1 / 12

The Global Financial Crisis And International Economic Law

The Global Financial Crisis And International Economic Law. Prof. Dr. Anne van Aaken Prof. Dr. Jürgen Kurtz 26/27 May 2009. Motivation. Lawyers have been slow to explore the potential violations of international economic law so far

allene
Download Presentation

The Global Financial Crisis And International Economic Law

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. The Global Financial Crisis And International Economic Law Prof. Dr. Anne van Aaken Prof. Dr. Jürgen Kurtz 26/27 May 2009

  2. Motivation • Lawyers have been slow to explore the potential violations of international economic law so far • Are there international law restrictions for states in times of crisis? • What are the most likely venues for disputes and which treaties form the legal basis? • Caveat: Measures are a moving target; for now mainly parliamentary laws giving great discretion to executive branch; implementing measures/decisions have to be awaited!

  3. Overview • Procedural Issues • International Trade Law • GATS • Subsidies and Countervailing Measures • International Investment Law • How does it work? • OECD National Treatment Instrument • Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation • Bilateral Investment Treaties/RTA with Investment Chapters • National Treatment • Fair and Equitable Treatment • Exceptions • Conclusion and Outlook

  4. Procedural Issues • Likelihood for bringing a claim • Trade Law: State-to-State, but unilateral measures like CVD more likely than multilateral avenue (DSB) • Investment Law: Investor-to-State (in BITs) • Investment Law: more likely • Scope of Protection: broader, policy space smaller than an trade law • No political filter • Hard enforceable remedies  Focus on Investment Law

  5. International Trade Law • GATS • Financial Services Measures: included in principle • But prudential carve-out applies most likely (but good faith limits) • SCM Agreement • Measures most likely to be actionable measures (non-actionable non-existent anymore) • NAFTA • Financial Services (Ch. 14): prudential carve-out most likely to apply

  6. International Investment Law (I)How does it work? BIT (=IL) Home State Host State State Contract Nationality Investment Investor Int. Arbitral Tribunals (e.g. ICSID)

  7. International Investment Law (II) • OECD National Treatment Instrument • Non-binding • But: conveys common understanding of NT of OECD States by classifying measures as exceptions to NT • May be used for interpretational clarity in investment disputes • Treaties of FCN • Between OECD States; have NT provisions • but litigation only state-to-state (except US: self-executing  investors may litigate before US Courts) • otherwise: ICJ  Success on the merits is likely, but procedural hurdles

  8. International Investment Law (III) • Bilateral Investment Treaties • Mostly not between OECD states • US/Can BITs more restrictive than EU BITs • National Treatment • proscribes “less favourable treatment” of a foreign investor that stands “in like circumstances” or in “like situations” with a domestic actor • Comparator for “in like circumstances”? competition-based reading of national treatment • What is “less favourable treatment”? De iure and de facto • Is adverse purpose of the state needed or is effect enough? Jurisprudence is not uniform

  9. International Investment Law (IV) • How likely is the merit of litigation? • Comparator: “like circumstances” (+) for financial industry and e.g. automotive industry • “less favorable”: • De iure: if origin-neutrality is not guaranteed; e.g. if branches are excluded (e.g. Australia, Ireland, Germany) (+) • De facto: depends much how laws are applied, but market test applicable • Effects: less favorable enough • Purpose: depending on what “rational” ground tribunals accept unequal treatment e.g. on the grounds of systemic risk (CH), substantial business activity (USA)  Success on the merits is likely

  10. International Investment Law (V) • Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard • Discriminatory • Due Process • Intransparency  Success on the merits is not likely • Exceptions • Prudential Carve-Outs for Financial Services (NAFTA, US/Can BITs) • National Security Exceptions: rather unlikely to be accepted (cf. Argentina)

  11. Summary of Legal Instruments and Success of Legal Action

  12. Conclusion and Outlook • BITs/Treaties of FCN seem to be the most likely venue • National Treatment is the norm most likely to be violated • National Security Exceptions are unlikely to be accepted • International Investment Law seems the more likely legal venue for restricting States in protectionist tendencies than International Trade Law • Open question: is the law correctly so strict?

More Related