-type IND? �With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so low that terrorists, if they have such materials, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated HEU is at hand it�s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion � [and] even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order.� -- Luis Alvarez, Adventures of a Physicist

13. Required Skills to Build an IND Schematic drawings � widely available Detailed drawings � not available ? Large number of man-hours required to prepare Need team skilled in: Physical, chemical, and metallurgical properties Material characteristics affecting fabrication Neutronics and radiation effects High explosives and chemical propellants Hydrodynamics Electrical circuitry Unlikely that an individual would possess all these skills and knowledge even after years of training Need a team. Source: Mark et al. (1986)

14. Gun-type vs. Implosion-type IND Gun-type: Simplest design Cannot use plutonium; must use HEU Implosion-type: More sophisticated, but still first generation weapon Can use either plutonium or HEU

15. Gun-type IND

16. Implosion-type IND

17. Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile Material

18. HEU First Strategy Large stockpiles of HEU plus relative ease of construction of gun-type device ? Need to prioritize securing, consolidating, and eliminating HEU. Eliminate by down-blending into a low-enriched (non-weapons usable) form.

19. HEU Stocks of Biggest Concern Russia � about 500 metric tons outside of weapons Pakistan � smaller stocks, but turbulent region Research facilities � dozens of sites in some 40 countries; about 20 tons of HEU Naval and maritime use North Korea and Iran? United States?

20. Accumulation of Pu Some states such as France, Japan, and Russia continue to separate tons of plutonium per year Even reactor-grade Pu can be used in nuclear bombs

21. Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon Theft Purchase Gift? Coup

22. Arsenals of Nuclear-Armed Nations

23. Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition Russia � Large numbers of forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons Pakistan � Presence of al Qaeda Unstable political system Parts of government (ISI) sympathetic to terrorist causes Nascent nuclear command & control system

24. Highest Priority Efforts to Prevent Terrorist Acquisition ofIntact Nuclear Weapons Press Russia to bring forward deployed TNWs into central storage � in general the most portable weapons are the most vulnerable. U.S.-Russia need to work toward mutual and transparent nuclear weapons dismantlement Provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPT

25. Attacks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear Facilities Commercial nuclear power plants Research reactors Spent fuel storage pools Reprocessing facilities

26. Attacks on Nuclear Facilities � Worst consequence Major consequence of successful attack: release of radioactivity off-site Soviet-designed plants without containments, e.g., Chernobyl-type plants (RBMKs) 13 are still operating. Also, many reactors in the UK do not use containments.

27. U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Good News: All U.S. NPPs have reactor containments. All employ defense-in-depth safety systems. NRC responded quickly after 9/11 to enhance security.

28. U.S. NPPs (Continued) Bad News: Vulnerability to airplane attack? Control rooms and most nuclear spent fuel pools are outside containment structures. External power supplies and water intakes could be vulnerable.

29. Research Reactors Good News: Small inventory of radioactivity compared to commercial NPPs. Bad News: Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable. Many research reactors located in or near universities. Many do not use or have weak containments. Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-site. Mainly concern for foreign research facilities.

30. Priorities for Protecting Nuclear Facilities Ensure that design-basis-threat accounts for 9/11-type attack and need to factor in beyond-design basis threats. Take quick fix actions to upgrade protections around control rooms and spent fuel pools. Make sure that research facilities also are employing defense-in-depth security measures. Need performance-based, not compliance-based security system.

31. RDDs: A Rising Concern RDD = Radiological Dispersal Devices such as �dirty bombs� Heightened Concern: Are radioactive materials secure? Attacks of September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda has expressed interest in RDDs Widespread news reporting The attacks of September 11, increased news media attention, and al Qaeda�s expressed interest in unleashing radiological terrorism have sparked heightened concern about the threats of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) � one type of which is a �dirty bomb.� RDDs would use either passive or active methods to spread radioactive material in order to contaminate cities or large areas. So far, there have been no terrorist attacks with dirty bombs, which would couple radioactive materials with conventional explosives to disperse radioactivity. Faced with this perceived increased threat, we must ask: Are radioactive materials secure? The attacks of September 11, increased news media attention, and al Qaeda�s expressed interest in unleashing radiological terrorism have sparked heightened concern about the threats of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) � one type of which is a �dirty bomb.� RDDs would use either passive or active methods to spread radioactive material in order to contaminate cities or large areas. So far, there have been no terrorist attacks with dirty bombs, which would couple radioactive materials with conventional explosives to disperse radioactivity. Faced with this perceived increased threat, we must ask: Are radioactive materials secure?

