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COIN Advisory and Assistance Team COIN in Afghanistan

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COIN Advisory and Assistance Team COIN in Afghanistan

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    1. COIN Advisory and Assistance Team & COIN in Afghanistan COL Joe Felter Good morning. My name is Col Joe Felter and I am the leader of COMISAF’s COIN Advisory and Assistance Team. My organization provides COMISAF and COMIJC a “directed telescope” by which they can get ground truth of what’s happening across Afghanistan at the district or company level. We have teams in each of the 4 Regional Command headquarters which enables them to work with those higher level staffs and get out with units and PRTs. Ultimately our job is to provide sensitive reporting directly to GEN McChrystal and provide the means through which he can change the culture of the force in Afghanistan.Good morning. My name is Col Joe Felter and I am the leader of COMISAF’s COIN Advisory and Assistance Team. My organization provides COMISAF and COMIJC a “directed telescope” by which they can get ground truth of what’s happening across Afghanistan at the district or company level. We have teams in each of the 4 Regional Command headquarters which enables them to work with those higher level staffs and get out with units and PRTs. Ultimately our job is to provide sensitive reporting directly to GEN McChrystal and provide the means through which he can change the culture of the force in Afghanistan.

    2. CAAT Mission Statement & Purpose

    3. Facilitate changing the culture of the force Provide COMISAF with unbiased, critical analysis and recommend solutions Identify and disseminate best COIN practices throughout the theater Support pre-deployment training for forces Facilitate continuity during RIP / TOA Teach, coach, and mentor leaders at all levels on COIN Review staff processes that advance or impede COIN efforts Facilitate unity of effort by, with, and through all actors CAAT Key Tasks

    4. CAAT Personnel By RC Teams As you all know, RC South is ISAF’s main effort. As we expand and deepen the “hold” in Central Helmand we are establishing a team in the new RC Southwest HQ. As this stands up, we are dedicating significant resources to our RC South Team which works closely with the RC South Commander and the Kandahar PRT. RC East shares top billing with RC South. We have enjoyed an excellent relationship with the 82nd Airborne and began engaging the 101st Airborne during their predeployment training this winter. Our RC East team lead enjoys a personal relationship with MG Campbell and we look forward to continuing our strong work in the East as the 101st arrives this summer. Though the main effort is weighted in these two regions, RC North and RC West both have ISAF areas of interest and remain very dynamic. Events in the North continue to shift requiring constant adaptation and nimble decision-making by ISAF leaders there. RC West has a new regional command staff and we’re looking forward to their leadership in Herat and elsewhere. As you all know, RC South is ISAF’s main effort. As we expand and deepen the “hold” in Central Helmand we are establishing a team in the new RC Southwest HQ. As this stands up, we are dedicating significant resources to our RC South Team which works closely with the RC South Commander and the Kandahar PRT. RC East shares top billing with RC South. We have enjoyed an excellent relationship with the 82nd Airborne and began engaging the 101st Airborne during their predeployment training this winter. Our RC East team lead enjoys a personal relationship with MG Campbell and we look forward to continuing our strong work in the East as the 101st arrives this summer. Though the main effort is weighted in these two regions, RC North and RC West both have ISAF areas of interest and remain very dynamic. Events in the North continue to shift requiring constant adaptation and nimble decision-making by ISAF leaders there. RC West has a new regional command staff and we’re looking forward to their leadership in Herat and elsewhere.

    5. Lessons Learned Information Operations Media Advisor Rule of Law Cultural Advisor Police Advisor HUMINT Advisor SIGINT Advisor COIN Academic Research Team (CART) HQ CAAT Subject Matter Experts One of the real advantages of the CAAT is the diverse body of military and civilian professionals that we are able to bring to the fight. Our HQ subject matter experts are able to advise with the ISAF and IJC headquarters, along with the US Embassy. Perhaps more importantly, they are able to “surge” to various Regional Commands or Taskforces in order to provide detailed advise to units and commanders. For example, our Rule of Law advisor is a National Guard SF intelligence office who is also a Boston District attorney. He has worked closely with TF 435 and the US Embassy while in Kabul, but is currently spending a month advising the Kandahar PRT in advance of upcoming efforts there. Our Lessons Learned officer is a Navy LCDR with a a film background. He’s able to work with our Media Advisor, who is a Army Reservist with significant Hollywood experience to collect best practices from across the AO and translate them into short films, web content, and our COIN newsletter.One of the real advantages of the CAAT is the diverse body of military and civilian professionals that we are able to bring to the fight. Our HQ subject matter experts are able to advise with the ISAF and IJC headquarters, along with the US Embassy. Perhaps more importantly, they are able to “surge” to various Regional Commands or Taskforces in order to provide detailed advise to units and commanders. For example, our Rule of Law advisor is a National Guard SF intelligence office who is also a Boston District attorney. He has worked closely with TF 435 and the US Embassy while in Kabul, but is currently spending a month advising the Kandahar PRT in advance of upcoming efforts there. Our Lessons Learned officer is a Navy LCDR with a a film background. He’s able to work with our Media Advisor, who is a Army Reservist with significant Hollywood experience to collect best practices from across the AO and translate them into short films, web content, and our COIN newsletter.

