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Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics

Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics. Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D. Assistant Professor LBJ School of Public Affairs University of Texas at Austin. Presented at conference on War and Poverty, Peace and Prosperity

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Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics

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  1. Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention:Lessons from Economics Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D. Assistant Professor LBJ School of Public Affairs University of Texas at Austin Presented at conference on War and Poverty, Peace and Prosperity Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, May 30 - June 1, 2007

  2. Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention and Its Potential Consequences

  3. Explanations for Rebellions by Groups Vulnerable to Genocidal Retaliation

  4. Bosnia: Examples of Evidence • Izetbegovic: “Our tactics were . . . the international community would defend this country.” • Silajdzic: “My main priority in the whole strategy was to get Western governments and especially the United States to get involved, because [Serbs] had the whole Army.” • Behmen says the goal was to “put up a fight for long enough to bring in the international community.”

  5. Kosovo: Examples of Evidence • Xhemajli: “We knew our attacks would not have any military value. Our goal was not to destroy the Serb military force [but to make it] become more vicious. . . . We thought it was essential to get international support to win the war.” • In May 1998 KLA official quoted saying intention is to “attract heavy Yugoslav barrages and thus win strong international sympathy, as the Croats did in Vukovar.” • Negotiator Gorani: “There was this foreign diplomat who once told me, 'Look unless you pass the quota of five thousand deaths you'll never have anybody permanently present in Kosovo from the foreign diplomacy.”

  6. Cost-Sharing

  7. Randomization

  8. Regulation

  9. Other Methods

  10. Proposed Reform of Humanitarian Intervention

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