EMERGENCY PLANNING IN ILLINOIS

1. EMERGENCY PLANNING IN ILLINOIS Due to the accident at Fukushima, policy and procedure have changed globally as well as locally. IEMA is currently making changes to address severe accidents at Illinois Nuclear Power Plants These changes insure that Illinois’ IPRA (Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents) plan and procedures exceed the challenges that result from Fukushima-like events Even though changes are forthcoming, the current 10-mile EPZ and protective actions remain adequate for severe accidents

2. THE LEGACY OF FUKUSHIMA One of those events that has a lasting effect on Emergency Planning For Japan a severe economic loss including loss of power generation Has led to a reexamination of rules and guidance for fixed nuclear facilities Even safer nuclear power generation but at more cost per kwh

3. WHAT ARE THE HEALTH EFFECTS United Nations Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) has found that overall, the exposure of the Japanese population to radiation in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident was low or very low The additional dose received by most Japanese people in the first year and subsequent years is less than the background dose received. Consequently health risks are low

4. EMERGENCY RESPONSE • Japan evacuated a 20 km radius or about 12.4 miles • Approximately 80,000 people were evacuated • DOE Flyover surveys showed Protective Action Guides (PAGs) were not exceeded beyond 5 miles • The highest exposure rate at 20 km was 33 mr/hr

5. EMERGENCY RESPONSE Evacuations carried out by the Japanese at Fukushima were protective in the sense that they reduced exposures by about a factor of 10 Eventually over 100,000 people were monitored for contamination Approximately 1000 were over 13K cpm and 102 were over 100K cpm(13K cpm are equivalent to a small exposure rate of approximately 4 mR/hr while contamination is present on their person)

6. EVACUATION DEATHS • Eight Hospitals and 17 Nursing Care facilities within 20 Km evacuation zone • 60 early deaths resulted from evacuation • 573 deaths were later classified as disaster-related to the evacuation • A disaster related death certificate is issued when a death is not directly caused by a tragedy, but by fatigue or aggravation caused by the disaster

7. FUKUSHIMA VS CHERNOBYL • I-131 Released 3,780,000 Ci ( ~3-5%) • Chernobyl 48,000,000 Ci • Cs-137 Released 297,000 Ci (~2-3%) • Chernobyl 2,300,000 Ci • Approximately ten times the radiological source term was released at Chernobyl as all of the releases from all of the reactors at Fukushima

8. FUKUSHIMA’S EFFECT ON ILLINOIS • Reactors in Illinois are licensed by the NRC • As already presented there are many activities underway at the NRC that were initiated by Fukushima • Most of these activities are directed at what is known as Beyond Design Basis Accidents • Design Basis Accident is a postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand without loss to the systems, structures and components necessary to ensure public health and safety.

9. FUKUSHIMA’S EFFECT (continued) As the NRC goes, so goes Illinois The changes the NRC has made as a result of Fukushima, and any changes they may make in the future, will affect Illinois more than any other state

10. WHAT HAS CHANGED Changes Onsite mandated by NRC Offsite FEMA has not required changes yet The changes onsite are designed to enhance the response to an accident Offsite IEMA has enhanced our capabilities as a result of a self assessment

11. ONSITE CHANGES Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing Alternate Facilities Communications Enhanced Dose Assessment

12. ERO STAFFING The utility must complete studies showing that there are sufficient staff to handle all functions necessary to respond to a severe accident at all times As an example, if five individuals on-shift are needed for fire fighting there must remain adequate staff to mitigate the accident

13. ALTERNATE FACILITIES All utilities are being required to make arrangements for backup facilities in case their Technical Support Center (TSC) is unavailable due to a beyond design basis accident The Alternate Facilities are designed to have minimal capabilities that would allow TSC staff a place to assemble and interface with other emergency response organization staff

14. COMMUNICATIONS In a major accident like Fukushima, it is likely there will be a loss of infrastructure. This includes communications channels such as cell towers Licensees are being required to develop robust and redundant communications systems

15. DOSE ASSESSMENT Prior to Fukushima, most dose models only allowed one release point New dose models will be able to handle multiple release points and longer releases Even the NRC’s dose model RASCAL was not designed to run multiple releases simultaneously

