Dilemmas of peacebuilding

1. Dilemmas of peacebuilding Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy Sisk Presented by: Anita Zayghami

2. Overview of Ch. 4: “Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint Governance” • Main question: In what ways does power sharing facilitate, or impede the transition of divided societies toward a secure democracy? • Jarstad states that previous research provides explanations for why power sharing is acceptable…Power sharing contributes to peace as well as democracy. • But, studies have also shown that power sharing is actually a source of instability, ineffective governance and violence. • Jarstad’s interpretation is that previous research underestimates long-term negative consequences on both peace and democracy.

3. Scholars of democratic theory propose that power sharing promotes democracy and peace… “Government by many is more legitimate than mere majority rule.” • Cooperation is expected to promote tolerance, increased trust, development of democratic culture, and societal peace. • Jarstad argues that the research which provides this claim fail to take into account how the special conditions of war-torn societies affect the functioning of power sharing.

4. Power sharing in war-torn societies entails choices between promotion of democracy OR peace. • 4 mechanisms of power sharing condition the prospect of peace: • 1) Inclusion of warring parties • 2) Intra-group contestation • 3) International dependence • 4) Leveling of power relations

5. At the same time, power sharing can affect democratization negatively in at least 4 ways: • 1) By exclusion of moderate elites • 2) Lack of popular support • 3) External intervention preventing local ownership of the political process • 4) Freezing ethnic division by group representation.

6. The Meaning of Power Sharing • Two different ideas of power sharing in terms of conflict management and democratic theory: • Conflict Management  Main function is to end violence. • Jarstad discusses the work of Barbara Walter: explains the function of power sharing as a mechanism for solving the commitment problem in a context of severe distrust and vulnerability. • The concessions involved in a peace deal increase the parties’ vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty’s other terms. • Once parties lay down their arms and surrender, they become vulnerable to surprise attacks.

7. There is also a lack of trust in the other parties implementation of the agreement. • Therefore, provisions for democratic governance do not settle the issue of uncertainty by themselves. • Walter suggests that each side is likely to demand some form of power sharing as the price for peace. • Jarstad concludes that with this discourse, the main function of power sharing is ending violence and not building democracy.

8. Consociationalism • Jarstad discusses ArendLijphart’s theory on consociationalism. • Main issue is how to make democracy function in societies divided along ethnic lines. • This concept denotes an institutionalized form of democratic conflict management for divided societies. • Lijphart argues that majoritarian electoral systems are unfit… “they presuppose shifting majorities in parliament and fairly similar policies of major parties in order not to exclude the other parties’ interests.” • However, in divided societies, the political parties diverge greatly. Political parties representing ethnic minorities have no chance of ever forming a majority.

9. Majoritarian rule not only undemocratic, but also dangerous. • Lijphart advocates a group-based form of democracy, which he calls consociational democracy…all rival groups should be included in government. • Mutual veto rights and proportionality in political representation also features.

10. In the discourse of conflict management, power sharing seen as mechanism to manage uncertainty involved in peace process. • Research based on democratic theory treats power sharing as a mechanism to foster moderation and to improve quality of democracy.

11. Power Sharing: Effects on Conflict Dynamics • Several reasons why warring parties are reluctant to end conflicts by power sharing: • 1) Insecurity and trust  power sharing might be inadequate to mitigate parties’ vulnerability during the peace process…parties cannot trust each other to uphold an agreement. • 2) Concessions  power sharing entails great concessions for many parties. A strong party would be reluctant to accept a peace deal which makes all parties equal powers. The larger party would naturally consider a majoritarian system rather than power-sharing. -Minority groups might also be reluctant. • 3) Risk of resumption of violence remains  Angola in 1994, violence continued after Lusaka agreement was signed. • 4) Intergroup relations

12. Inclusion of Warring Parties • Who should be included in the power-sharing arrangement? • Negotiated settlements result from compromises between warring parties. For warring groups who see little chance of winning a war, a stake in the government, stipulated by a PSA (power sharing accord), may work as an incentive to lay down arms. • African National Congress  in South Africa is an example of a former rebel group that agreed to give up violent tactics in exchange for transition to democracy. • Northern Ireland  Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army

13. Exclusion can also lead to violence • Exclusion of violence makers can also trigger violence  an agreement which gives positions in government to some of the warring groups provides incentive for excluded groups to resort to violence. • 2000 Burundi PSA, Sudan 2005: cases of partial inclusion • Jarstad concludes that inclusion of warring parties in a power sharing arrangement does not always end violence.