32. Characteristics of RDDs RDDs are NOT Weapons of Mass Destruction Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption Major effects: Panic (psychological and social effects) Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding) It is important to realize that RDDs are NOT weapons of mass destruction. Few, if any, would die immediately after exposure to ionizing radiation from a typical RDD. However, there might be some specialized situations in which thousands could die from cancer over many years to decades due to receiving small doses from an RDD. Possibly many could die from a conventional explosive associated with a dirty bomb. This depends on the type of explosive and the setting (pop. Density and damage to buildings). We are mainly concerned that RDDs can be weapons of mass disruption. This would result in panic [Discuss blocking emergency response efforts and indirect deaths and injuries from car crashes, etc.] Economic costs could be steep (many billions) if rebuilding is necessary.It is important to realize that RDDs are NOT weapons of mass destruction. Few, if any, would die immediately after exposure to ionizing radiation from a typical RDD. However, there might be some specialized situations in which thousands could die from cancer over many years to decades due to receiving small doses from an RDD. Possibly many could die from a conventional explosive associated with a dirty bomb. This depends on the type of explosive and the setting (pop. Density and damage to buildings). We are mainly concerned that RDDs can be weapons of mass disruption. This would result in panic [Discuss blocking emergency response efforts and indirect deaths and injuries from car crashes, etc.] Economic costs could be steep (many billions) if rebuilding is necessary.

33. Components of Radiological Weapons Radioactive materials: Radioactive sources: Used in medicine, food irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oil-prospecting, etc. Spent nuclear fuel Nuclear waste Means of dispersal: Conventional explosives Fizzle-yield improvised nuclear devices Aerosolized particles Contamination of water supplies

34. FAS Study: Cesium Bomb2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT

35. Goiania, Brazil, 1987 Cesium-137 Dispersal Incident Scavengers broke into abandoned medical facility Stole 1,375 curie Cs-137 source Cut into pieces and distributed to friends and family Junk dealer caused further dispersal of powdered source Results: Four deaths and one arm amputation Some 200 people contaminated More than 110,000 monitored (Fear mongering via news media) Massive cleanup that captured most of the materials (about 1,200 curie)

36. High-Risk Materials? HIGH RISK LOW RISK Good news: Most radioactive sources do not pose a high security risk. Right: Smoke detectors contain a minuscule amount of Am-241, a radioisotope. To build an effective dirty bomb would require millions of smoke detectors. Even though individual smoke detectors would not present a security concern, smoke detector factories could contain enough americium to pose a security concern. Left: The left photo depicts a radiation cancer treatment machine that contains cobalt-60. There could be enough cobalt-60 in such machines to present a security concern. [Mention 1987 Goiania, Brazil incident, which resulted in 4 deaths.]Good news: Most radioactive sources do not pose a high security risk. Right: Smoke detectors contain a minuscule amount of Am-241, a radioisotope. To build an effective dirty bomb would require millions of smoke detectors. Even though individual smoke detectors would not present a security concern, smoke detector factories could contain enough americium to pose a security concern. Left: The left photo depicts a radiation cancer treatment machine that contains cobalt-60. There could be enough cobalt-60 in such machines to present a security concern. [Mention 1987 Goiania, Brazil incident, which resulted in 4 deaths.]

37. Finding: Only a small fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks But still large number High-risk sources are: Portable Dispersible More radioactive High-Risk Materials (cont�d) This study found that only a small fraction of the millions of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks. Still, at least tens of thousands of sources worldwide are in this high-risk category. High-risk determination factors are: Portability Dispersibility Amount of radioactivity Photo shows two small (highly portable) radiography sources. This study found that only a small fraction of the millions of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks. Still, at least tens of thousands of sources worldwide are in this high-risk category. High-risk determination factors are: Portability Dispersibility Amount of radioactivity Photo shows two small (highly portable) radiography sources.

