Teacher Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?

1. Teacher Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance? NAEN 33rd Annual Conference Clearwater, Florida Presentation by Randall W. Eberts W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

2. “Never before in recent history have the public schools been subjected to such savage criticism for failing to meet the nation’s educational needs” John Chubb and Terry Moe, Politics, Markets and America’s Schools, 1990

3. “Teacher unions have become crucial forces in deciding how public education should be run in the U.S.” --Wall Street Journal “The most important outcome of teacher unionization is its effect on the way public policy is made.” --Myron Lieberman

4. Teacher Unions • Some of the strongest attacks on public schools are reserved for teachers’ unions • Discontent with public schools in general and teacher unions in particular have fueled interest in a variety of reforms

5. Teacher “Pay for Performance” Vouchers Charters School Accountability Systems State Curriculum And Testing

6. Questions • What do we really know about the effect of unions on student achievement? Are they a help or a hindrance? • If collective bargaining produces a standardized workplace, how does that affect the rapidly changing field of education? • How do reform/school improvement proposals affect student achievement? How do unions figure into these efforts? • Is union reform consistent with educational reform?

7. Why These Issues are Important to You? • Collective bargaining agreements, through negotiated rules and regulations, establish school policy • Important to understand how collective bargaining agreements may affect educational policy and school outcomes • Important to know how negotiations can produce win-win outcomes for teachers, students, administrators, boards • With pressure to reform schools and increase student test scores, and the reality of unions, ways must be found to harness the power of teacher unions to improve schools

8. Are Teacher Unions the Problem or the Solution? • Divided public perception of teacher unions • Asked whether teacher unions helped, hurt, or made no difference in the quality of U.S. public education • Helped 27% • Hurt 26% • Made no difference: 37% • Didn’t know 10% Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll, 1998

9. Your Views? • How would you respond? • If you categorically favor unions and you see them as beneficial, then my talk will not entirely support your views • If you categorically oppose unions and you see them as detrimental, then my talk will also be disappointing

10. My view • Unions are here and they can be a positive force in educational reform • Unions have both positive and negative aspects • Many union preferences and negotiated contracts are consistent with improving student achievement, but some are not • Unions need to act as partners not adversaries, be more flexible, and encourage teachers to be more innovative in meeting the needs of each student

11. Basis for My View • View districts not as either unionized or not, but look at the characteristics of each type of organization to understand what works and what does not (open up the “black box”) • Consider how different organizational forms (e.g. collective bargaining provisions) affect student outcomes • Believe that a successful school environment requires that teachers participate in the decision-making process but that they also recognize that education is risky and that empowerment to make decisions requires accountability in the outcomes

12. Purpose • To share my research and that of others to provide insights into union/nonunion effects • Explore evidence of the effects of current reform efforts • Explore the role of unions in current school improvement and restructuring initiatives

13. What is Collective Bargaining? • Process by which teachers and administrators agree on a set of rules and regulations that govern working conditions and determine compensation • “Web of rules” can affect every dimension of the workplace and educational outcomes • Define rights and duties of teachers to particular assignments • Govern compensation • Establish disciplinary sanctions for failure of teachers to achieve certain standards • Provide for teacher participation in restructuring the workplace

14. Background • Teacher collective bargaining came about with public employee collective bargaining • Wisconsin was the first state to allow public employee collective bargaining in 1962 • By 1978, 61 percent of classroom teachers resided in states that permitted formal collective bargaining in education • Today, unions represent 66 percent of the nation’s elementary and secondary teachers

15. “When we reinvented our association in the 1960s, we modeled it after traditional, industrial unions. Likewise, we accepted the industrial premise: Namely, that labor and management have distinct, conflicting roles and interests ...that we are destined to clash ... that the union-management relationship is inherently adversarial.“ Robert Chase, President, National Education Association, Before the National Press Club, February 5, 1997, Washington, D.C.

