Iraq Going Forward

1. Iraq Going Forward Promoting a democratic and stable Iraq Feb 15, 2011

2. Agenda • The Iraq War and the American Occupation • Tracking Change in Iraq: Key Updates • National Interests and Policy Objectives • Strategic Options • Recommendations & Implementation • Possible Scenarios for The Future • Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond

3. The Iraq War and the American Occupation • Timeline of US War Decision: 9/11: Focus on Iraq at the top: Late September 2001: preliminary planning order; November 2001: specific planning order; Afghanistan War:October-December 2001; “Axis of Evil”: January 2002; April 2002:Blair agrees on regime change; June 2002: Bush Doctrine; Post-9/11: Debates in Administration on Iraq. Fall 2002: “U.N. Detour” : Summer: Powell and Blair push Bush toward UN; September: Bush speech to GA; November: UNSC 1441; Iraq permits return of inspectors (UNMOVIC). October 2002:Congressional approval of use of force resolutions by wide margins;December 2002:Troop deployments to Kuwait begin; January 23, 2003: Blix criticizes Iraqi compliance; February 2003: Powell presentation to UNSC; February 14, 2003: Blix reports Iraqi cooperation; IAEA reports no nuclear program; No use of force resolution from UNSC. Military Operations start: March 19, 2003: Air campaign begins; April 9, 2003: US forces take Baghdad; April 10, 2003: Kurdish forces take Kirkuk; April 11: US and Kurdish forces take Mosul; : US forces take Tikrit; May 1: Mission Accomplished!

4. The Iraq War and the American Occupation: War Decision • WMD and Terrorism?: 9/11 effect of new focus on WMD and terrorist link – Bush Doctrine(Anthrax scare of September/October 2001; Cheney focus on WMD issue); Other intelligence sources reporting Iraq BC; Iraq and nuclear: intelligence community divided;Administration pushes the nuclear issue (“smoking gun a mushroom cloud”) for public opinion; Iraq-al-Qaeda: intelligence community skeptical. Defense Dept. sets up a special office outside of IC to establish links. They turn out to be baseless (Atta Prague meeting). • Democracy?: Belief that political status quo in Middle East produced 9/11, so have to change the status-quo; Some strongly for democracy (Wolfowitz, Bush himself); others less committed to form and more interested in change (Cheney, Rumsfeld); Democracy as American default option; Belief in “ripple effect” in region. • Oil?: Oil as important background – why the region matters to U.S., why the military is there; But oil absent from accounts of lead-up to war(No mention of Iraq in National Energy Policy released before 9/11); Policy during occupation: no privatization of Iraqi oil, no withdrawal from OPEC, no contracts for US companies. • Israel?: US commitment to Israel a constant – hard to explain change; Some members of Administration very strongly pro-Israeli (Douglas Feith); No evidence that Israel pushed for this (focus on Iran even then), but supported it; Israel wary of being forced to compromise with Palestinians to help US on Iraq – stalled on “Road Map”(Bush public support for Palestinian state in lead-up). • Change or Continuity?:A major change in American Gulf policy or the logical culmination of an established pattern? • Logical endpoint: escalating military involvement since the Iranian Revolution, enduring oil interest • Change: overturn the status quo, direct involvement in local domestic politics

5. Public Opinion Before The Invasion

6. The Iraq War and the American Occupation: Saddam’s Decision-Making • Regime security perspective can help explain the seeming irrationality of his behavior: • Fear of domestic enemies: Shi’a opposition, military coup • Fear of Iran • U.S. in past not using military force to bring down his regime • WMD: suspended after 1991, but wanted people to think that he had them: • Sure that the U.S. knew he did not have them • Gave up this game in December 2002, but too late • Military planning: divide forces to prevent coup, focus on Iran, belief that US would not fully invade

