Regime Change and constitutionalism

1. By MihaelaRacovita Regime Change and constitutionalism

2. Definitions, concepts, typologies Process of Regime change Facilitating and Impeding Factors Empirical Cases Presentation outline

3. What is a regime? How is it different from state, and govt ? State = the community organized for political purposes; Govt = the individual or teams of indiv. who take decisions; “govts succeed each other, the state endures” – Calvert • Existing definitions of ‘political regime’: 1.1 Definitions and concepts

4. What type of typology do we need? - dichotomous (Lawson) • Construction of elaborate, formal typologies is not necessary to describe basic regime types; • Proposed typology: democracy - totalitarianism - tripartite (Linz, 1964) • Dominant since 1960s; • it introduced authoritarianism (nondemocratic, yet fundamentally different from totalitarianism) • Problem: actually - quintuple (Linz and Stepan, 1996) • Democracy, totalitarianism, authoritarianism, plus two additional types: post-totalitarianism, sultanism 1.2 Typologies: 2, 3 or more? Dem Authoritarianism Tot D A T

5. What is democracy?- the term has lost meaning (Lawson) • Dogmatic? • Discursively distorted after CW • Evaluative not just descriptive concept (Lawson) • What's In A Name? That Which We Call A Rose  By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet.’ (W. Shakespeare) ?– Not for ‘democracy’ – it has iterative capacity; => instrumentality (Orwell) • it is less useful to define it as a continuum (Linz and Stepan) in terms of conceptualization (the continuum model helps more in empirical analyses) – Lawson; • scholars concentrate on elaborating ‘how to’ guides rather than analyzing the meaning and nature of democracy (Dawisha) • Can democracy be anything? (Sartori) – according to Lawson democracy requires certain minimal conditions • Cannot specify sufficient conditions for democracy to exist – but can have necessary ones (Lawson) 1.3 Democracy

6. Antithesis to democracy • Totalitarianism = also lost a lot of its meaning – becoming a universal term of condemnation • Includes a unified, homogenized view of society – an organic view of society and the state - through ideology, symbolism and rhetoric • Government = regime= party= leader • One-party states: Cultural difference or an excuse? (Lawson) • E.g. Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi Germany 1.4 Totalitarianism

7. For Lawson – the in-btw is unhelpful • For Linz and Stepan: 3 additional subtypes of non-democratic regimes : • Authoritarianism (Auth); • Post-totalitarianism (PT): early Pt, frozen PT (Czechoslovakia 1977-1989) and mature PT (Hungary 1982-1989) • Sultanism (Sul); e.g. Romania under Ceausescu Based on the scores of 4 variables: • Pluralism (fully to non-existing) Pl -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Non Pl Dem Auth PT Sul Tot • Ideology (elaborate & pervasive vs. no ideology) NL-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FL Dem Auth Sul PT Tot • Mobilization (autonomous to forced) NM------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FM Dem Auth Sult PT Tot • Leadership (constitutional leadership vs. personal leadership) CLD-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PLD Dem PT Auth Tot Sul 1.5 In between or in addition?

8. Typologies – still ideal types – empirical use? Generalization? • Concepts still unclear and contested; authoritarianism – a historical regime explanation rather than good typology (Linz, 2000) • Linz and Stepan - disaggregate the concept of regime only to aggregate them again into complex typology – self-defeating? • They look at democratization as a multistep process; a continuum – yet they still code their variables dichotomously • Is it new? – some argue that Hannah Arendt thought of the division in Origins of Totalitarianism • forcing the different types of authoritarianism into a uni-dimensional continuum can restrain one’s ability to understand authoritarian politics. • Typology – still geographically laden - how to explain Asia? Africa?; only modern era 1.6. Criticisms and discussion of typologies

9. 1.7 Historic typologies – no longer applicable? • Historic Typologies: • Plato: • tymocracy – oligarchy – democracy – • tyranny • ideal: republic of philosophers • Aristotle: • monarchy – aristocracy – democracy • Tacitus: • principatus ( / res publica) ; dominatio • Machiavelli: • republica – monarchy • De Tocqueville: • aristocracy – democracy (danger) • In Boesche, R. Theories of Tyranny. From Plato to Arendt, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. Graph by Capelli, O, “Pre-modern State-Building in Post-Soviet Russia,” Journal of Communist and Transition Studies, 24(4), 2008

10. How does regime change work? • Internal & external processes; • Path-dependency - by previous regime type (Linz & Stepan) • Unclear how the changes would work for Linz and Stepan 2.1 Process of regime change

11. 2.2 Other Variants of regime change • The Hadenius- Teorell Typology: • monarchy • military regimes • One party regime • No party regime • Democracy • Hybrid regime • Regime change:

