1 / 22

Monitoring Key performance indicators Ruud van der Ploeg EMTA GM 11-12 november 2010

Quality in Amsterdam public transport contracts. Monitoring Key performance indicators Ruud van der Ploeg EMTA GM 11-12 november 2010. Stadsregio Amsterdam in Randstad area. Amsterdam €221 mio subsidy €129 mio revenue Cost coverage 37%. Zaanstreek €9 mio subsidy €5 mio revenue

andra
Download Presentation

Monitoring Key performance indicators Ruud van der Ploeg EMTA GM 11-12 november 2010

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Quality in Amsterdam public transport contracts MonitoringKey performance indicators Ruud van der Ploeg EMTA GM 11-12 november 2010

  2. Stadsregio Amsterdam in Randstad area

  3. Amsterdam€221 mio subsidy€129 mio revenue Cost coverage 37% Zaanstreek€9 mio subsidy€5 mio revenue Cost coverage 36% 2005 2005 2004 2004 Waterland€11 mio subsidy€22 mio revenue Cost coverage 67% 2011 2012 Amstelland-Meerlanden€30 mio subsidy€21 mio revenue Cost coverage 41% 2007 2007 Running contracts in Amsterdam region

  4. Risks linked with the production hold by The Authority The Operator Management contract (M) Gross cost contract (GC) M with productivity bonus GC with shared production risk GC with shared production risk and revenue bonus M with revenue bonus M with productivity and revenue bonus GC with revenue bonus Revenues risks hold by NC with revenue bonus and shared production risks NC with shared revenue risk Net cost contract (NC) NC with shared production risks responsabilities and risk sharing Source: MARETOPE

  5. Wish to have Want to have Need to have Quality of a trip Experience Satisfiers Dissatisfiers Basic Quality Minimum Quality

  6. ‘lust’: travel relaxed ‘must’: travel fast Pyramid of Customer Needs Emotions Time is money Experience Comfort Physical effort: Personal convenience Mental effort: No hassle, no stress Ease Travel time door to door: The faster, the better Speed Reliability Trust: Safe and secure journey Get what you expect Safety

  7. Emotions (Lust) Functionalities (Must) ..and Functionalities Emotions.. Experience Basic Quality Minimum Quality

  8. Amsterdam concession Key performance indicators bonus and fines Only fines Customer judgment (KKM*) bonus and fines

  9. Looking back from figures 2006-2010 Development of Bonus/fines Development of main KPI’s • Punctuality • Trips cancelled • KKM (Passenger Satisfaction)

  10. Methods of monitoring (1) • Concession Amsterdam City • In Amsterdam: making use of quarterly data base performance information; (a minimum of 95% of trips is checked) • Operator management reports send to the transport authority • Outcomes of the reports are randomly checked • Apart from these reports, mystery guests are brought into play • Operator earns a bonus for the % of performance within the standard and is fined for the % of performance above the standard.

  11. Methods of monitoring Concessions (3) outside Amsterdam • Carrying out quarterly surveys (observations i.e. with cameras and mystery guests) • Representative random check (every day of the week; in and outside rush hours) in respect to the total network • Random checks  faults assessed  fines imposed • Independent consultant carries out the surveys (outsourced) Administrative fines imposed for a range of quality insufficiencies

  12. Contract incentives regional buses 1. Revenue based contract 2. Bonus/Fine arrangement on Passenger satisfaction • Yearly report by independent institution • Rise of figure results in Bonus • Decrease of figure results in Fine 3. Fine policy on Key Performance Indicators

  13. Looking back on GVB-concession 2006-2011 • 2006-± mid 2008: • animosity and tiresome discussions on contract clauses  imposing fines (“malus”) for insufficient reporting on performances and poor level of operations; • Mid 2008 – 2009: • Improvement of relation and mutual understanding (mediation); GVB meets standards of reporting and succeeds better in meeting (key) performance indicators less fines • 2009 – now: • growing towards a joint effort of GVB and PTA (Stadsregio), aiming to improve customer services (transition to customer oriëntation)

  14. Results Suburban transport contracts (bus): • Considerable growth of both productivity and ridership (from 15-60% more driving hours); • National barometer customer satisfaction: stable (on average 7,5). Urban transport (GVB): - Step by step a better performance on the main kpi’s for quality: less fines and more bonuses.

  15. GVB delivers more driving hours (dru) for less subsidy

  16. Recommendations To the PTA’s • Generate a level of trust between commissioning authority and operator • Define a starting level of reliability of service in your tender documents (indicating that the level of performance has to move up each year) • Think of fines/bonuses as a means to an end: just a trigger to get better quality • Create a reliable and trustworthy monitoring system • Be transparent, consistent and straightforward • Quality is reflected in customer surveys appreciation! To the operators- mind the comfort and style of driving (bus) • grant friendliness to passengers- don’t take the passenger for granted!

  17. Customer appreciation yardstick

More Related