IPP- ETH Zurich October 12th, 2006 LAGUNA Meeting WG 7: Safety and Environment Report by L. Mosca

1. IPP- ETH ZurichOctober 12th, 2006LAGUNA MeetingWG 7:Safety and EnvironmentReport by L. Mosca L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

2. Members of the WG 7 Luigi MOSCA (Fréjus) : Coordinator Neil SPOONER (Boulby) Timo ENQVIST (Pyhäsalmi) W. PYTEL (Poland) ………………. Others are welcome ! L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

3. Few general remarks 1) The safety requirements should be present since the beginning of a laboratory and detector project (not added afterwards) 2) The safety solutions need to be studied in close connection with the overall safety strategy of the host infrastructure (tunnel or mine) 3) A close cooperation with the ILIAS WG-2 will be natural and fruitful L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

4. Proposed “guide-lines”(not exhaustive …) • stability of the large cavities considered in the feasibility study for each site (in particular versus possible earthquakes) and in the long term • fire detection and extinction • risk of liquids leaks (evaporation, surroundings contamination, etc.) • risk of falls (great height) • risk of electrocution • air composition and purity (CO, CO2, NO,NO2, Radon, …) • integration of the experiment’s installation safety in the overall safety strategy of the host infrastructure (tunnel or mine) • …………………….. L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

5. So far two LAGUNA members contributed with a preliminary description (along the proposed guide-lines) of the safety problems and perspectives in their candidate site : Pyhäsalmi and Fréjus (other contributions are expected …) L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

6. Pyhäsalmi • -Stabilityoflargecavities • Accordingtoapre-feasibilitystudy(April2002),itispossibleto • excavatelarge-sizecavernsinPyhäsalmiatthedepthof1400-1500 • metres(4000-4200mwe).ThismeansLENA-typecaverns.Thisisespecially • trueifthedirectionofthecavernisnotimportant.Therockisvery • stable.Somemicro-seismicactivityappears(itismonitoredbythemine) • buttheycannotbecomparedwithearthquakes,whichareextremelyrare • andsmallinthescale(allaroundFinland).Thelong-termstabilityof • largecavernsshouldalsobegood. • -Firedetectionandextinction • Afireisthemostdangerousaccidentinthemine.Itshouldtakeinto • considerationalreadyinthedesignofanexperiment.Automaticdetection • systemsshouldbeused.Dependingonthetypeoffire,various(automatic) • extinctionsystemscanbeused.Waterusuallyisnotgood. • -Riskofliquidleaks • Thegroundwaterisabovethe1400metreslevel,andthuscannotbe • spoiltduetoaliquidleak. • Themainactivityofthemineoccurs(untilabout2016)atthelevelof • 1400-1450metres.Ifalarge-volumedetectorisconstructedduringthe • life-timeofthemine,itshouldbetakecare,thattheleakageofliquids • doesn'trisktheoperationofthemine. L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

7. Pyhäsalmi (continued) • -Aircompositionandpurity • Themineoperationtakesplaceatthedepthof1410metres(themainlevel). • Thefreshairisputdirectlythere.Thisisnormalorstandardwayof • havingfreshairunderground,andtherearenotroublewithCO,CO2,etc. • Alsonotroublewithradon,whichismonitoredregularly(bytheRadiation • SafetyAuthorityinFinland).Inthenewdeeplaboratorythefreshair • procedurecanbedoneinthesameway. • -Integrationofthesafetyoftheexperimentwiththemine • Thisisessential.Theexperimentcannotbestarteduntiltheminehas • acceptedallitssafety(andother)issues.Apparentlyallthesafety • issueswillbedone(andshouldbedone)togetherwiththeminesafety • personnel. L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

8. Fréjus • -Stabilityoflargecavities : • this item was already implicit in the Feasibility Study performed for the Fréjus site, but a more extensive investigation is needed in the frame of a Design Study • -Firedetectionandextinction : • I agree with you that fire is the more serious risk for an underground experiment ; we have some experience with the access to, and operations inside, the present Fréjus Laboratory (LSM) • The type of fire automatic detection and fire (automatic ?) extinction must be very seriously investigated and defined by the Design Study • -Riskofliquidleaks : • this risk is of course qualitatively very different for the 3 types of detectors (Water, Liquid Argon and Liquid Scintillator) and, for example, the case of Liquid Argon must be considered in very close connection with the ventilation system of both the Laboratory and the Tunnel and with a reliable monitoring of the air composition (see the next item) L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

9. Fréjus (continued) • -Aircompositionandpurity : • we have a quite long (about 25 years) and specific experience in this sector at the present (LSM) Laboratory, which should be taken into account in the Design Study • -Integrationofthesafetyoftheexperimentwiththetunnel safety organization : • here also we have a 25 years experience with the LSM laboratory : our safety equipments have been systematically discussed and defined in agreement with the Tunnel safety authorities and experts and safety tests and exercises are periodically performed with the Tunnel safety operators. So, the implication of the Tunnel safety experts in the Design Study will be an essential condition. L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich

10. Road-map for the (next) future : • define a precise programme (more inputs are needed for that) • fix “milestones” and “deliverables” • find partners both in our Institutions and in external Institutions and Companies • estimate the needed budget • ……………………………… • produce a draft-proposal L. Mosca LAGUNA Meeting in Zurich