    6. CAAT Initiatives In addition to those multi-media efforts—which come at the request of GEN McChrystal in his effort to change the culture of the force and push his COIN guidance out as far as possible--we focus on a variety of issues from the tactical to the strategic level. CAAT team members at ISAF HQ and each of the RCs have worked hard to bring MG Flynn’s vision of improved intelligence collection and analysis to units in Afghanistan. In RC West, for example, CAAT members served an integral role in standing up and manning the “Stability Operations Intelligence Cell.” This SOIC drives COIN operations for much of RC West, including direct engagement with the governor or Herat Province—a relationship greatly facilitated by the CAAT. We have worked with LTG Rodriguez to develop training vignettes to walk soldiers and Marines through the decision-making process demanded by our new escalation of force SOP. These scenarios are designed to develop “mature threat assessment” and prevent civilian casualties. On that front, CAAT has been privileged to sponsor some ground-breaking academic research. In addition to those multi-media efforts—which come at the request of GEN McChrystal in his effort to change the culture of the force and push his COIN guidance out as far as possible--we focus on a variety of issues from the tactical to the strategic level. CAAT team members at ISAF HQ and each of the RCs have worked hard to bring MG Flynn’s vision of improved intelligence collection and analysis to units in Afghanistan. In RC West, for example, CAAT members served an integral role in standing up and manning the “Stability Operations Intelligence Cell.” This SOIC drives COIN operations for much of RC West, including direct engagement with the governor or Herat Province—a relationship greatly facilitated by the CAAT. We have worked with LTG Rodriguez to develop training vignettes to walk soldiers and Marines through the decision-making process demanded by our new escalation of force SOP. These scenarios are designed to develop “mature threat assessment” and prevent civilian casualties. On that front, CAAT has been privileged to sponsor some ground-breaking academic research.

    7. This focus on the population—and counter-insurgency more generally—isn’t a fad or PR campaign. GEN McChrystal and the ISAF and IJC staffs have fully embraced the principles of counter-insurgency. These are his COIN Imperatives. He drives us everyday to understand the importance of the people… ------- 1. Protect and Partner with the People. We are fighting for the Afghan people—not against them. Our focus on their welfare will build the trust and support necessary for success. 2. Conduct a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Campaign. Insurgencies fail when root causes disappear. Security is essential, but I believe our ultimate success lies in partnering with the Afghan Government, partner nations, NGOs, and others to build the foundations of good government and economic development. 3. Understand the Environment. We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others. Our ability to act effectively demands a real appreciation for the positive and negative impact of everything we do—or fail to do. Understanding is a prerequisite for success. 4. Ensure Values Underpin our Effort. We must demonstrate through our words and actions our commitment to fair play, our respect and sensitivity for the cultures and traditions of others, and an understanding that rules of law and humanity do not end when fighting starts. Both our goals and conduct must be admired. 5. Listen Closely—Speak Clearly. We must listen to understand—and speak clearly to be understood. Communicating our intentions and accurately reflecting our actions to all audiences is a critical responsibility—and necessity. 6. Act as One Team. We are an alliance of nations with different histories, cultures, and national objectives—united in our support for Afghanistan. We must be unified in purpose, forthright in communication, and committed to each other. 7. Constantly Adapt. This war is unique, and our ability to respond to even subtle changes in conditions will be decisive. I ask you to challenge conventional wisdom and abandon practices that are ingrained into many military cultures. And I ask you to push me to do the same. 8. Act with Courage and Resolve. Hard fighting, difficult decisions, and inevitable losses will mark the days ahead. Each of us, from our most junior personnel to our senior leaders, must display physical, mental, and moral courage. Our partners must trust our commitment; enemies must not question our resolve. This focus on the population—and counter-insurgency more generally—isn’t a fad or PR campaign. GEN McChrystal and the ISAF and IJC staffs have fully embraced the principles of counter-insurgency. These are his COIN Imperatives. He drives us everyday to understand the importance of the people… ------- 1. Protect and Partner with the People. We are fighting for the Afghan people—not against them. Our focus on their welfare will build the trust and support necessary for success. 2. Conduct a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Campaign. Insurgencies fail when root causes disappear. Security is essential, but I believe our ultimate success lies in partnering with the Afghan Government, partner nations, NGOs, and others to build the foundations of good government and economic development. 3. Understand the Environment. We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others. Our ability to act effectively demands a real appreciation for the positive and negative impact of everything we do—or fail to do. Understanding is a prerequisite for success. 4. Ensure Values Underpin our Effort. We must demonstrate through our words and actions our commitment to fair play, our respect and sensitivity for the cultures and traditions of others, and an understanding that rules of law and humanity do not end when fighting starts. Both our goals and conduct must be admired. 5. Listen Closely—Speak Clearly. We must listen to understand—and speak clearly to be understood. Communicating our intentions and accurately reflecting our actions to all audiences is a critical responsibility—and necessity. 6. Act as One Team. We are an alliance of nations with different histories, cultures, and national objectives—united in our support for Afghanistan. We must be unified in purpose, forthright in communication, and committed to each other. 7. Constantly Adapt. This war is unique, and our ability to respond to even subtle changes in conditions will be decisive. I ask you to challenge conventional wisdom and abandon practices that are ingrained into many military cultures. And I ask you to push me to do the same. 8. Act with Courage and Resolve. Hard fighting, difficult decisions, and inevitable losses will mark the days ahead. Each of us, from our most junior personnel to our senior leaders, must display physical, mental, and moral courage. Our partners must trust our commitment; enemies must not question our resolve.