38. High-Risk Radioactive Source Examples Here are some more examples of radioactive sources that present high security risks. [Name them.]Here are some more examples of radioactive sources that present high security risks. [Name them.]

39. Only 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concern: Internal Health Hazards (Mainly): americium-241 californium-252 plutonium-238 Internal and External Health Hazards: cesium-137 cobalt-60 iridium-192 strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard) High-Risk Materials (cont�d) We also found that only seven reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concerns. Three of them [name] pose only internal health hazards only. Internal hazards arise from inhalation or ingestion of the radioactive material. The other four [name] are both internal and external health hazards. However, strontium-90 is mainly an internal hazard. It is especially pernicious because it can replace calcium and thus lodge in bones. The IAEA also tracks these radioisotopes as high safety and security concerns. Moreover, the NRC unofficially recognizes the security risks posed by these isotopes. Co-60 5.3 years Cs-137 30 years Ir-192 74 days Sr-90 29 years Am-241 433 years Cf-252 2.7 years Pu-238 88 years We also found that only seven reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concerns. Three of them [name] pose only internal health hazards only. Internal hazards arise from inhalation or ingestion of the radioactive material. The other four [name] are both internal and external health hazards. However, strontium-90 is mainly an internal hazard. It is especially pernicious because it can replace calcium and thus lodge in bones. The IAEA also tracks these radioisotopes as high safety and security concerns. Moreover, the NRC unofficially recognizes the security risks posed by these isotopes. Co-60 5.3 years Cs-137 30 years Ir-192 74 days Sr-90 29 years Am-241 433 years Cf-252 2.7 years Pu-238 88 years

40. Radioactive Source Lifecycle

41. Major Areas of Concern �Disused� Sources �Orphaned� Sources Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countries U.S. Export and Domestic Licensing Rules 5. Consequence mitigation and public education [Mention that the rest of the presentation will explain why these areas are major concerns.] [Mention that the rest of the presentation will explain why these areas are major concerns.]

42. 1. �Disused� Sources Bad News: Large numbers Vulnerable to theft, diversion Potential safety hazard Could become �orphaned� Inadequate disposal facilities Good News: �Disused� sources are largely accounted for [Define disused source.] More good news: Inadequate facilities can be fixed. For example, the DOE OSR program has already established an interim secure storage facility at LANL. This program is focused on an important class of high-risk sources � mainly transuranics. Focused efforts over the next few years would secure many thousands of high-risk disused sources in the U.S. Need to expand these efforts throughout the world � Lugar-Biden legislation would do that. [Define disused source.] More good news: Inadequate facilities can be fixed. For example, the DOE OSR program has already established an interim secure storage facility at LANL. This program is focused on an important class of high-risk sources � mainly transuranics. Focused efforts over the next few years would secure many thousands of high-risk disused sources in the U.S. Need to expand these efforts throughout the world � Lugar-Biden legislation would do that.

43. Bad News: Many Thousands of High-Risk Sources Result of: High disposal costs Lack of adequate depositories Most in FSU � terrorist and illicit trafficking activities cause concern Good News: Ongoing programs, e.g., IAEA, U.S., and Russia efforts focused on FSU 2. �Orphaned� Sources [Define] Do not really know how many there are. But no one really does. We analyzed available NRC data and estimated that no more than 20% of the roughly 300 sources orphaned per year in the U.S. are in the high security risk category. Comparing these numbers to the numbers of high-risk disused sources in the U.S. (about 27,000), it appears that less than 1% (roughly 0.2%) of high-risk disused sources become orphaned per year. However, the numbers of orphan sources are likely underreported because users are not inclined to report missing sources. Based on a recent EU report, we believe that a similar situation holds there. Could stem the flow of sources becoming orphaned by prioritizing securing high-risk disused sources. [Define] Do not really know how many there are. But no one really does. We analyzed available NRC data and estimated that no more than 20% of the roughly 300 sources orphaned per year in the U.S. are in the high security risk category. Comparing these numbers to the numbers of high-risk disused sources in the U.S. (about 27,000), it appears that less than 1% (roughly 0.2%) of high-risk disused sources become orphaned per year. However, the numbers of orphan sources are likely underreported because users are not inclined to report missing sources. Based on a recent EU report, we believe that a similar situation holds there. Could stem the flow of sources becoming orphaned by prioritizing securing high-risk disused sources.