16. Principles of Industrial Bargaining Interests of labor and management at odds Standardized practice is desirable Similarly skilled workers are interchangeable and should be treated alike The Factory Model of Schooling Administrators set policy and teachers comply Instruction is delivered uniformly to large groups of students Teaching force is undifferentiated Industrial Style Bargaining Johnson and Kardos,in Conflicting Missions, Loveless (ed.), 2000

18. Contract Provisions • Compensation, including fringe benefits • Working Conditions • School calendar and working hours • Class size • Supplementary classroom personnel (e.g., aides) • Employment Protection • Assignment • Transfers • Promotion • Reductions in force

19. Contract Provisions • Professional Services • Inservice and professional development • Instructional policy committees • Student grading and promotion • Teacher evaluation • Performance indicators • Grievance Procedures • Student Discipline and Teacher Safety • Pupil exclusion from classroom

20. Teacher Pay and Benefits • Pay: Teachers covered by collective bargaining earn 8-12 percent more than teachers not covered • Union factory workers typically earn 8-10 percent more than nonunion ones • Benefits: significant effect of the number of contract items on fringe benefits, more so than for pay

21. Working Conditions • Paid time for instructional preparation is 4 percent greater for unionized teachers • Student-teacher ratio (class size) is between 7-12 percent smaller in union districts • In our national sample of elementary schools, 17 per teacher in union districts versus 19 per teacher in nonunion districts

22. Workplace Standardization • Unionized districts are less likely to rely on specialized instructional modes • Students studying math in unionized schools spend: • 42% less time with a specialist • 62% less time with an aide • 26% less time with a tutor • 68% less time in independent, programmed study • Low- and high-achieving students are in larger classes in union schools than in nonunion schools

23. Employment Protection • With smaller class size, union districts employ more teachers, even in the face of higher pay and more costly fringe benefits • Limitations on class size and reduction in force provisions protect teachers from employment loss in union districts

24. Cost of Instruction • Increased pay, better fringe benefits, improved working conditions, a more regulated standardized workplace, and protections against loss of employment Suggest higher costs in union districts • Union districts spend from 8-15% more per pupil than similar nonunion districts

25. Web of Rules • More complex bargaining agreements raise expenditures per student and affect the internal allocation of funds • Contracts with more bargaining items: • Increase instruction costs/pupil • Increase benefit costs/pupil • Increase teacher salary costs/pupil • Reduce other discretionary expenditures/pupil • No effect on class size • No effect on administrative expenses

26. Effect on Student Achievement • Are there union “productivity” effects that offset the higher cost of union districts? • First, look at what impacts student achievement, as measured by standardized tests • Next, look at the effect of unions on the educational process

28. Resources (Class size) Student Attributes Time Teacher Attributes Administrative Leadership Mode of Instruction

29. What Affects Student Achievement? Top school-based inputs from our study, accounting for other factors • Time teachers spend in instruction • Time teachers spend in preparation • Time principals spend assessing and evaluating educational programs • Total experience of principals as administrators and as teachers • Total experience of teachers • Teacher/student ratio (class size) Student economic status and childhood experience are big factors, but they are not school inputs

30. Educational Factors • The effects of various attributes on student achievement differ by union or nonunion district • Key attributes, such as class size and instructional and preparation time, have less of an effect in union districts than in nonunion ones • May have to do with differences in class size (union districts already have smaller classes) or in the way instruction is organized (fewer specialized classes in union districts) • Suggests that union and nonunion districts use educational inputs differently

31. Unions and Student Achievement • Unions have only a modest effect on student achievement • Even with major differences between union and nonunion districts in the effects of key educational factors • The effects of individual factors net out • Average student test scores slightly higher in union districts • 1-3 percent higher on standardized math test • 3.3 percent higher as a percentage of average gain from pretest to posttest

32. Collective Bargaining: Impact on Student Achievement

34. Why the Union Effect on Student Achievement? • Unionized schools are more likely to rely on traditional classroom instruction and much less on specialized modes of instruction • If teaching takes place in traditional classroom, norm of instruction most likely directed toward average student • Smaller classes directed to average student • With fewer specialty classes, low and high achievers tend to receive less attention in union districts than in nonunion districts

35. Unions and Educational Reform • Unions have established rules and regulations through collective bargaining that are generally consistent with student achievement • Teachers are a key factor in student achievement • Unions represent teachers’ preferences by allocating resources to instruction (smaller class sizes, voice in decisionmaking)

36. Unions and Educational Reform • The CB process has come about through more of an adversarial than collaborative role • Industrial-style contracts narrowly and rigidly define teachers’ roles, responsibilities, and activities • Allows little flexibility among schools • In some instances, administrators as well as teachers are content to live by rules • Public’s discontent with public schools and perception of union’s lack of innovative approaches calls for reform

37. Desire for Change in Bargaining Approach “Our challenge is clear: Instead of relegating teachers to the role of production workers -- with no say in organizing their schools for excellence -- we need to enlist teachers as full partners, indeed, as co-managers of their schools. Instead of contracts that reduce flexibility and restrict change, we -- and our schools -- need contracts that empower and enable.” Robert Chase, President, National Education Association, Before the National Press Club, February 5, 1997, Washington, D.C.