7. The Iraq War and the American Occupation: Iraq Occupation • Direct Rule: Stage 1 – the “Quick Exit”: ORHA and Gen. Garner; 60 and 90 day contracts; State would continue functioning; Local meetings to generate new government; Relieved in May 2003. Stage 2 – “MacArthur in Baghdad” (May-Nov. 2003): CPA and Amb. Bremer; Disband army, ban Ba’thists from bureaucracy; Governing Council and slow transition; Privatization of economy (except oil); Beginning of insurgency • Transfer to Iraqi Sovereignty: American shift in Nov. 2003 – move to Iraqi sovereignty: Transitional Administrative Law and UN role; June 27, 2004: IyadAllawi government; Constitutional Assembly election: January 2005; Constitutional referendum: October 2005; Parliamentary election: December 2005; First government: Ibrahim al-Ja’fari (Da’wa) as prime minister. Coalition of UIA, Kurds and Accordance Front. Served April 2005 – March 2006; Second government: Nouri al-Maliki (Da’wa) as prime minister. Same coalition. Begins April 2006 to today. • Insurgency: Elements of the Insurgency:Various Sunni groups: Islamists, ex-Ba’thists, nationalists; Al-Qaeda in Iraq (القاعدة في بلاد الرافدين) and “Islamic State of Iraq”; Mahdi Army (جيش المهدى) of Sadr movement. Other militias, absorbed into government: Peshmerga of KDP and PUK; Badr Brigade of SCIRI (فيلق البدر) – police in south. Insurgency Timeline: August 2003: bombings in Baghdad, death of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; April 2004: first Fallujah battle and Sadrist uprising in south; Abu Ghraib pictures; November 2004: second Fallujah battle; February 2006: bombing of Askariyya Mosque; December 2006: hanging of Saddam Hussein; 2006-07: appalling levels of violence

8. Tracking Change in Iraq: Trends in Patterns of Violence ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS AGAINST THE COALITION AND ITS PARTNERS, BY WEEK

9. Tracking Change in Iraq

10. Tracking Change In Iraq: Key Updates Iraqi politics are dead-locked: lack of national unity government

11. Tracking Change In Iraq: Key Updates • Security • Reduction in size of Army bases from 500 to 126 – aim is to be at 94 by September 1, 2010 • Currently 88,000 troops on the ground – aim is to be at 50,000 by September 1, 2010 • Moved 18,000 vehicles out of Iraq, and more than 600,000 containers • US has picked up or Killed 34 of the 42 top AQ in Iraq officials. – AQ in Iraq has lost • contact with AQSL (Al-Qa’ida Senior Leadership) in Pakistan and Afghanistan. • All of this is a result of the mixed efforts of the US troops along with Iraqi military and • lawenforcement efforts. • Economy • Iraq’s Real Gross GDP estimated at 4.3% due to falling oil prices and global economic downturn • Iraq’s Presidency Council ratified a $73.26 billion budget for 2010. – 23.5% increase from • 2009 • Extended Natural Gas negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell for an additional 6 months • Electricity production rises 14% since 2009 • Funding • The US, GOI, and International community have committed $162.83 billion towards Iraq’s Reconstruction efforts. • The US has appropriated $53.31 billion towards these efforts through four major funds –ISFF, IRRF, ESF, CERP • Congress has also allocated $6.10 billion towards smaller reconstruction initiatives • The Government of Iraq (GOI) has committed $91.43 billion

12. Tracking Change In Iraq: Key Updates 82% of US bases have been closed or transferred to the government of Iraq military 4,408 US militarydeaths to date 300, 000 Iraqi youthsaged 10-18 have neverattendedschool Society 65% of Iraqi youths do not know how to use a computer 30% youthunemployement rate 62% of youthsbelieve a relative cankill a girl for profaningfamilyhonour 42%, 2010 Electricity demand that cannot be met

13. European and U.S National Interests • Vital • Secure The US & Europe from threats or attacks from hostile states or terrorist networks • Prevent a regional conflict in The Middle East • Ensure stability in economic system • Extremely Important • Suppress terrorism • Prevent regional proliferation of WMD • Prevent emergence of regional hegemon • Reduce potential volatility of global energy market • Important • Discourage human rights violations • Promote the development of democratic institutions and values

