Equality and Priority

1. Equality and Priority Derek Parfit

2. The Ethics of Distribution • Many political and moral philosophers are interested in what makes a distribution good. Some, such as Nozick, would argue that distributions in themselves are not good or bad. However, Egalitarians believe that distributions can be fair or unfair, just or unjust, equal or unequal. • The ethics of distribution is the attempt to find the principle that governs just distributions, by locating the best overall set of arguments in favor of a principle. • Parfit’s goal is to argue againsEgalitarianism about distributions, and in favor of a new position called Prioritarianism.

3. Egalitarians vs. Utilitarians • Utilitarians may argue that equality is important because it increases overall utility. Utilitarians are not bared from the ethics of distribution if they can show that equality instrumentally increases utility. • Egalitarians may argue for the instrumental value of equality, but in general they ought to be aiming for an explanation of the intrinsic value of equality or some explanation that ties equality to a moral good.

4. Telic vs. Deontic Egalitarianism • Telic Egalitarians maintain that inequality is in itself a bad thing. Inequality on this view is intrinsically bad, Thus we should aim for equality because it is intrinsically better. • DeonticEgalitarians maintain that we should not aim for equality because it is intrinsically bad, but rather we should aim for equality for some moral reason. For example, deontic egalitarians may believe that people have rights to equal shares, which requires an equal distribution.

5. Four Kinds of Justice • Comparative Justice deals with whether people are treated differentially with respect to other people. • Non-comparative Justice deals with whether people get what they deserve. It does not deal with any facts other than those about the person in question. • Purely Procedural Justice only pertains to how we act. For example when some good cannot be divided but must be distributed, we may be required to administer a fair lottery. • Substantive Justice deals partially with procedure but is also concerned with outcome. Substantive justice requires a just outcome.

6. The Principles of Equality and Utility Examined • The Principle of Equality (PE): It is in itself bad if some people are worse off than others. • The Principle of Utility (PU): It is in itself better if people are better off. • Everyone is equally well off. • Everyone is equally badly off. (PE) cannot distinguish between (a) and (b). If equality is all that matters why shouldn’t we choose (b) rather than (a)? (PU) is required in order for us to avoid (b).

7. Individualist and Communitarian Defenses of Equality • Inequality damages self-respect. • Self-respect is intrinsically valuable. • So, equality is intrinsically valuable. • Inequality damages healthy fraternal attitudes, desires and sympathies between members of a society. • Healthy fraternal attitudes, desires and sympathies between members of a society are intrinsically valuable. • So equality is intrinsically valuable.

8. The Master Argument • Egalitarianism is a coherent position concerning justice, only if either telic or deontic interpretations of egalitarianism are plausible. • The telic view leads to the levelling down objection. The deontic view leads to unjustified beliefs about the moral importance of equality. • So, neither the telic view nor the deontic view are plausible defenses of egalitarianism. • So, egalitarianism is not a coherent position concerning justice. • Prioritarianism is a distinct alternative to egalitarianism, and it is defensible. • So, prioritarianism is the preferred account of justice.

9. The Leveling Down Objection If inequality is bad, its disappearance must be in one way a change for the better, however this change occurs. Suppose that those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so that they become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome, on the Telic View, even though they would be worse for some people, and better for no one. This implication seems to many to be quite absurd. I call this the Levelling Down Objection. It is worth repeating that, to criticize Egalitarians by appealing to the levelling down objection, it is not enough to claim that it would be wrong to produce equality by levelling down….Our objection must be that, if we achieve equality by levelling, there is nothing good about what we have done. (PARFIT pg. 99)

10. The Divided World Example • Suppose the world is perfectly divided into two groups of people A and B. However, the geographical division between A and B is such that neither A nor B know of the others existence. Further suppose, that the wealth of individuals in A is larger by a great amount than the wealth of individuals in B. • Why does equality in resources or income or wealth between A and B matter? • On the deontic view there is no moral wrong doing and no injustice. The only way to claim that equality between A and B is to be preferred is by appealing to the Telic view.

11. The Prioritarian View • The Priority View: Benefitting people matters more the worse these people are. Question: To who should we give priority? • Those who are worse off in their lives as a whole. • Those who are worse off at the time. • Those who have needs that are morally more urgent. (a) and (b) generally diverge. (b) and (c) usually coincide.

12. The Prioritarian View • X’s needs may now be more urgent than Y’s, even though, in most of her life, X has been, and will later be, much better off than Y. • Should we give more weight to a person’s needs at a time or to the person whose whole life overall is worse off. • The Priority view maintains that we should give priority, not to meeting special needs, but to benefitting those people who are worse off. While we can determine at a time whose needs are more pressing, how do we determine whose life will be worse off overall?

13. Priority and Levelling Down • The Levelling Down Objection maintains that telic views of equality are required to remove some inequality by making some people worse off even though no one is made better off. • The Priority view does not allow for the removal of inequality when no one is made better off. • So, the priority view is to be preferred to the telic view in so far as it is not subject to the levelling down objection. What about the deontic view?

14. Priority vs. Egalitarianism • On the priority view it is morally more important to benefit the people who are worse off. But we benefit the worse off not because it will reduce inequality. The priority view does not believe in equality. • What matters in the priority view is not that some people are worse off than others, but rather that they are worse off than they might have been. • Egalitarians are concerned with relativities: with how each person’s level compares with the level of other people. On the priority view, one is concerned only with people’s absolute levels. People at higher altitudes find it harder to breathe. Is this because they are higher up than other people. In one sense, yes. But they would find it just as hard to breathe even if there were no other people who were lower down. In the same way, on the priority view, benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only because these people are at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people are worse off than others. Benefits to them would matter just as much even if there were no others who were better off. Parfit pg. 104

15. Priority vs. Sufficiency • Both Sufficiency and Priority views are opposed to egalitarian accounts. However, what is the difference between sufficiency and priority? • Both S and P views claim that equality is not important. There is no intrinsic value to equality. And neither view goes in for a interpersonal comparative account of the value of distributions. • S maintains that what matters is that people have enough to lead a life worth living. A life that comes from their conception of the good life. • P maintains that it is morally better to gain a benefit or avoid a loss, all else being equal, the worse of the person would be absent the benefit. ‘worse off’ is to be understood in absolute terms, and not relative to other people.