540 likes | 704 Views
Global Solidarity in a Climate Constrained World the Greenhouse Development Rights framework for burden-sharing in a global climate regime. Authored by Tom Athanasiou, Paul Baer from Ecoequity and Sivan Kartha from SEI. Presented by Sanjay Vashist , Heinrich Boell Stiftung
E N D
Global Solidarity in a Climate Constrained Worldthe Greenhouse Development Rights framework for burden-sharing in a global climate regime Authored by Tom Athanasiou, Paul Baer from Ecoequity and Sivan Kartha from SEI Presented by Sanjay Vashist, Heinrich BoellStiftung sanjay.vashist@hbfasia.org
Arctic Sea Ice melting faster than expected 2005 2007 “The sea ice cover is in a downward spiral and may have passed the point of no return. The implications for global climate, as well as Arctic animals and people, are disturbing.” Mark Serreze, NSIDC, Oct. 2007. 2
Implication of 1 meter rise Nile Delta 2000 3
Implication of 1 meter rise IPCC-AR4: “0.18 – 0.59 m by 2100” Post-AR4: “0.8 to 2.4 m by 2100“ (Hansen: “several meters“) Nile Delta 1 meter sea level increase Nile Delta 2000 4
Tipping Elements in the Climate System Lenton et al, 2008 Even 2ºC risks catastrophic, irreversible impacts.
The climate challenge: in three steps Global 2ºc pathway Emissions pathway in the developing world Emissions pathway in the industrialized world What kind of global climate deal can enable this to happen…?
… in the midst of a development crisis? 2 billion people without access to clean cooking fuels About 800 million people chronically undernourished More than 1 billion have poor access to fresh water 2 million children die per year from diarrhea 30,000 deaths each day from preventable diseases More than 1.5 billion people without electricity 13
A viable climate regime must… • Mitigation: emergency climate stabilization • Adaptation: inevitable, increasingly urgent • While safeguarding a right to development
Greenhouse Development Rights Towards Principle-based Global Differentiation
The Greenhouse Development Rights approach to burden-sharing in a global climate regime Defines and calculates national obligations with respect to a development threshold Allows people with incomes and emissions below the threshold to prioritize development Obliges people with incomes and emissions above the threshold (in both the North & South) to share the global costs of an emergency climate program 17
A “development threshold” ? What should a “Right to Development” safeguard? Traditional poverty line: $1/day? …$2/day? (“destitution line” and “extreme poverty line” of World Bank, UNDP, etc.) Empirical analysis: $16/day (“global poverty line,” after Pritchett/World Bank (2006)) For indicative calculations, consider development threshold 25% above global poverty line about $20/day ($7,500/yr; PPP-adjusted)
A “Greenhouse Development Rights”approach to burden-sharing Define National Obligation (national share of global mitigation and adaptation costs) based on: Capacity: resources to pay w/o sacrificing necessities We use income, excluding income below a “development threshold” of $20/day ($7,500/year, PPP) Responsibility: contribution to climate change We use cumulative CO2 emissions, excluding “subsistence” emissions (i.e., emissions corresponding to consumption below the development threshold)
UNFCCC: The principles “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”
UNFCCC: The preamble “Acknowledging the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response,in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”
Income and Capacity income distributions (relative to a “development threshold”)
Emissions and Responsibility fossil CO2 (since 1990) (showing portion defined as “responsibility”)
National obligations based on national “capacity” and “responsibility” 25
Allocating global mitigation obligationsamong countries according to their “RCI” 28
Allocating global mitigation obligationsamong countries according to responsibility & capacity 29
National Obligations in 2020 (for climate costs = 1% of GWP)
Final Comments The scientific evidence shows that a maximum tolerable warming of 2C implies a very strict remaining carbon budget. (≤ 700 GtCO2 over this century) Carbon-based growth is no longer an option in the North, nor the South. Rigorous, binding commitments to substantial emissions reductions are critical, but even ambitious Annex 1 cuts leave very little remaining budget for the non-Annex 1 countries. Technology & financial resources to enable developing countries to keep within this budget is critical. The alternative to something like this is a weak climate regime with little chance of preventing catastrophic climate change. This is about politic reality, not just equity and justice. 33
The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework Authors Tom Athansiou (EcoEquity) Sivan Kartha (Stockholm Environment Institute) Paul Baer (EcoEquity) Eric Kemp-Benedict (SEI) Key Collaborators Jörg Haas (European Climate Foundation) Lili Fuhr (Heinrich Boll Foundation) Nelson Muffuh (Christian Aid) Andrew Pendleton (IPPR) Antonio Hill (Oxfam) Supporters Christian Aid (UK) Oxfam (International) European Aprodev Network The Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany) MISTRA Foundation CLIPORE Programme (Sweden) Stockholm Environment Institute (Int’l) Rockefeller Brothers Fund (US) Town Creek Foundation (US)
Example 1 The European Union 35
Implications for European Union Domestic reductions (~40% below 1990 by 2020) are only part of total EU obligation. The rest would be met internationally. 37
Implications for European Union -20% -30% 38
EU15 and EU New Member States Obligation varies significantly among EU members
Example 2 The United States
Implications for United States US mitigation obligation amounts to a reduction target exceeding 100% after ~2025 (“negative emission allocation”). 42
Implications for United States Here, physical domestic reductions (~25% below 1990 by 2020) are only part of the total US obligation. The rest would be met internationally. 43
Example 2 China and India 44
Implications for China 中国的测算结果 45
Implications for China 中国的测算结果 A fraction of China's reduction, (and most of the reductions in the South) are driven by industrialized country reduction commitments. 46
Implications for India The majority of the reductions in the South are driven by industrialized country reduction commitments. 47
Obligations for Annex 1 countries according to their “RCI” in a Copenhagen phase (to 2020), and globally thereafter. 49
Allocating global mitigation obligationsamong countries according to their “RCI” 50