Venezuelan Military as a POLITICAL ACTOR

1. Venezuelan Military as a POLITICAL ACTOR

2. Independence & Post Independence • Simon Bolivar as liberator of Northern South America • Criollo elite • Boves the brutal and primitive royalist commander • Military forces of 19th century • Armies of regional caudillos • Liberals begin to establish a professional army (1870-1899)

3. Andean Militarism (1899-1958) • From small towns of Tachira • Little professional training • Married into Caracas upper class • Generational divide leads to revolution of October 1945 • Military at the heart of General Perez Jimenez’s “New National Ideal”

4. Military & Consolidation of Punto Fijo Democracy • President Betancourt reorganizes the armed forces • Abolition of the joint staff • Institutionalized competition for resources • Military role as defender of the 1961 constitution

5. Military Support for Punto Fijo • Increased budgets • Sophisticated military equipment • Social services • Professional training in the North Atlantic • Positions in public administration for retired officers

6. Strong Ties with the United States Military • Cooperation to neutralize leftist guerrillas in 1960’s • Military groups residing “in country” • Joint maneuvers • 1980’s – purchase of F 16 aircraft

7. The Unsuccessful Coups of 1992 • February 4, 1992 (4F) • Junior officer “Bolivarians” come close to capturing President Perez • Lt. Col Hugo Chavez gains notoriety • Government purges Army Officer Corps • November 27, 1992 • Navy and Air Force • More violence • Military leaders frighten the populace

8. Military in Post-Coup Era • Son in law of President Caldera (General Pérez Rojas) involved in corruption • Tripartite division of military • Strongly supportive of Punto Fijo • Professional, non-political • Clandestine supporters of Hugo Chavez

9. Military as a Factor in the Transition to the Fifth Republic • Military insures the integrity of the 1998 electoral process • 1961 Constitution commits military to uphold democracy • Extent of Chavez support in officer corps unclear • Caldera urges the military to respect the electoral outcome • AD refuses to support military efforts to block Chavez’s assumption of power

10. External Actors, Venezuela’s Military & Chavez’s Assumption of Power • Much of Venezuela’s officer corps trained by the United States military • United States government upholds sanctity of elections • Latin American neighbors uphold the sanctity of elections

11. Armed Forces emerge as backers of the Fifth Republic • Purges of senior, anti-Chávez military • Promotion of sympathetic junior officers • Staffing of senior positions in the police and intelligence forces with confidants of President Chávez

12. Armed Forces and the Paro of December 2001- February 2002 • Armed Forces disarm police forces controlled by politicians opposed to President Chávez • In general – maintain order during anti-Chávez marches • Evidence mounts of violence being used against dissident military personnel.

13. Heightened Tensions February – March 2002 - Chavez fired the head of the state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and appointed a new board of directors. • Ousted PDVSA executives ally with the Catholic Church, media, and anti-Chavez military officers • Anti-government also included the business elite and middle class.

14. Golpe April 11 , 2002 • March on the Presidential Palace (Miraflores) • protests politicization of PDVSA and National Assembly • grant of additional powers to the executive • Violence at end of march leads to death of at least 20 • Chavez detained and incarcerated on a Caribbean island

15. Golpe and Counter-GolpeApril 12 – 13, 2002 • Security forces raid the residences of government supporters • Chávez supporters arrested • Military and civilian supporters quarrel over the shape of the new government

16. More Golpe April 12, 2002 • Military installs the president of FEDECAMARAS as the president of the Republic • Constitution suspended • Institutions closed • United States government supportive of new government

17. Golpe and Counter-GolpeApril 12 – 13, 2002 • Security forces raid the residences of government supporters • Chávez supporters arrested • Military and civilian supporters quarrel over the shape of the new government

18. Counter-Golpe April 12 – 13, 2002 • Chávez loyalists take to the streets • Carmona & supporters retreat to military headquarters of Fuerte Tiuna • Army returns President Chávez to Miraflores

19. AFTERMATH OF THE GOLPE • Officers of questionable loyalty removed from positions of command • loyalists promoted • Intelligence services purged

20. MORE AFTERMATH OF THE GOLPE • President Chávez cuts most remaining ties with the United States military • Asymetric warfareto resist possible seizure of Venezuelan oil fields by President George W. Bush • 2005 increased control by Bolivarian elite over promotions • Strengthening of reserve forces ties with Communal Councils

21. Encouragement of Afro-Caribbean religion within the Armed Forces – SANTERIA

22. Unexpected Defection of General RaúlIsaíasBaduel (November 2007) • Helped to reinstall Chávez’s in office during a brief coup in 2002 • Minister of Defense • Described the proposed changes to 1999 Constitution “in effect a coup d’état”

23. Venezuelan Military: A Bolivarian Armed force (2012) • Regulars • Commanded by Bolivarian loyalists • $ 5 billion in Arms purchases from Russia • Some Iranian influence • Militias • Personally responsible to El Comandante • Recruitment from Community Councils • Training • Insurgency • Maintenance of order