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Private Security Companies: An NGO perspective

Private Security Companies: An NGO perspective. Geoffrey Dennis CARE International UK. Structure of presentation:. Private Security Company (PSC) roles in providing security PSC attempts to get involved in humanitarian action & reconstruction

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Private Security Companies: An NGO perspective

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  1. Private Security Companies:An NGO perspective Geoffrey Dennis CARE International UK

  2. Structure of presentation: • Private Security Company (PSC) roles in providing security • PSC attempts to get involved in humanitarian action & reconstruction • PSCs in the context of wider trends impacting on NGO operations & objectives • Conclusions

  3. PSC roles in providing security for aid operations Aid based on community acceptance/ownership & humanitarian principles vs. Aid based on deterrence

  4. CARE Safety & Security Policy &acceptance-based operations • CARE Global Security Unit • Country Security Assessments • Programme Security Assessments • Staff training • Evaluations • CARE Country Office Security Strategies & Capacities • Joint approaches with other agencies

  5. PSC attempts to get involved in humanitarian action & reconstruction • “Private security companies are out to raid the humanitarian space. We want a part of your market.” • Quote from PSC industry employee, August 2006

  6. Deterrence-based aid operationsCharacteristics • Different identity and relationship to beneficiaries & local populations • Affinity with aggressive ‘force posture’ of contested military intervention (even if weaponry is low visibility) • Likely to be perceived as, or become, a party to the fighting • Blurs the line between security & aid work • Frequently driven by short-term donor agenda, not long-term sustainability or local needs/ownership

  7. Why are deterrence-based aid operations problematic? • Fosters climate of distance, enmity & fear between aid provider & local populations • Undermines scope for access negotiated on the basis of humanitarian principles and community acceptance • Undermines aid effectiveness – as deterrence is associated with top-down imposition, not local participation & ownership • Difficulty of returning to longer-term & civilian-led aid efforts in post-conflict phase

  8. PSCs in the context of wider conflict/security trends • Civil conflict – high levels of IHL violations • Protracted conflict – cycles of violence, war economies etc • Increased levels of deliberate political targeting of aid workers • …Are PSCs the answer?

  9. Conclusions • PSC bubble emerged in Iraq & Afghanistan – search for new markets • Need to critically assess wider implications of PSC beyond ‘quick fix’ gap-filling role • Providing security: ‘Last resort’ option – requires legal regulation at national & international levels • Aid delivery: Not a tenable option – Erodes humanitarian space & potential for sustainable, civilian-led reconstruction

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