EU as A Security Actor GOSEM 2013, rethimnon

1. EU as A Security ActorGOSEM 2013, rethimnon TriantafyllosKaratrantos University of the Aegean

2. Structure of the Presentation • The Modern World, Something is wrong with the State, Welcome to the Post- Modern new World, Global Risks, The Risk Society. • The Post- Modern (Element, World, Entity) • A Distinct Power (The Civilian Power, The Normative Power) • The Cold War Period • The New Security Environment, The New Threats • EU as A Security Actor, The European Way to Security • A Comprehensive Security Strategy (The “Soft” Instruments, Priority to Prevention, What For Vs Against Whom?, Globality and Regionality, Strong means Savage?) • Conclusion

3. The EU as an international norms promoter rather than a super-power is less threatening to non-European states and offers a pole around which support could be built in multilateral fora such as the UN. This is why international law is so important. Barcelona Report, “A human security doctrine for Europe”

4. The Modern World • In the modern period, social and political science worked with a Weberian notion of power. • A world of nation-states wherein territory was carved up into domains in which each state was sovereign. • According to this modernist world view, law involves a ‘coercive apparatus’ the purpose of which is norm enforcement within a community or other social group and this activity is usually understood to be bound to a particular jurisdiction. The sovereign nation-state with its claim to a monopoly of coercive force on its territory is thus the quintessential modern institution (Jessop). • Modernist assumptions about the naturalness of the Hobbesean state system made this mere common sense. The tragedy of the Hobbesean international order of modernity was that it was, all too often, a war of all against all.

5. Something is wrong with the State • Sociologists of the ‘global system’ (Sklair, 1991) and of social power in its historical sense (Mann, 1986; 1993) have etched out a rather different conception. It is not that sovereign states are not important power actors; they most certainly are, and never more so than during the modern period. • In the contemporary period these sociologists and others have argued that it is necessary to recognize that there are important non-state actors who wield considerable power both globally and regionally. • The former observation encourages us to think about a world order that comprises not only states, but also large corporate enterprises, religious movements, non-governmental organizations and a whole range of other non-state actors who are capable of acting and organizing transnationally.

6. Welcome to the Post- Modern new World • In the postmodern period our thought has had to come to grips with the ‘polycentricity of power’ (Stenson) • As Zygmunt Bauman puts it, The kind of society that, retrospectively, came to be called modern, emerged out of the discovery that human order is vulnerable, contingent and devoid of reliable foundations. That discovery was shocking. The response to the shock was a dream and an effort to make order solid, obligatory and reliably founded. This response problematized contingency as an enemy and order as a task. It devalued and demonized the 'raw' human condition. It prompted an incessant drive to eliminate the haphazard and annihilate the spontaneous. • Risk is ambivalence. Being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century. (Bech)

7. Global Risks • The experience of global risks represents a shock for the whole of humanity. No one predicted such a development. Perhaps Nietzsche had a kind of premonition, when he talked of an ‘age of comparing’, in which different cultures, ethnicities and religions could be compared and lived through side by side. • Without being explicit he, too, had an eye for world historical irony, that in particular it is the self-destructiveness not only physical, but also ethical of unleashed modernity, which could make it possible for human beings to outgrow both the nation-state and the international order, the heaven and earth of modernity, as it were. • The experience of global risks is an occurrence of abrupt and fully conscious confrontation with the apparently excluded other. Global risks tear down national boundaries and jumble together the native with the foreign. • The distant other is becoming the inclusive other not through mobility but through risk. Everyday life is becoming cosmopolitan: human beings must find the meaning of life in the exchange with others and no longer in the encounter with like.

8. The Risk Society • Modern societies are shaped by new kinds of risks, that their foundations are shaken by the global anticipation of global catastrophes. • Such perceptions of global risk are characterized by three features: • De-localization : its causes and consequences are not limited to one geographical location or space, they are in principle omnipresent. • Incalculableness : its consequences are in principle incalculable; at bottom it is a matter of ‘hypothetical’ risks, which, not least, are based on science induced not-knowing and normative dissent. • Non-compensatibility: the security dream of first modernity was based on the scientific utopia of making the unsafe consequences and dangers of decisions ever more controllable. Not only is prevention taking precedence over compensation, we are also trying to anticipate and prevent risks whose existence has not been proven.

9. The Post- Modern Element • The third part of the international system may be called the postmodern element. (Cooper) • Here the state system of the modern world is also collapsing; but unlike the pre-modern it is collapsing into greater order rather than into disorder. • The post-modern system does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. • The legitimate monopoly on force, which is the essence of statehood, is thus subject to international – but self-imposed – constraints.