16. OFFSITE ENHANCEMENTS Modernization of IEMA data monitoring capability Expanded Training Program Expanded Environmental Monitoring Program

17. MODERINIZATION OF DATA Illinois currently monitors more reactor parameters than any other state (~1,000 per reactor) Illinois also has an extensive monitoring program for offsite radiation data Illinois is currently upgrading the software used to process and analyze this data Net result will be state of the art displays, more modern monitoring capabilities, and a more user friendly interface

18. ENHANCED TRAINING PROGRAM Over the years, we have been fortunate to have a highly skilled and talented staff IEMA’s training program has been revised to capture the key skills needed to maintain proficiency in our Radiological Task Force (RTF) staff These proficiency standards ensure that all individuals who may respond possess the skills needed to perform at the highest level

19. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING • Goals: • Collection and analysis of samples from locations which provide sample types appropriate to determine if a public health or environmental radiological impact is detected in the environs of the nuclear power plants due to their operation • Establishment of useful baseline data which can be used to perform exposure assessments when necessary and to compare environmental radioactivity measurements in the event of a potential nuclear reactor accident anywhere in the world

20. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING • Program Expansion • IEMA is in the midst of expanding our Environmental Monitoring Program, in part, due to lessons learned following the Fukushima incident.

21. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING • Independent Sample Collection • IEMA is developing independent sampling plans which include multiple locations suitable for collection of various sample types in the environs of each nuclear power plant in Illinois • IEMA Staff collect the samples • IEMA Staff test the samples in our Radiochemistry Laboratory

22. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING • Background Reference Site • Carlyle Lake → Sangchris State Park • Since it is not in the proximity of any nuclear power plants, it will be an essential component in assessing the impacts of any future incidents at nuclear power plants in other states or countries

23. WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE? There are many topics still being evaluated by the NRC As was pointed out earlier most of these items fall into Tier 3 The EP related items that previously were Tier 2 (9.3 EP Items) are adequately being addressed by Order EA-12-049, ORDER MODIFYING LINCENSES WITH REGARD TO REQUIREMENTS FOR MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EXTERNAL EVENTS

24. FUTURE (continued) Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements for prolonged SBO and multiunit events (dependent on availability of critical skill sets) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability (modernization of data) Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring and public education

25. FUKUSHIMA EXPERIENCE • A NRC Commissioner decided to recommend a 50 mile evacuation for all U S residents at Fukushima • This recommendation was based on a RASCAL projection • The projection assumed several reactor cores of activity were released • Knowledge of onsite plant conditions and offsite radiation levels was extremely limited

26. Purported Offsite Issues 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Potassium Iodide (KI) Beyond 10 Miles

27. 10 MILE EPZ The basis for the 10 Mile EPZ is the Reactor Safety Study WASH 1400 (1975) The 2012 NRC study, State of the Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA), shows timing and magnitude of releases result in reduced risks when compared to earlier studies Fukushima results support SOARCA The 10 Mile EPZ was the subject of a petition for Emergency Planning Rulemaking

28. 10 MILE EPZ (continued) No closeout yet of the petition for an expanded EPZ Technical Basis does not exist for expanding at this time Therefore, it is expected that the 10 mile EPZ will remain In summary, Fukushima and SOARCA point to risks lower than what was known at the time the 10 mile EPZ was established

29. KI There has been a push among some groups to expand the distribution of KI KI (Potassium Iodide) is only protective for the internal dose received from Radioiodine KI offers no protection from external dose received from radioiodine or any other radionuclides Evacuation or shelter remain the preferred protective action

30. FUKUSHIMA KI EXPERIENCE • KI was eventually recommended at Fukushima out to 20 km • I-131 concentrations at site boundary resulted in a thyroid dose peak of 160 mR/hr, i.e. require over 31 hours to reach EPA PAG • Yet thousands of miles away in California, there was a run on supplies of KI

31. SUMMARY • As a result of Fukushima, changes to EP have occurred and more will be forthcoming in Illinois and the rest of the US • Fukushima supports recent NRC research in that severe reactor accidents develop more slowly than previously thoughtand releases and offsite consequences are also lower than previously postulated