    8. Cornerstones of the ISAF COIN Campaign COMISAF notes “An insurgent attack is a secondary effort….Behind the smoke of battle, the insurgents are principally focused on political and social activities…In doing so, they displace the government’s legitimacy” Why focus on the population? Because the insurgents do Population provides key support to insurgents: intelligence, material support, concealment Insurgents seek to control + govern the population 2001-2008 reveal limitations of enemy focused strategy In addition, protecting the population also protects our troops. Those relationships, that engagement, are the buffer between coalition troops and everyday danger. We must also work to establish legitimate political control at the district level—this differs from previous efforts to develop programs and institutions in Kabul alone. Must establish “more compelling alternatives” to the Taliban in each village and district. Counterinsurgency is always local. Need to build capacity and capability of Afghan Police and Army Key is developing trust between staffs & units For platoons and companies: live together, eat together, patrol together For staffs: work together, plan together Afghans provide detailed understanding and local context; ISAF provides enabling resources—we’ll return to this subject in more detail in a few minutes. COMISAF notes “An insurgent attack is a secondary effort….Behind the smoke of battle, the insurgents are principally focused on political and social activities…In doing so, they displace the government’s legitimacy” Why focus on the population? Because the insurgents do Population provides key support to insurgents: intelligence, material support, concealment Insurgents seek to control + govern the population 2001-2008 reveal limitations of enemy focused strategy In addition, protecting the population also protects our troops. Those relationships, that engagement, are the buffer between coalition troops and everyday danger. We must also work to establish legitimate political control at the district level—this differs from previous efforts to develop programs and institutions in Kabul alone. Must establish “more compelling alternatives” to the Taliban in each village and district. Counterinsurgency is always local. Need to build capacity and capability of Afghan Police and Army Key is developing trust between staffs & units For platoons and companies: live together, eat together, patrol together For staffs: work together, plan together Afghans provide detailed understanding and local context; ISAF provides enabling resources—we’ll return to this subject in more detail in a few minutes.

    9. CIVCAS CONTEXT – STRATEGIC ISSUE “Because of CIVCAS I think that we have just about eroded out credibility here in Afghanistan. The constant repeat of CIVCAS is now so dangerous that it threatens the mission…I want confirmation that every soldier in the command from every country understands the Tactical Directive” COMISAF (13 Apr 10)