14. Intra-Group Contestation • “Eclipse” mechanism  by fixing the ratio of government positions for each contending group, the primary conflict is regulated or at least concealed. This provides space for moderate factions in support of the peace process and increases vertical legitimacy. • This process can take time: power sharing provisions of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol weren’t fully implemented until large sections of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) had been defeated and after their leader, Savimbi was killed in 2002. • Pierre Atlas and Roy Licklider suggest that societies in civil war are often driven by a wide range on conflicts…once one conflict is taken care of, another presents itself. • Extremist splinter groups can arise  resumption of violence. (Rwanda an example…genocide was not prevented by the Arusha accords).

15. International Dependence • Many PSA’s are mediated by international actors. • Cyprus 1960  Constitution was a result of negotiations between Great Britain, Turkey, Greece, a Greek Cypriot delegation and a Turkish Cypriot delegation. • Consociational arrangement was a compromise between Turkish Cypriot demand for partition and Greek Cypriot desire for unification of Cyprus with Greece. • In 1963, President Makarios announces revision of constitution, believing that his bargaining position had improved. • Ethnic conflict erupted and since then there was no Turkish Cypriot representation. • International actors failed to intervene in order to restore constitutional order….power sharing ended.

16. Leveling Power Relations • Power sharing entails the leveling of power relations between contending groups with the hopes of reducing uncertainty of elections. • However, power sharing can cause another dilemma. • A PSA tends to reflect the power relations at the time of negotiations…when a shift occurs, there is risk of defection from agreement. • Lebanon  4 power sharing systems since 1861. With each change of power balance, the system brought about different winners and losers amongst the 17 religious groups in the country.

17. Power Sharing and Democratization in War-Torn Societies • Lijphart’s theory on consociational democracy is mainly based on the analysis of reforms in already democratic societies. • His theory fails to analyze how the conditions of a war-torn society affect the democracy-promoting aspects of power sharing. • Jarstad lists 4 types of potential democratic shortcomings that designers of a PSA confront:

18. 1) Exclusion of moderates • 2) Weak popular support • 3) Lack of local ownership • 4) Group representation

19. Exclusion of Moderates • According to Jarstad, warring parties decide to share power. At the same time, these parties block other political movements from power. When this happens, the former warring parties tend to control economic resources and media outlets. • This causes any opposition group to lag behind due to lack of resources, creating an uneven start in the democratization process. • To overcome this, the inclusion of other actors in the peace negotiations is necessary (ex: Ivory Coast 2003, Liberia 2003). • Inclusion of warring groups, however, remains an obstacle for democracy.

20. Lack of Popular Support • Increasing the number of political parties in decision making beyond mere majority may enhance legitimacy, but this depends on the level of support for the included elites among the population. • In divided societies, power sharing freezes conflict lines, and parties don’t need to compete for votes among former foes  most parties have narrow support base. • (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

21. Lack of Local Ownership • Problem of local versus external ownership of the democratization process. • In situations in which power sharing is imposed by third parties, local ownership is weak. • Ex: power sharing has to a very limited extent led to political cooperation for the communities of Kosovo…result of lack of ownership of power-sharing agreement. • Power sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina suffers from similar lack of ownership as well... During negotiations in Dayton 1995, no representative from civil society was included. • In cases of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a problem of democratic accountability.

22. Group Representation • Power sharing emphasizes representation of certain target groups, rather than representation of ideas/ideologies. This causes questions as to whether or not power sharing is democratic. • Accountability is an issue as well. When all groups are included in government, it becomes difficult to hold politicians accountable. • Suggested that power-sharing arrangements are inefficient and that decision-making process slows down when all groups have a say. • According to Jarstad, there are ways to make power sharing more democratic  In New Zealand, power sharing arrangements allow the voters to vote for candidates of any ethnic origin.

23. Conclusion • Power sharing has become a tool used to end conflicts by including warring parties in government. • Jarstad argues that power sharing in war-torn societies can have negative effects on war-to-democracy transitions. • Power sharing may enhance the risk of violence and can inhibit democracy. • By bringing together research on power sharing from two strands of research – conflict management and democratization, the potential negative consequences become more evident. • For power sharing to promote both peace and democracy, it needs a carefully crafted design, as well as continuous monitoring.

24. CH 5: When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in Post-War Politics MimmiSöderberg Kovacs

25. What are the prospects for democratization and sustainable peace in war-scattered societies which formerly armed insurgents emerge as politicians? • This chapter argues that although the inclusion of formerly armed and militarized groups in post-war politics has proven beneficial, it sometimes has negative consequences for the emerging democratization process.

