Settlement of 1815 left Italy weak and divided Lombardy and Venice— habsburg rule

1. Settlement of 1815 left Italy weak and divided • Lombardy and Venice—habsburg rule • Tuscany, Parma and modena tied to Austria • Central and Southern italy—papacy and Bourbons • Piedmont retained political independence, but geographically peripheral, french culture, italian minority, displayed little interest in wider affairs pre 1840s • But napoleonic period established rudiments of modern state—had swept away Ancien regime—welcome to many intellectuals, wider political participation, expectation of careers open to talent, dismantling of aristocratic and ecclesiastical privileges • After downfall, return to reactionary policies, political opposition forced to operate underground—secret political sects throughout italy, carbonari • 1830—any groups arguing for emergence of Italian state would be suppressed, no active political campaigns could be conducted to persuade neutral/wavering opinion • Economic development, except in Lombardy, lagged behind N. Europe, lack of large entrepreneurial and professional class—the force behind liberal and nationalistic propaganda • Restricted literacy, regional dialects used, Italian was restricted to narrow elite, coherent national movement hard to sustain • But international situation kept italian question on agenda—french revolution haunted political consciousness of europe • Austrian empire obstacle to nationalism, quickening pace of economic change would lead to demands for political reform • As middle class grew in italy, combination of deep attachment to cultural tradition and legacy of french revolution—undermined austrian rule

2. Guiseppemazzini did most to set idea of Italy before the public eye, originally part of the Carbonari, but believed political transformation needed acquiescence of broad sections of population. This couldn’t happen if insurrectionary activity was left in hands of small secret sects. • Elaborate propaganda exercise plus insurrections needed, clarity of long term goals needed, public had to be persuaded to sympathize with revolutionary movement • Created La Giovine Italia, educated people politically, mission to emerge as nation state in age where national principal undermined legitimacy of outmoded political forms • Limited practical achievement, abortive insurrections of Savoy and Naples 1833-34, various uprisings in Naples after 1837 easily suppressed, but even failure has propaganda value—government was overthrown momentarily in Turin and Naples 1920-1, showing that it could be done • Mazzini forced activists to think in terms of national, not regional politics. Became bete noir of authorities, exiled, only returned in 1849 • Large amount of writing in exile, but only read by educated few, more popular in England, but also influenced many radicals—Garibaldi and many of his thousand were Mazzinians • Reaction to Mazzini was split—Cattaneo, editor of Il Politecnico wanted concrete improvements, society and economy needed general extension of free trade areas, like Zollverein, modernization in transport, industry, administration and law—lot of ordinary Italians would improve only by this instead of ambitious political reconstruction • Socialists suspicious that ideological zeal would not serve needs of people—question of which national cause to respond to • Moderates hardened against insurrectionary strategy, no guarantee that concrete socioeconomic and constitutional reforms would follow, repetition of reign of terror wasn’t a risk worth running

3. Alternative national strategy in 1840s developed—instead of revolution from below, possibilities for political changes in one or more of established ruling houses who could be persuaded to reform—deeply suspicious of populism, ambitions went no further than modest constitutionalism, close links to liberal aristocracy, especially Piedmont, wielded influence without recourse to subversive measures • Lesson of Mazzini—population not ready for revolution • Instead, initiative to be left to Piedmont (only state with independent political options, despite Charles Albert’s prevarication) or Papal states • Position of the constitutional monarchists, the moderates in-between Mazzinian left and status quo, came to center stage with ascendancy of Pius IX—reputation of liberal sympathies (not true), granted amnesty to prisoners (customary), conceded lay representation on consultative committees—consulta, wider commitments to examine civil and criminal law, press censorship and economic infrastructure (allowed development of free trade union, protested against Austrian occupation of Ferrara) Swept away by public excitement and praise • Italians faced threat of public in dangerously volatile atmosphere with backdrop of food shortages and economic crisis • Pressures for political reform increased—risings in most of urban centers—milan, turin, genoa, parma and modena • Princes turned to moderates—hasty constitutions formed in naples, Rome and Tuscany • Developments abroad ensured Italian local uprisings would be viewed in international context—february revolution in Paris, with uprisings in Vienna and budapest, resignation of Metternich in March 1848, stage set for concerted action against Austria (in theory) • 1848 March Milan—initial boycott of tobacco (Austrian state monopoly) led to more general insurrection, managed to force large Austrian garrison under Radetzky out of Milan, but Milanese leaders unclear on policy, military strategy in hands of radical council of war