10. The Post- Modern World • The characteristics of the post- modern world are: • the breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs • mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance • the rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of rules of behavior. • the growing irrelevance of borders • security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.

11. The Post- Modern Entity • The European Union is the highest developed post- modern entity • Modern Europe was born with the Peace of Westphalia. • Post-modern Europe begins with two treaties. The first of these, the Treaty of Rome, was created out of the failures of the modern system: the balance-of-power which ceased to work and the nation state which took nationalism to destructive extremes. • The second foundation of the post-modern era is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty): this was born of the failures, wastes and absurdities of the Cold War.

12. An ‘unidentified political object’ • Jacques Delors used to call the EU an ‘unidentified political object’, and it is obviously difficult to comprehend the nature and behaviour of such an object. • Some talk about the E.U. as if it were a state or a state in the making. • They point to an ever stronger European government in charge of EU external borders and an ever growing list of functional fields, ranging from agriculture, migration and trade to foreign policy, anti-terrorism and defence. • to the EU’s ever expanding diplomatic service and its growing military capability. • Europe’s mission in the world and discuss the ‘European security strategy’

13. However…1 • However,the EU is nothing like a state, nor is it likely to become one. The Union has no effective monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of authority. Its territory is not fixed. Its geographical, administrative, economic and cultural borders diverge. • It is a polity without coherent demos, a power without identifiable purpose, a geopolitical entity without defined territoriallimits.

14. However…2 • The European Common Foreign and Security Policy is a misnomer because EU member states are allowed to act outside the EU framework, and frequently do so, either within the UN framework or via the OSCE, Council of Europe or NATO. • European foreign and security policies are often carried out by formal or informal coalitions of the willing, by contact groups or bilateral initiatives. Europe’s external trade relations are largely divorced from Europe’s foreign policy. • Responsibility for external trade is shared or split between the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the Council of Ministers, the euro area and the member states. (Zielonka,2008)

15. A Powerful International Actor • Nevertheless, though the Union may not be a state, it is a very powerful international actor. • With its 27 member states and their nearly 500 million inhabit- ants, a quarter of the world’s GNP and around 40 per cent of its merchandise exports, and a comprehensive array of economic, legal, diplomatic and military instruments at its disposal, the EU is able to exercise significant influence in various parts of the world. • The euro is one of the world’s most important international reserve and trade currency, giving substantial influence to the EU around the world. European norms and regulations are progressively being adopted across the world. • Europe is also the largest provider of developmental aid.

16. A Distinct Power • In the past decades, several concepts for the role of the EU have been advanced, each of them suggesting that the EU has a particular kind of power in the world. • The idea of a new power underwent a renaissance, and it was joined with many scenarios and types, such as ‘a magnetic force,’ a ‘gentle power,’ a ‘normative power,’ a ‘European superpower,’ a ‘quiet superpower,’ a ‘Kantian paradise,’ a ‘post-modern state,’ a ‘middle power,’ a ‘neo-medieval empire’ and a ‘responsible Europe. • Among these various concepts I will focus more closely on civilian power and normative power

17. The Civilian Power 1 • The concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ finds its origin in the thoughts and plans of Duchêne. • Although such a definition is very open to different interpretations and various views on the role of Europe after the creation of the Union, the main principle at the basis of all the debate on civilian power is that the European shift from being a military power to an entity pursuing new strategy could stabilize the region and allow Europe to play a new role in the international framework. • As Duchêne states, “Europe would be the first major area of the Old World where the age-old process of war and indirect violence could be translated into something more in tune with the 20th century citizen’s notion of civilized politics. In such a context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centers of power.”

18. The Civilian Power 2 • According to Zielonka EU implies exercise of power through enlargement, democracy promotion, diplomatic mediation of conflicts, ‘export’ of commercial regulations, and development aids. • Zielonka argues that Europe is playing a successful role in the international arena by exercising a pure civilian power which is the combination of three key features: • the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals • the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems • and the willingness to use legally binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress

19. The Normative Power 1 • Ian Manners suggests a different analysis about the actual future of the EU, which takes into consideration another means used by Europe in the international arena, the so called ‘normative power.’ • We refer to this kind of strategy when the state or a political entity has the ability to shape the image of what is right and wrong and of what is normal and abnormal. • Some scholars, like Manners, Nicolaidis, and Sjursen consider the classical analysis as an inappropriate one because it concentrates too much on empirical emphasis of EU’s institutions and policies. • The normative view, instead, focuses on the understanding of the EU’s international identity, common principles, and willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions.