12. Transition? – can everything be transition? transition from a regime X (totalitarianism, authoritarianism, sultanism) to the regime Y (democracy) as a shift from one clearly identifiable point of departure to the other distinct arrival point (Linz and Stepan) How far back? Only look at previous regime type as determinative – or a longer historical view? (Elster & Offe) Transitology neglects incomplete character of any socio- political change (changements inachevés, Dobry, 1986) and treats the temporal dimension as linear instead of recognizing its multiple moves- linear, circular, chaotic (Matonyte). They fail to specify HOW the causal path would work, by which a regime would determine the path of transition – cannot move beyond the simple identification of the (possibly) causal condition They often explain the particular cases discussed rather than the broader attempts at generalization Vicious circle? – inescapable path-dependency? 2.3 Criticisms

13. Not initiation, but consolidation of regime change • Institutions & Constitutions = have ‘lock-in’ effect • Establishes the rules & procedures, the limitations of power • Beyond re-establishing former institutions? (Horrowitz) • Not everything can be factored in 2.4 Regime change: Constitutional design Features of Constitutional Design

14. Structural • Codification – regulating all? – grey areas – possibilities for abuse OR lack of flexibility • Declaring and ending state of emergency • Succession in crisis • Immunity of heads of state/ Parliament • Ambiguities in separation of powers 2.5 Discussion of constitutional design

15. 2.6 Constitutional design and state-building • Challenges in state-building constitutional design: • Balance? • Constitution- making (a façade?- Sartori) • account for contextual factors ? • Principles + incentives for conciliation (Horowirz) • Amendments – against ‘spirit of constitution

16. 3.1 Impeding factors

17. 3.2 Facilitating factors

18. Temporary : short-term process with long-term aims (Sriram, 2007) “a pragmatic balancing of ideal justice with political realism that instantiates a symbolic rule of law capable of constructing liberalizing change” (Tietel, 2002) Can consolidate democracy (cement regime change) – promoting justice, de-legitimizing previous leaders, enforcing rule of law, promote norms of inclusiveness Types: domestic or international trials, truth-telling, amnesty, reconciliation (both a subtype and a goal) Cases of successful TJ: South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Rwandan Gacaca courts, etc. Cases of unsuccessful TJ (?): Uganda (LRA- ICC) 3.3 The case for Transitional justice

19. Causality • Plural causation (Linz and Stepan) • Endogeneity? • Excluded variables? • Historic conditions - • Path- dependency? • Structure vs agency debate • Existing variables: • Political leadership = black box variable 3.4. Discussion of causal factors

20. From ideal types to real situations Comparison – Africa? Western/ Eastern divide? Romania Iraq 4.1 Empirical cases Source: BBC News timeline

21. Romania under Ceausescu: sultanistic regime • Sultanistic regime traits (beginning in the 1970s): • Personality cult – Ceausescu and wife Elena (Orwellian), dynastic tendency • Regime& state fusion • Absolute power (Roper) • Narrow social basis • Increasing perversion of communist ideology • Alienating the Communist nomenklatura – promoting clientelism • Fusion of private and public life – the Securitate • Absence of rule of law – spread of corruption • Regime change • From totalitarianism to sultanism • Sultanism to democracy? – transition, disputed revolution – coup d’etat? – what initiated it? • Legacies of Sultanism – Path of transition: • Widespread corruption and clientelism • Societal vacuum • Low public mobilization flickr.com and wikipedia.org

22. Brownlee argues that many exits are possible for sultanistic regimes, but also non-exits Case of non-transitions = high endurance of these types of regimes The role of externally imposed constraints Comparison with other sultanistic regimes

23. Regime type: authoritarian or sultanistic? • Features: • Dynastic, clientelistic • Ba’athism – Saddam’s personal will, not ideology • Cult of personality • Absent rule of law and economic Pluralism • Only occasional mobilization • Transition – trigger= external factors Iraq Source: BBC News timeline: Iraq under Saddam

24. Dawisha & Dawisha’s solution – constitutional design • split executive power btw a weak presidency (symbolic power, unitary figure) and a PM; or a constitutional monarchy • indirect presidential elections would ensure that minorities were not neglected • Parliamentary elections = mixed voting system, no quotas, bicameral Parliament • Facilitating factors = UK model parliamentary system, experience with some political pluralism (unlike scholars claiming sultanistic regime) • Horrowitz’s solution – rule and norm creation • Beyond restoring former institutions • Electoral rules – to create incentives for interethnic cooperation • Federalism or regional autonomy - where large concentrations • Conciliation rules Iraq – transition to democracy

25. Which are more successful in ensuring regime transition - ‘How to’ guides to state building or serendipitous approaches? How much of the direction a transition takes can be determined through constitutional design? Is Iraq an authoritarian or a sultanistic regime? How would that definition affect our understanding and expectations as to its transition path? Is sultanism a particularly difficult regime to change? Why/why not? What is the best regime typology? 2, 3 – more? Historical, or contemporary frameworks? What is democracy/ totalitarianism today? Have the meanings evolved and if so, how? Does the previous regime variable create inescapable path dependency? Can transitional justice mechanisms help consolidate regime change? 5. Conclusion and discussion questions

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