14. Short Term (1 year) Ameliorate political and security conditions -------------------------- Continued decrease in violence Increase professionalism and size of Iraqi Security Forces Begin bilateral and multilateral dialogue Convene conference for international coalition for Iraq Achieve movement forward on political reforms including: National Reconciliation Protection of women and minorities Crack down on militias Cooperation with neighboring Countries Progress on key decisions: Kirkuk, oil distribution revenues Long Term (4+ years) Prevent failed state, conflict, and regional hegemon ----------------------------- Strengthen ISF & Transfer Authority Increase size and capabilities of ISF Secure borders with Syria and Iran UN peacekeeping/development role Increase US training efforts Develop governing institutions Implement employment programs Build sustainable infrastructure Support public finance reforms Make political institutions legitimate and inclusive Develop stable oil infrastructure Policy Objectives

15. StrategicOptionsOption 1: Complete Drawdown Short Term: • Unconditional withdrawal within 16 months Long Term: • Station rapid reaction forces in the region which can be used to gather intelligence, battle Al Qaeda, and manage humanitarian crises • Persuade UN to take on governance development, NATO to expand training programs • Fund employment and economic development programs that create jobs and stabilize oil infrastructure

16. Strategic Options Option 2: Stay the Course Short Term: • Keep current troop levels in place • Maintain the current goals and costs; human, political and economical Long Term: • Stay in Iraq as long as it takes

17. Strategic Options Option 3: Regulated Transfer Short Term: Reduction of U.S. forces to 50,000 troops in the first half of 2011 Continued gradual withdrawal over 4 years, conditions permitting, subject to periodic revisions Long Term: Promote the establishment of UN peacekeeping force Augment programs to train Iraqi Security Forces Promote strategic cooperation among Iraq & its neighbors Promote the integration of “awakening” forces into ISF Enhance civilian reconstruction and development programs

18. Evaluation Complete Drawdown 1 DomesticConsensus Medium/High Low Medium Feasibility High Low Medium/High Risk(if failed)) High High Low Benefit Low Low/Medium High Stay the Course 2 Regulated Transfer 3

19. Implementation • Augment Provincial Reconstruction Teams, USAID, Iraq Transition Assistance Office, Active Response Corps. • Continued active role by the US to shape the outcome of the election to ensure that No party beallowed to subvert Iraqi democracy • Promote economic development by: • Strengthening Iraq’s oil infrastructure • Diversifying Iraq’s economy • Micro finance schemes to encourage small business growth • Transfer authority to multilateral institutions • Entrusting NATO with a larger mandate for training ISF • UN peacekeeping forces. • Vetting uprising forces and employing them through the government. • Make foreign aid conditioned upon inclusive governance practices, transparency, sharing of national resources.

20. Possible Scenarios for The Future • Best Case Scenario: Violence levels continue to decrease; international organizations effectively fulfill peacekeeping, training objectives; Iraqi Security Forces become larger and more capable of providing security; economic development discourages ex-militants from returning to insurgency; Iraqi government works to include Sunni voices into the decision-making process; malicious foreign interference replaced with regional cooperation • Worst Case Scenario: After U.S. withdrawals, sectarian warfare intensifies into a civil war; militias and terrorist organizations regain ground in Iraq; neighboring countries fuel civil war by supporting various Iraqi factions; tensions lead to economic stagnation and gridlock among governing officials, causing each leader to pursue sect-based interests; Iraq’s provinces threaten to secede.

21. U.S Plans for Iraq after The Military leaves

23. Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond • Complete the constitutional and legal basis for Arab and Kurdish political accommodation; move towards truly “national” treatment of Sunni and Shi’ite • Stable planning and funding of economic and infrastructure development. • Fully shift away from outside aid; create stable planning, spending, and control of budget without major deficits. • Creation of jobs for steadily growing population. Rise in per capita income from 160th to Gulf standards, better distribution of income. • Structural reform of agriculture • Conversion-modernization-privatization of state industries. • Reconstruction and modernization of upstream and downstream petroleum sector; pipelines and Gulf facilities; stable Iraqi-foreign company partnership. • Deal with foreign refugees and internally displaced persons. • Shift and downsizing of Iraqi military from counterinsurgency to deterrence and defenceagainstforeignthreats. • Shift of police and security forces from counterinsurgency to rule of law; checks on corruption and organization crime.