38. Principles of Reform Bargaining Management and labor share interests and collaborate Flexibility and site-based discretion are built into contract Varied roles and status are recognized The Reform Model of Schooling Teachers and admini-strators hold joint responsibility for schooling Governance and instruction are school based Teachers participate as mentors, curriculum experts, and peer reviewers Reform Style Bargaining Johnson and Kardos,2000

39. School Reform • Current wave of school reform grew out of 1983 report “A Nation at Risk” • Two movements: • Reform existing system • Incentive pay • Accountability systems • Find alternative system • School choice—vouchers, charters

40. Vast majority of the public still supports reforming existing schools 72% favor reforming existing system 24% favor finding alternative system Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll September 2001

41. Voucher Referenda • California • $4,000 voucher • Defeated 70% to 30% • Michigan • $3,300 to students in failing districts • Defeated 70% to 30%

42. “The imperative now facing public education could not be more stark: Simply put, in the decade ahead, we must revitalize our public schools from within, or they will be dismantled from without. …The vast majority of Americans …want higher quality public schools, and they want them now.” Robert Chase, President, National Education Association, Before the National Press Club, February 5, 1997, Washington, D.C.

43. Performance Incentive Systems • Pay for performance is an incentive system to hold teachers/administrators accountable for student outcomes • A portion of a teacher’s/administrator’s pay is based on predetermined and agreed upon outcome measures or activities • Old Style: Based on subjective evaluations by principals/superiors • New Style: Based on outcomes (test scores) Based on activities (professional development, mentoring, certification)

44. Incentive Structure • Typically sets aside 5-20 percent of the base salary for performance pay • Some plans offer bonuses above the regular base salary • Other plans start with a reduced base salary (e.g., 90% of regular base) and offer a maximum performance incentive well above that amount • Individual or group-based incentive programs • Programs based on clear, understandable, observable objectives that are consistent with educational goals Source: OSBA Negotiator’s Notebook, March 2000

45. Examples • Individual incentive systems • Denver • Previous merit pay systems during 70s, 80s • School-based incentive systems • Charlotte-Mecklenburg • Kentucky Accountability Program; Maryland School Performance Program • Dallas Source: OSBA, Negotiator’s Notebook, March 2000

46. Effects of Performance Pay • Little empirical evidence on the effects of performance pay on student achievement • Most of the literature on performance pay systems documents the institutional experiences in districts, not the outcomes • Few comparisons of outcomes in schools with incentive programs and in schools with traditional systems • Those experiences, particularly for individual incentive programs, have been rather short-lived and usually negative • A major study of merit-based pay found that most (75%) merit-pay programs that had been in existence in 1983 and had been studied by the researchers, were no longer operational in 1993.

47. Performance Pay: Evidence on SuccessfulPractice • Murnane and Cohen (1986) • Extra pay for extra work • Make everyone feel special (everyone receives) • Inconspicuous • Teachers help design • Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford (1994) • Substantive participation by teachers • Ample planning time • Substantial proportion of teachers receive award • Reward improvement, not just performance • Voluntary

48. Performance Pay: No Evidence of Effect on Student Achievement • “None of the 18 school districts [out of 18 examined] reported significant gains in student achievement. This finding held true even in districts that explicitly targeted and delineated student achievement as a program goal. Where found, improvements in student achievement (test scores) were short-lived and sporadic.” • “Similarly, we found little evidence from other research . . . That incentive programs (particularly pay-for-performance) had led to improved teacher performance and student achievements.” Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford (1994) • No correlation between test score gains and teachers awarded merit bonuses. Tulli (1991)

49. Case Study • Alternative high school in a union district • Teachers opted out of contract to pursue performance pay incentive program • Performance based on student retention and on response to satisfaction survey • A retention bonus is paid if 80% or more of students assigned to class are still enrolled and attending at end of the quarter • Performance bonus if rated 4.65 or above on 5.0 scale • Both bonuses yield 20% of base salary

50. Evaluation Method • Compared students in high school with performance incentives to students in a similar high school with traditional compensation scheme • Examined outcomes by student and course before and after implementation • Evaluated several outcomes: • GPA • Attendance • Course completion • Passing