4. Moderate patricians began to fear republican developments—only wanted to free milan from austria, radicals saw milanese campaign in context for italian republic • Radicals recognized power and influence of patricians couldn’t be effectively challenged, deferred discussion of constitutional and ideological issues till final victory—left patricians with free hand to consolidate position, turned to Piedmont • Piedmont beset by conflicting pressures—charlesalbert viewed prospect of republican victory in milan with alarm, reluctant to further republican campaign against austria, but couldn’t risk undermining position of milanese moderates through inactivity, piedmontese dynastic interest in annexing lombardy, opportunity to put itself at head of national movement, intense pressure for intervention, influential article by cavour published, major triumph of milan against austria could seriously threaten piedmont’s political hegemony in northern italy • So agreed to give military assistance—proved disastrous to milanese cause—delay and prevarication led to military initiative to be lost, wasted time collecting votes for annexation of Lombardy, piedmont leadership accepted this for duration of struggle • In venice, nationalist leader Manin released from prison—Austrians unable to rely on own forces, so withdrew—Republic of St. Mark declared, but precarious existence • Manin reluctant to rely on Piedmont but had no option, without military assistance, independence would be short lived. Fusion with piedmont • Piedmont’s objectives of defeat of radicals in Milan and Venice and dominant position in Northern Italy were achieved, but by this time, Austrians had regrouped—had more resources, supplies, Radetzky better strategist, Piedmont troops had terrible leaders and very little skill because of nepotism, reinforcements from Austria arrived to crush Piedmont army in July • When forced by radicals in Piedmont to launch second initiative, Charles Albert failed again. Had raised expectations of nationalist movement, so return of Milan to Austria was bitter disappointment, personal credit was exhausted, abdicated, Victor Emmanuel II came to throne

5. But Piedmont still retained statuto • Only venice continued struggle—but position was desperate, succumbed to Austrian bombardment, food shortages, cholera and failure of revolution in Hungary (meant austria no longer embroiled in internal affairs) August 1849 • In papal states, pius IX couldn’t commit to war against catholic power, church before nationalist interests, liberal minister of interior suppressed rights—assassinated Nov. 1848, Pius fled rome. Republic formed, triumvirate led by Mazzini, but completely isolated—Austrian, French and Bourbon troops massing, despite Garibaldi’s defensive action, succumbed in July 1849 • Radicals in Naples, Sicily and Palermo isolated from other italian centers and lacked international support—didn’t coordinate tactics, pursued own causes, allowed Ferdinand II (initially forced to abandon Sicily) to bide his time till favorable time for princes, then picked them off separately: Bourbon rule restored April 1849 in Kingdom of two Sicilies • Lessons learned: insurrection as a tactic almost worthless without extensive coordination of policies across wide range of political fronts, popes and kings couldn’t be trusted to pursue nationalistic goals if these should clash with dynasty, insurmountable practical problems couldn’t be solved by theoretical and abstract discussions • Regions of italy simply had different economic and cultural interests, as did different classes • Mazzini’s preoccupation with the nation simply glossed over larger social, cultural and economic implications of revolution, yet without structural changes, political innovation would be merely cosmetic • Among radicals, revolution of 1848 exacerbated fundamental differences of view • Piedmont required wide-range of reform if she wanted to retain future freedom of movement—finance, administration, industry and commerce