    11. ISAF + Insurgent Generated Civilian Casualties (Jan 2009 – Mar 2010) There has been a great deal of anecdotal and qualitative discussion on the relationship between civilian casualties and future kinetic activity as mediated by trust and information sharing. Because it’s difficult to observe this, there is very limited quantitative evidence that there is a systematic relationship. Data: We link two sets of data. SIGACTS -- which we are going to use as a proxy for insurgent presence and activity in a district—and unclassified, aggregate CIVCAS counts. We use only those incidents which result in the injuries or deaths of women or children. We think this distinction is important because these individuals will most likely be perceived as innocent bystanders not engaged in insurgent activity. Analysis: We conduct a district level analysis using aggregate counts for each month starting in January 2009 until March 2010. We estimate a linear regression—a way to calculate a statistical relationship—between SIGACTs and the previous six months of civilian casualties. It’s easy to see that there are a lot of omitted factors which we cannot observe but will affect both the levels of SIGACTs and the number of civilian casualties. This problem will make the results from a simple trend analysis incorrect and even misleading. Our analysis controls for three factors: Fixed characteristics in a district Seasonal differences in violence (because winter is different than summer) Previous levels of violence—to allow us to compare low and high violence districts There has been a great deal of anecdotal and qualitative discussion on the relationship between civilian casualties and future kinetic activity as mediated by trust and information sharing. Because it’s difficult to observe this, there is very limited quantitative evidence that there is a systematic relationship. Data: We link two sets of data. SIGACTS -- which we are going to use as a proxy for insurgent presence and activity in a district—and unclassified, aggregate CIVCAS counts. We use only those incidents which result in the injuries or deaths of women or children. We think this distinction is important because these individuals will most likely be perceived as innocent bystanders not engaged in insurgent activity. Analysis: We conduct a district level analysis using aggregate counts for each month starting in January 2009 until March 2010. We estimate a linear regression—a way to calculate a statistical relationship—between SIGACTs and the previous six months of civilian casualties. It’s easy to see that there are a lot of omitted factors which we cannot observe but will affect both the levels of SIGACTs and the number of civilian casualties. This problem will make the results from a simple trend analysis incorrect and even misleading. Our analysis controls for three factors: Fixed characteristics in a district Seasonal differences in violence (because winter is different than summer) Previous levels of violence—to allow us to compare low and high violence districts

    12. Effects of Civilian Casualties on Subsequent Violence The results of this analysis can be summarized in these two graphs. While these results are important, we would like to highlight that these have not undergone peer review yet. This work will be vetted by a team of academic experts to ensure it meets all standards of academic analysis and rigor. When looking at these graphs the first thing you should notice is the confidence intervals, shown in dotted lines. A confidence interval shows you how precise the estimated relationship is. Because we have limited data and there are a lot of factors, such as troop movement, civilian and military development activities, etc, that we cannot control for, you’ll notice that the margin of error is too large to say with confidence that there is an effect. [BUILD] On the left is the kinetic response from ISAF-Generated CIVCAS: The confidence intervals are quite wide with results suggesting that in the months immediately following a civilian casualty there is an increase in violent activity. The effect sizes vary from 25 to 65 percent increase in kinetic activity with an average of about 35% over 5 months. [BUILD] On the right is the kinetic response from Insurgent-Generated CIVCAS: You’ll see that at first there is a sharp uptick in violence as well. This effect is significant and increases violence between 10 and 25% but only lasts until the third month. [SLIDE]The results of this analysis can be summarized in these two graphs. While these results are important, we would like to highlight that these have not undergone peer review yet. This work will be vetted by a team of academic experts to ensure it meets all standards of academic analysis and rigor. When looking at these graphs the first thing you should notice is the confidence intervals, shown in dotted lines. A confidence interval shows you how precise the estimated relationship is. Because we have limited data and there are a lot of factors, such as troop movement, civilian and military development activities, etc, that we cannot control for, you’ll notice that the margin of error is too large to say with confidence that there is an effect. [BUILD] On the left is the kinetic response from ISAF-Generated CIVCAS: The confidence intervals are quite wide with results suggesting that in the months immediately following a civilian casualty there is an increase in violent activity. The effect sizes vary from 25 to 65 percent increase in kinetic activity with an average of about 35% over 5 months. [BUILD] On the right is the kinetic response from Insurgent-Generated CIVCAS: You’ll see that at first there is a sharp uptick in violence as well. This effect is significant and increases violence between 10 and 25% but only lasts until the third month. [SLIDE]

