Nuclear Forensics Project Development

1. Nuclear Forensics Project Development Eileen S. Vergino Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

2. National programs in technical nuclear forensics • Acquire multiple signatures in order to assess the source, route and individuals involved in smuggling of nuclear and radiologic materials • Chemical, isotopic and physical signatures • Compare to known samples from throughout the fuel cycle • Emphasis on material properties • Partnership with law enforcement .....analysis of nuclear or radioactive materials and any associated material to identify the source of the materials, determine the point of origin and routes of transit, and ultimately to contribute evidence for nuclear attribution…..

3. Current international needs and requirements for nuclear forensics • Rigorous nuclear forensics analysis that incorporate quality assurance, standardized procedures and proficiency testing • Discovery science to determine the persistence of nuclear forensics signatures (isotopic, chemical, and physical) and relation to source and manufacture • Access to representative and well pedigreed samples from across the nuclear fuel cycle for comparison • Technical, operational and administrative structure of a directory of national nuclear forensics libraries to enable comprehensive interpretation of nuclear forensics data • Training and outreach that both provides orientation to nuclear forensics applications (customs, law enforcement) as well as preferred methods for conducting nuclear forensics investigation (e.g., Model Action Plan)

4. Ukraine – scientifically based technical exchange and capacity building • Analytical method sharing and round-robin activities with nuclear materials from across the fuel cycle • Cooperative research and development to identify and validate signatures of nuclear materials from across the fuel cycle • Cooperative research and development to develop tools for determining nuclear material provenance; comparisons between forensic and known sample characteristics; • Scientific engagement to promote nonproliferation nuclear forensics and best practices, including sample and data exchange • Scientific engagement to develop architectures and search engines for nuclear forensic databases • Developing agreements to share information and materials from the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g., U-ore and ore concentrate • Exchanging quality assurance and laboratory best-practices

5. Georgia – capacity building and technical exchange • Cooperative research and development of analytical methods used in technical nuclear forensics • Bilateral sample and data exchanges to facilitate a better understanding of laboratory analysis capabilities • Sharing of data for international nuclear forensic database activities (including ITWG e.g.) • Scientific engagement to develop architectures and search engines for nuclear forensic databases, including capturing critical country-specific nuclear material forensic characteristics • Engagement to promote nonproliferation best practices and understanding

6. Azerbaijan – capacity building to ensure infrastructure and procedures for nuclear sample handling • Promoting a basic understanding of nonproliferation nuclear forensics, including developing best practices for technical nuclear forensic activities • Promoting the development of basic response protocols for securing interdicted materials with a focus on chain of custody to ensure sample integrity • Sharing of non-destructive assay/minimally destructive analysis techniques for nuclear materials identification and assay • Developing procedures for shipping materials to appropriate facilities for forensic analysis

7. Nuclear forensics is predicated on strong technical partnerships – collaboration in Central Asia During the Soviet era, uranium ore from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan was mined and milled into yellowcake • Security concerns • Common borders • Decline in the post-Soviet economy and infrastructure • Legacy radioactive inventories • Smuggling; RDD threat • Alkaline earths (Ca), trace metals, and U-234 isotopic content distinguish source locations Kaji-Say Uranium Mill, Kyrgyzstan Lack of physical protection Taboshar Uranium Mill, Tajikistan 10,000 kg of poorly secured uranium ore concentrate Presence in the region secures samples and data for a nuclear forensic database

8. Central Asia is an essential partner in international efforts to secure nuclear and radioactive materials along the “Silk Road” • Adapting methods to existing capabilities • Shared understanding by relevant officials and experts needed • Engagement in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan predicated on strong laboratory-to-laboratory partnerships • Emphasis for on-the-ground site visits • access for US experts to major uranium producing and milling sites • Representative 5 to 10 gram aliquots collected; radiological information collected in the field (e.g., 40K, 232Th, 226Ra, alpha survey) to categorize samples for analysis and shipping • Samples shipped to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for analysis of uranium isotopes, major elements, and trace elements • Peer-review of the data The science of nuclear forensics stimulates ministerial and regional awareness of the challenges of nuclear proliferation and terrorism affecting Central Asia

9. Nuclear forensics engagement links technical capabilities to end-user applications • Information sharing between governments and different ministries • Forum for current capabilities and recent technical accomplishments • Mechanism for building technical capacity to meet each government’s needs • A community of practitioners • Country-specific reports, “lessons learned” and table top exercises emphasize the state of nuclear forensic readiness • Essential for regional cooperation and partnerships 2008 All-Central Asia Nuclear Safety Workshop November 12-14, 2008 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan Law enforcement working cooperatively with nuclear scientists to advance nuclear forensics