44. 3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countries Bad News: Regulatory controls are weak or non-existent � about half the world�s nations Good News: Number of high-risk sources outside the FSU is limited Concentrate security efforts on FSU The IAEA has had programs focused on this problem since the mid-1990s. It needs more support to expand these programs. Some 50 nations do not qualify from IAEA assistance � need to find a way to provide regulatory assistance to them. However, change does not occur instantaneously. It can take several years for a nation to develop a safety and security culture. Therefore, concerted effort is required. Just enacting a law or regulation is not enough. These nations should also be encouraged to pull themselves up. Mention the 170 teletherapy units in 62 Indian cities that use Co-60 sources generally containing 5,000-9,000 curies. On a per capita basis, this is not many teletherapy sources. The relative magnitude of the number of high-risk sources in the developing world is small. The IAEA has had programs focused on this problem since the mid-1990s. It needs more support to expand these programs. Some 50 nations do not qualify from IAEA assistance � need to find a way to provide regulatory assistance to them. However, change does not occur instantaneously. It can take several years for a nation to develop a safety and security culture. Therefore, concerted effort is required. Just enacting a law or regulation is not enough. These nations should also be encouraged to pull themselves up. Mention the 170 teletherapy units in 62 Indian cities that use Co-60 sources generally containing 5,000-9,000 curies. On a per capita basis, this is not many teletherapy sources. The relative magnitude of the number of high-risk sources in the developing world is small.

45. 4. U.S. Export Licensing Rules Bad News: Rules are currently inadequate to prevent illicit commerce Unlimited, unregulated exports of high-risk sources to most destinations including Syria Exceptions: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan are embargoed but no measures to prevent transshipments. Good News: Regulatory measures could be implemented quickly if given priority We found a significant gap in the U.S. export licensing rules for high-risk radioactive sources. These rules currently permit the export of these sources under general licenses, which means that governmental review of the credentials of end-users are not required. Exporters are not required to report on transfers of these materials. Because plutonium is classified as a �special nuclear material� it falls under separate regulations. However, common practice has led to small quantities of plutonium-238 to non-restricted nations under general license. So, an importer could in a short period of time accumulate enough plutonium-238 to construct a dangerous dirty bomb. The NRC is considering new export control regulations but the initiative is moving slowly. The NRC is attempting to coordinate any changes in export licensing with changes in the IAEA�s Code of Conduct, which has not been finalized. In Canada, the regulations are very similar, but Canadian regulatory officials have contacted major source exporters to review their export practices, including the mechanisms for determining the legitimacy of end-users. We found a significant gap in the U.S. export licensing rules for high-risk radioactive sources. These rules currently permit the export of these sources under general licenses, which means that governmental review of the credentials of end-users are not required. Exporters are not required to report on transfers of these materials. Because plutonium is classified as a �special nuclear material� it falls under separate regulations. However, common practice has led to small quantities of plutonium-238 to non-restricted nations under general license. So, an importer could in a short period of time accumulate enough plutonium-238 to construct a dangerous dirty bomb. The NRC is considering new export control regulations but the initiative is moving slowly. The NRC is attempting to coordinate any changes in export licensing with changes in the IAEA�s Code of Conduct, which has not been finalized. In Canada, the regulations are very similar, but Canadian regulatory officials have contacted major source exporters to review their export practices, including the mechanisms for determining the legitimacy of end-users.

46. Consequence Mitigation and Public Education Bad News: Little apparent effort by the government to prepare the public for a radiological attack. No apparent stockpiling of decon gear at regional sites Not apparent that credible spokespeople are being trained Good News: DHS, NRC, and CDC have useful info on Web sites. R&D is ongoing in decon technologies. Also, development of medical treatments, e.g. Prussian Blue

47. Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System Recommendations: Implement Source Controls Establish Regulatory Measures Manage Security Risks Prepare for RDD Attack [Name them][Name them]