20. The Normative Power 2 • When Manners talks about Europe, he states that, although the EU has its foundation in civilian power made up of diplomatic cooperation and legally binding supranational institutions, this is not its highest potential, but a means to play the most powerful role in promoting the standards of action and behavior for the rest of the world. • Such ability, although dramatically powerful, is somehow intended to be used in a positive way for the sake of global benefits under the guidelines of peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and respect of human rights which are considered as the core norms of the EU.

21. Sanctions and Coercion • It would be wrong to identify the Union with soft power alone. The concept of soft power, as spelled out by Joseph S. Nye, is based on diplomacy. Soft powers shape institutions by setting agendas. They also rely on their normative power of attraction to spread values. • The Union not only applies soft power of this kind, but has also used economic power to further its objectives, including the instruments of sanctions, bribes and even coercion. Consider, for instance, the mega-fine of $1.4 billion imposed on Microsoft for failure to comply with European regulatory demands to end allegedly anticompetitive business practices.

22. The Cold War Period • During the Cold War, Europe’s security was essentially defined in politico-military terms, as the avoidance of direct military danger by a clearly identified foe. • This uni-dimensional definition was a product of the bipolar constellation, in which Europe’s security was deemed to hinge on avoiding armed conflict on the European continent by maintaining a nuclear and politico-military balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union. • So European security policy was forged under American leadership, mostly within the framework of NATO, and was essentially limited to defence policy. The non-military dimensions of security were regarded as being of much less consequence, as were developments in other parts of the world.

23. The New Security Environment • The end of the cold war produced a drastic change in Europe’s security environment. • The collapse of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself meant the end of a direct and major military threat to Europe’s security. • Accordingly, defence policy became less important. • The EU Member States had long ceased being a threat to one another, and through enlargement the deeply integrated European ‘security community’ was to be extended to Central and Eastern Europe. • But the end of the cold war also triggered a wave of inter- and intra-State armed conflicts in the vicinity of the EU. • Although they have not threatened the EU directly, they have produced negative spillover effects.

24. The New Threats • In the absence of a major military threat, other factors that can constitute the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third States, or that can intrinsically affect the values and interests of the EU, have come much more to the fore • organised crime, illegal immigration, social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and respect for human rights, failed States, ineffective multilateral institutions, environmental problems etc. • Another element is the growing awareness of the importance of values in international relations, such as democracy and respect for human rights and an effective international legal order. • The number of international players – State and non-State, legal and illegal – has increased too. • Security is evidently becoming a multidimensional concept.

25. A Security Actor • The EU has become a security and defence actor of importance since the end of the Cold War particularly since 1998, and the famous St Malo declaration by France and Britain. • While the EU is now developing a military capability, acquiring military and crisis management experience and building capacity on the military–strategic side in its own organization, it is also developing a global strategy, as set out in the European Security Strategy of December 2003. • “there has been a major development in EU security policy over the last ten years.” (Bailes, 2008)

26. The Main Question • The main research question: “the EU will be a ‘different’ military actor from a state or a military alliance like NATO.”

27. The Ethical Question • The deeply ethical question of which values and interests warrant the use of the ultimate tool of the state, with its specific attendant risks, is at the core of the EU’s ethical agenda. The concept of human security is a candidate for the ‘values’ part that relates to humanitarian intervention, but not for the ‘security’ part that relates to the fight against terrorism. • At the outset it is clear that the EU does not purport to have a military security policy that relates to such questions. The EU’s use of force is limited to crisis management alone.

28. The Military Tool • The military tool is deployed no longer in defence of existential survival, but in defence of values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. • Few if any interventions take place for purely humanitarian/human rights reasons, but such factors clearly play an increasing role. • This has to do with the salience of new self- styled actors in security policy (NGOs, churches, public, media) and with global communications. The key issue now, therefore, is not that the military tool must be deployed by the state, but rather that it is deployed with legitimacy.

29. The Barcelona Report • ‘Human rights have become much more prominent, and an intervention that uses traditional war-fighting means, such as bombardment from the air, may be unacceptable when viewed through the lens of human rights.’ • ‘Unlike in classic wars where only states bore responsibility, armed forces have to act within a legal framework that applies to individuals.’ • There should be a legal framework with local responsibility, they argue, and clear links between the military actors and local population—without, however, detailing how this might work out in practice.

