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Brazil’s Bilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agenda

Brazil’s Bilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agenda. Trade relevant facts (2003). Annual export: USD 83 bio ~ 1,2% of world trade Industrial exports amount to ~ 60% of Brazil’s total exports Agricultural exports amount to ~ 40% of Brazil’s total exports

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Brazil’s Bilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agenda

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  1. Brazil’s Bilateral and Plurilateral Trade Agenda

  2. Trade relevant facts(2003) • Annual export: USD 83 bio ~ 1,2% of world trade • Industrial exports amount to ~ 60% of Brazil’s total exports • Agricultural exports amount to ~ 40% of Brazil’s total exports • Ranks third in world share of total agricultural exports • 3% of world’s population, GDP and investments • 7th biggest consumer in the world • 15th biggest economy in the world • One of the BRICs

  3. Context for RTAs post-1985 • Democratization • ”Lost decade” • Liberalization • International insertion

  4. Plurilateral MERCOSUR (1991) Bilateral MERCOSUR-Bolivia Association Agreement (1996) MERCOSUR-Chile Association Agreement (1996) 1985-today

  5. Bilateral MERCOSUR-EU MERCOSUR-SACU MERCOSUR-Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador MERCOSUR-Peru MERCOSUR-Mexico MERCOSUR-India MERCOSUR-Egypt Plurilateral FTAA Ongoing negotiations

  6. EU-MERCOSUR and FTAA • Background • Issues • Threats & Opportunities • Status • Link to Doha Development Agenda

  7. Trade relations(2003)

  8. Timeline

  9. Issues • One (FTAA) vs. three (EU-MERCOSUR) pillars • All WTO-trade areas on the table • Labour and environment excluded • Scope differs

  10. EU-MERCOSUR Negotiation is test case for MERCOSUR Future policy autonomy Compromising perception of Brazil as developing country leader FTAA Negotiation is test case for MERCOSUR Can MERCOSUR survive in an FTAA? Future policy autonomy Brazil isolated in its ”own region” Political and strategic threats

  11. EU-MERCOSUR Institutional strengthening of MERCOSUR Power equilibrium FTAA Lock-in of reforms at national level …and opportunities

  12. EU-MERCOSUR Erosion of gains vis-à-vis the WTO Limited gains in industry ”Sensitive issues” FTAA Erosion of gains vis-à-vis the WTO Limited gains in agriculture ”Sensitive issues” Socio-economic threats

  13. EU-MERCOSUR Increased agricultural exports Increased investments FTAA Increased industrial exports to the US Increased investments ”Investment guarantee” Protection of preferential access to US market …and opportunities

  14. EU-MERCOSUR Exchanging offers Possibility of meeting in October New Commission Probable extension of deadline What happens in the WTO? FTAA Standstill: Offers and modalities New president No new meeting scheduled Extension of deadline Bilateralisation within the negotiation What happens in the WTO? Status

  15. Link to the WTO • Timing • Issues • Alliances • Concessions

  16. Future perspectives • Conclude ongoing pluri- and bilateral negotiations? • Initiate new bilateral negotiations? • MERCOSUR-Central America • MERCOSUR-Japan • MERCOSUR-China • MERCOSUR-South Korea • MERCOSUR-Thailand • MERCOSUR-Russia • MERCOSUR-Morocco

  17. Conclusions • 2003-2004: Mixed results for Brazil’s regional and multilateral negotiations • Bilateralization of trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere • Increased focus on South-South bilateral trade agreements combined with a wait-and-see approach concerning the FTAA and EU-MERCOSUR negotiations • South-South trade cannot in the short run replace US and EU, but importance has increased, both economically and strategically • Complementary strategy is still needed

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