48. 1. SOURCE CONTROLS Safely and securely dispose of disused sources Example: DOE Off-Site Source Recovery Program needs additional support Track down and secure orphan sources, especially those in the NIS, that pose the highest security risk Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System OSR: I would recommend moving responsibility of the OSR program from DOE�s Environmental Management division to the NNSA because this program is not just a radiation safety and environmental cleanup program. It is a national security program. OSR has already secured some 3,000 high-risk disused sources. I estimate that less than $70 million would be required to secure the 15,000 sources that the program has identified as remaining to be secured. This money could be directed to this program over the next few years to achieve a significant improvement in source security. Set up a disposal fee system. Fee could be collected when a source is purchased. This could go into a fund to operate disposal facilities. Need a confidential national tracking system. HPS has written a policy paper last year that focused on the disused and orphan source problems in the U.S. OSR: I would recommend moving responsibility of the OSR program from DOE�s Environmental Management division to the NNSA because this program is not just a radiation safety and environmental cleanup program. It is a national security program. OSR has already secured some 3,000 high-risk disused sources. I estimate that less than $70 million would be required to secure the 15,000 sources that the program has identified as remaining to be secured. This money could be directed to this program over the next few years to achieve a significant improvement in source security. Set up a disposal fee system. Fee could be collected when a source is purchased. This could go into a fund to operate disposal facilities. Need a confidential national tracking system. HPS has written a policy paper last year that focused on the disused and orphan source problems in the U.S.

49. 2. REGULATORY MEASURES Assist nations with weak or essentially nonexistent regulatory controls (buttress IAEA assistance programs) Protect against illicit commerce in radioactive sources Implement improved U.S. export licensing rules Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System About 50 nations do not qualify for IAEA assistance. IAEA Code of Conduct is being revised to focus more on security. Illicit commerce: radiation detection equipment, Customs officials (hand held detectors), training of Customs officials in FSU and in developing countries. Canadian and other developed countries have similar regulations and gaps. About 50 nations do not qualify for IAEA assistance. IAEA Code of Conduct is being revised to focus more on security. Illicit commerce: radiation detection equipment, Customs officials (hand held detectors), training of Customs officials in FSU and in developing countries. Canadian and other developed countries have similar regulations and gaps.

50. 3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS Decrease security risks from future radioactive sources by: Encouraging producers to make fewer high-risk radioactive sources Promoting use of non-radioactive alternatives Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System [Discuss what is meant by non-radioactive alternatives.] [Mention beer can level checking.] [Discuss photo] Hospitals in the US are by and large switching to non-radioactive alternatives. [Discuss what is meant by non-radioactive alternatives.] [Mention beer can level checking.] [Discuss photo] Hospitals in the US are by and large switching to non-radioactive alternatives.

51. 4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK Educate the public, the press, and political leadership Equip and train first responders Conduct planning exercises Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security System Need transition: Residual risk; much we can do to reduce the risk over the next five years; prepare for the worst so we are not caught unprepared. Need to be attentive to lessons learned from planning exercises. [Mention Biden-Lugar-Domenici legislation � Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002] Five regional shelters for disused and orphan sources. Cooperate with the IAEA to establish worldwide OSR program. 3. Replace RTGs in lighthouses, weather stations, and other facilities throughout the FSU with non-radioactive power sources. 4. Train emergency responders abroad. 5. Require the State Dept. to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat 6. Establish special representative for negotiations of international agreements to ensure inspections of cargo � coordinate with Customs Service. 7. Encourage development of non-radioactive alternatives. Mention complementary Clinton-Gregg legislation -- Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002 Plans to reintroduce; handles domestic side. Need transition: Residual risk; much we can do to reduce the risk over the next five years; prepare for the worst so we are not caught unprepared. Need to be attentive to lessons learned from planning exercises. [Mention Biden-Lugar-Domenici legislation � Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002] Five regional shelters for disused and orphan sources. Cooperate with the IAEA to establish worldwide OSR program. 3. Replace RTGs in lighthouses, weather stations, and other facilities throughout the FSU with non-radioactive power sources. 4. Train emergency responders abroad. 5. Require the State Dept. to conduct a global assessment of the radiological threat 6. Establish special representative for negotiations of international agreements to ensure inspections of cargo � coordinate with Customs Service. 7. Encourage development of non-radioactive alternatives. Mention complementary Clinton-Gregg legislation -- Dirty Bomb Prevention Act of 2002 Plans to reintroduce; handles domestic side.