26. Rebel-to-party transformations: a remedy for ending the war • Two arguments have been put forward in favor of efforts to transform former rebels to political parties in civil war peace processes: • First argument based on notion that if the previous war was the result of legitimate grievances on the part of the armed opposition, the conflict resolution processes should strive to address these injustices…in particular, exclusion of certain groups. • Second argument builds on the view that in order to ensure the commitment of the rebels in the peace process, one should strive to increase their incentives for peace through granting them a legitimate political role in the new post-war order.

27. Outcomes of the two scenarios have varied: In some cases, former rebels emerged as the new government party after decades of armed struggle (South Africa, East Timor and in Palestinian self-governing territories). In other cases, former rebel groups emerged as opposition parties in the post-settlement period (El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, Mozambique). • In some cases, rebels returned to arms during implementation of the peace accord (Cambodia). • Some rebels emerge as political parties through establishment of power-sharing mechanisms.

28. Political Parties as Agents of Democratization • Political parties have traditionally been regarded as the intermediary organization of liberal democracy, linking citizens with the state. • They provide post-war political order, creating a multi-party democracy which did not previously exist. • Two main categories of functions of political parties: • 1) political parties are expected to perform a variety of representative functions aiming at channeling the interests and preferences of the people into policy proposals. • 2) They perform a variety of procedural or institutional functions that serve to organize the political system of the state.

29. One of the greatest problems facing party systems in new democracies is their lack of institutionalization, lack of legitimacy, and weak roots in society. • This causes representative role of these parties to be limited with weak links to the population. • However, political parties “remain an indispensable institutional framework for representation and governance in a democracy” (Diamond 1999). • Thus, with its limitations, political parties are considered vital to the start of democracy.

30. Dilemmas of Armed Insurgents in Post-War Politics • Transformation of formerly armed group to political parties generally considered positive development. • However, emergence of rebels gives rise to challenges for both democratic progress and peace.

31. Horizontal Dilemma: Inclusion vs. Exclusion of Rebel Groups • Two issues that illustrate tensions that arise between values of peace and democracy when former rebels are included into the political system: • 1) The risk of a sedimentation of parties and issues based on the structures of war • 2) The risk of undermining the democratic principle of rule of law when peace agreement includes provisions of amnesty for crimes committed during armed struggle.

32. 1) • Inclusion of warring parties into post-war politics can take place at the expense of the exclusion of other parties. • The rising party comes to define which questions will dictate the post-war agenda…this could reinforce incompatibilities which were meant to be eliminated through the peace process. • Ex: Bosnia and the Croatian Democratic Union, the Serb Democratic Party and Bosniac Party of Democratic Action….play a big role in hampering democratic development.

33. 2) • Assurances of amnesty  Inclusion of formerly warring parties in politics can often take place at the price of granting these individuals amnesty for war crimes. • This is problematic in terms of the practice of democracy. Instead, there should be a need for prosecution for abuses committed during war. This provides a sense of justice, and provides a focus for rebuilding the justice system.

34. The Vertical Dilemma: Popular Legitimacy Versus Efficacy of Governance • A number of issues can be identified in regards to legitimacy and efficacy: • Democratic deficits due to legacy of armed struggle and background as political-military organizations Hard for many of these parties to adjust to democratic policies. **What characterized these groups and their movements in armed struggle was the stress on unity…Paradoxically, as these groups became more successful, they found it more difficult to transition into one political competitor. ** • Changing relationship between the former rebels and the population at large in transition from war to democracy: in many cases, these parties remain true to wartime ideology, making it harder to work on gaining supporters and votes.

35. The Systemic Dilemma: Domestic Versus International Legitimization of Parties • The transformation of warring actors to legal political parties in democratic transitions raises the question of who has the right to determine which formerly warring groups are to be considered legitimate actors and should be granted a role in post-war politics. • The international community carries significant influence over the dynamics and outcomes of the process of rebel conversion. This raises some questions: Does the process of international legitimization of certain warring groups always comply with the perceptions and opinion of the domestic audience? (Sierra Leone)

36. The Temporal Dilemma: Short-term Versus Long-Term Effects of Rebels in Politics • Lack of good governance and democratic progress in new democracies poses a long-term risk for sustainable peace and may contribute to renewed armed conflict. • Legitimacy of the peace process is contingent on the display of significant improvement in people’s daily lives. If there is no significant, positive changes, the people and the warring parties will question the legitimacy of the peace accord…this leads to new grievances. • If there is no progress, there is more of a chance that armed conflict occur (Liberia 1997). • **Efforts to advance sustainable peace must be accompanied by efforts to advance democratic values.**