6. Cavour, architect of Piedmont’s modernization, technical mastery, well-read, thrusting ambition, ministry of finance—laissez faire economics program of economic liberalization • 1852 connubio—concluded agreement with leader of moderate democrats, beginning of style of politics of liberal regime, isolated monarchic right and mazzinian left, in control of moderate parliamentary opinion of all shades—able to pursue various political options • Negotiated twin perils of revolution and reaction at home while ensuring policies well-received abroad to get loans • Till death in 1861, pragmatic liberalization of economy, national bank—raised capital of private investment, public works projects—railways, canals, irrigation • Piedmont started to look modern • Cavour uninterested in wider italian question at first, but political elite of turin shared enthusiasm of 1848 and political culture no longer as narrow—revolutionaries of 1848 had gathered in Piedmont—austrian wars had given people broader view • So cavour set diplomatic grounds to bring about dramatic changes, recognized italian unification would have implication on european balance of power • ensured sensible reformism not swamped by ambitions of democrats and socialists • Saw possibility of exploiting nationally assertive France in more general anti-austrian strategy after Napoleon III’s coup of 1851 • Crimean war 1853-6 marked final breach between autocratic states securing status quo in europe, piedmont sent army to help french and british, secured uncertain ally and degree of sympathy from UK at congress of Paris 1856 • Cavour couldn’t risk conventional trial of strength against Austria, but persuaded UK and France that Piedmont constituted important buffer against potentially dominant continental state, focused diplomatic efforts on france were Napoleon III was more sympathetic to Italian cause, secret meeting committed Napoleon to support Piedmont in event of Austria war

7. France to be compensated by cession of Nice and Savoy (realpolitik, repugnant to nationalists) • Cavour didn’t put himself at head of national campaign—intent upon maximisingpiedmontese advantage in case of future uprisings • Nationalists recognized Piedmont’s importance, but some (garibaldi) upset at cavour’srealpolitik. Piedmont supporting nationalists formed Italian National Society 1857 under Manin—bridge between cavour and wider nationalist movement, branches extended throughout northern and central italy, new cohesion in national campaign • 1859 cavour provoked austria into declaring war, but couldn’t continue relying on French assistance in all circumstances, French and Piedmontese victories accompanied by spontaneous risings in central italy, but this alarmed Napoleon who sought independent peace with Austria, Cavour disgusted, resigned, Piedmont gained only lombardy • Public opinion via national society in tuscany and emilia continued pressing for union with piedmont, napoleon as declared champion of Italian nationalism couldn’t publicly oppose, but grew suspicious of Piedmont’s growing territorial ambitions • Cavour returned 1860, confident he could persuade napoleon to give gains in central italy in return for savoy and nice, used public plebiscites to force napoleon’s consent • Spring 1860, garibaldi and his radicals concerned Piedmont had no intention of unification, exploited small rising in Palermo, sailed to sicily with band of volunteers in name of Victor Emmanuel and italy in hope that popular enthusiasm and fear of unrest would force piedmont to extend military campaign to the south • Cavour and VE strongly against movement—southern italy was undeveloped and viewed as diseased, cavour supplied archaic and faulty arms to garibaldi (couldn’t directly oppose him) but Garibaldi was master of guerilla tactics and defeated Bourbon army in may 1860 and by june was dictator of sicily. As he embarked on march to naples, cavour decided to risk civil war to prevent him from reaching rome—used italian national society to foment disorder

8. Pretext for right of passage of piedmont troops—garibaldi had claimed all in name of VE, so lost political battle, couldn’t risk civil war ruining all progress—piedmont parliament annexed south, garibaldi offered kingdom he had liberated to VE • State established in 1861 hollow achievement—Rome and venice remained in hands of Papacy and austria respectively, french garrison in rome • Italian military had not been crucial to completion of state, shift of european balance of power and prussian expansion forced austria to accept cession of venice to italy in 1866, while franco-prussian war in 1870 forced french withdrawal from rome • Minor italian role in unification source of deep shame, deep divisions post 1848 still remained, unitary or federal, republican or monarchical, host of political dilemmas—conservative revolution which preserved social status quo • Many radicals made peace with regime but on terms which deprived united italy of regular opposition party, fiery opposition from church argued against liberalism and nationalism on doctrinal grounds—couldn’t deal with loss of temporal power, withdrew to vatican and refused to recognize state, urged catholics not to involve themselves in politics, prevented emergence of broad based conservative party that could have provided stability • Instead leaders felt unable to respond positively to threats from left or right • Constitution was old 1848 piedmont statuto, extended to peninsula irrespective of difficulties in extending modern state to regions accustomed to different practices • Franchise based on tax and literacy overrepresented advanced north, only 2% allowed to vote • Chamber of deputies dominated by factions whose leaders supported government in return for political favors, system corrupt • Widespread unrest in south 1861-5: endemic lawlessness compounded by ideological disaffection, demobilized bourbon troops and intransigent clerics—brutality of italian army in quelling army soured relations, removal of trade barriers devastated southern industry