30. The European Way to Security • Over the years, a distinctive European approach to security has emerged, which is characterized by a broad, multidimensional or comprehensive notion of security, which starts from the interdependence between all dimensions of security – political, socio-economic, environmental, cultural and military – rather than just focusing on the latter; hence the need to set objectives and apply instruments in all of these fields. • A further characteristic is a focus on dialogue, cooperation and partnership, or cooperative security. • In its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention11 e.g. the Commission proposed to address the ‘root causes of conflict’ by promoting ‘structural stability’, defined as ‘sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict’.

31. A Comprehensive Security Strategy • A comprehensive security strategy starts with the recognition that there are various dimensions of security in the current international environment and therefore that the underlying causes of potential threats to the security of the EU are very diverse in terms of both nature and origin. • Kirchner and Sperling dub this ‘the new security agenda’. It is concerned with the ability to protect the social and economic fabric of society, to act as gatekeeper between desirable and undesirable interactions and to foster a stable international economic and political environment. • This agenda goes beyond the politico-military dimension, which nonetheless remains a vital element, so for Kirchner and Sperling ‘a broader, holistic definition of the relationship between the “new” and “traditional” conceptualisations of security’ is required.

32. The “Soft” Instruments • In order to achieve these twin objectives, a comprehensive security strategy looks beyond the traditional confines of security policy, i.e. beyond the use of politico-military instruments. • it aims to integrate a range of external policies, which together offer a broad set of instruments that have a worldwide scope and that address the different dimensions of security. • This range of policies covers all three pillars of the EU; it includes inter alia external trade, development cooperation, international environmental policy, international police, justice and intelligence cooperation, immigration policy, foreign policy (multilateral diplomacy and the promotion of the values of the EU) and politico-military measures. • The overall objective of this range of policies, which functions as an integrating mechanism, is the promotion of the core global public goods.

33. Priority to Prevention • A comprehensive security strategy gives priority to active prevention of conflict and instability as opposed to a reactive and curative approach, which would be much more costly in both human and economic terms. • Global public goods are the angle from which prevention can be tackled in the most encompassing and fundamental way. • Accordingly, rather than being threat-based, a comprehensive security strategy is a positive approach that aims at achieving positive objectives, GPG, through global governance, in the interests not only of the EU but also of human beings everywhere.

34. What For Vs Against Whom? • What for?’ rather than ‘against whom?’ is the question that determines policy. • A comprehensive security strategy will thus be able to avoid the classic ‘security dilemma’ of over-emphasizing threats, leading to unnecessary military build-ups and in return provoking distrust and military measures on the part of others. • In the terms used by Buzan, comprehensive security amounts to an ‘international security strategy’, i.e. a strategy addressing the root causes of threats by trying to change ‘the systemic conditions that influence the way in which States make each other feel more (or less) secure’, as opposed to a ‘national security strategy’, aimed at reducing one’s own vulnerability by taking defensive measures.

35. Globality and Regionality • At the level of regions, States and individuals, insufficient access to GPG provokes tensions and armed conflict and, in case of a major deficiency, can destabilize the international system as such. • Comprehensive security therefore by necessity demands global action: prevention must aim to safeguard and improve access to GPG worldwide. This global scope does not contradict the specific EU role vis-à-vis its neighbourhood envisaged in the Strategy. • This is not a question of a hierarchy of priorities: an effective system of governance at the regional level is a component of the overall objective of global governance; because of globalisation, stability of the world order as such is equally important as stability in our neighbourhood. • Rather the modus operandi differs: whereas at the global level the EU chooses to act through the multilateral architecture, in its neighbourhood it seeks to assume leadership itself.

36. Strong means Savage? • The comprehensive security concept is not contradictory with defining the EU as a ‘civilian power’, contrary to what inter alia Smith claims. • This is in line with Maull’s definition of civilian power as including military power ‘as a residual instrument’ • This leads Stavridis to the assertion that ‘thanks to the militarizing of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world’ • As Gnesotto states, ‘the great debate of the 1980s over Europe as a civil power or a military power definitely seems to be a thing of the past […] what the Union intends to become is a sui generis power’.

37. Conclusion • A will to act is tantamount to the need for the EU to behave as a global power. • Or, in the words of the Laeken Declaration adopted by the European Council in December 2001: ‘a power wanting to change the course of world affairs […]’ • For the EU to become a power, it must have the will and the capacity to weigh on the course of international events and influence the other players on the international stage. • The EU and its Member States must consciously and collectively muster the will to form one of the poles of a multipolar world and pursue their own distinctive policy: comprehensive security. • effective multilateralism’ as a global objective and with regard to the EU’s neighbourhood in particular; which amounts to global governance in a whole range of policy fields, corresponding to the notion of GPG, putting to use all instruments available to the EU, in cooperation with States, regions and international organization.