    13. INS attack in Nangahar killed Afghan soldiers, wounded ISAF troops, and killed two Afghan children. INS begin whisper campaign as violence separates ISAF troops from population People were motivated to take to the streets indicates active efforts by anti-government/ anti-ISAF factions Propaganda and Civilian Casualties A likely interpretation of these results is perhaps easiest to illustrate with an example: Many of you will be familiar with an attack that occurred in Rodat district in Nangarhar in January. This was clearly an insurgent initiated attack since ISAF personnel were targeted and the tactics were similar to those used in previous attacks. On Wednesday January 06, 2010, a roadside IED explosion was detonated near a local school, in the Rodat District of Nangarhar Province, just outside of Jalalabad. Several ANA members were killed, ANA and ISAF personnel were injured, and two Afghan children died. Even though the insurgents were responsible for the attacks, they were able to start a whisper campaign that the US forces were throwing grenades at Afghan children. People’s anti-ISAF feelings were incited, resulting in protests like the one you see here. These protests illustrate the decreased willingness of the population to share information, consistent with the lower IED clear rates you saw from the quantitative analysis. [SLIDE] A likely interpretation of these results is perhaps easiest to illustrate with an example: Many of you will be familiar with an attack that occurred in Rodat district in Nangarhar in January. This was clearly an insurgent initiated attack since ISAF personnel were targeted and the tactics were similar to those used in previous attacks. On Wednesday January 06, 2010, a roadside IED explosion was detonated near a local school, in the Rodat District of Nangarhar Province, just outside of Jalalabad. Several ANA members were killed, ANA and ISAF personnel were injured, and two Afghan children died. Even though the insurgents were responsible for the attacks, they were able to start a whisper campaign that the US forces were throwing grenades at Afghan children. People’s anti-ISAF feelings were incited, resulting in protests like the one you see here. These protests illustrate the decreased willingness of the population to share information, consistent with the lower IED clear rates you saw from the quantitative analysis. [SLIDE]

    14. The Benefits of Courageous Restraint This contrasts sharply with the experience of the Marines in Garmsir district in Helmand Province. In January this year, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines found itself facing a riot amongst local Afghans following rumors of a defaced Koran. As events escalated, frustrated locals began throwing rocks and bricks at Marines. Rather than opening fire or firing warning shots, the Marines stood fast. Not a single Marine fired their weapon, even after suffering concussions and other injuries. Their “courageous restraint” prevented a bad situation from becoming much worse--avoiding civilian casualties. This in itself is a good news story. But there’s more: this unit enjoys one of the highest ratios of found-to-exploded IEDs in the theater. Senior Marine leadership routinely recognized the ability of this battalion to get tips from local Afghan regarding IED locations. Many factors obviously drive these IED finds, but the company commanders stated at their commanders’ conference that it is their relationship with the people that provides their best protection. Their protection of the population in January likely contributes to their good community relations and those locals’ willingness to offer information to the Marines. This contrasts sharply with the experience of the Marines in Garmsir district in Helmand Province. In January this year, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines found itself facing a riot amongst local Afghans following rumors of a defaced Koran. As events escalated, frustrated locals began throwing rocks and bricks at Marines. Rather than opening fire or firing warning shots, the Marines stood fast. Not a single Marine fired their weapon, even after suffering concussions and other injuries. Their “courageous restraint” prevented a bad situation from becoming much worse--avoiding civilian casualties. This in itself is a good news story. But there’s more: this unit enjoys one of the highest ratios of found-to-exploded IEDs in the theater. Senior Marine leadership routinely recognized the ability of this battalion to get tips from local Afghan regarding IED locations. Many factors obviously drive these IED finds, but the company commanders stated at their commanders’ conference that it is their relationship with the people that provides their best protection. Their protection of the population in January likely contributes to their good community relations and those locals’ willingness to offer information to the Marines.

    16. “We won’t win if we do not partner. We have to work around the challenges and we have to get on with it- all of us.” General Stanley McChrystal April 2010 Another avenue for reducing escalations of force is through rigorous partnering between ISAF and Afghan forces.Another avenue for reducing escalations of force is through rigorous partnering between ISAF and Afghan forces.

    17. Working with other militaries is not new. Provide some short vignettes that demonstrate both good – and bad- partnering in history for context. Good partnering-LTC Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Askari German East Africa 1914-1918 At the beginning of WWI, Lt Col Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was the commander of a small garrison of 260 Germans and 2,472 Africans in German East Africa. For over four years, Lettow-Vorbeck , with his Askari partners, conducted successful guerilla operations against much larger Allied forces in the British colonies of Kenya and Rhodesia. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s unit expanded to some 14,000 soldiers, most of them Askari, but all well-trained and well-disciplined. Lettow-Vorbeck led his troops and their partners for over four years without suffering a defeat. Lettow-Vorbeck’s fluency in the Swahili language earned the instant respect and admiration of his African soldiers; Appointed black officers and "said — and believed — 'we are all Africans here'."[6] Bad Partnering-Failed Opportunity to Partner- The Battle of Little Bighorn; “Custer’s Last Stand” Montana 1876 Summer of 1876, South Central Montana Little Bighorn Valley, USA Among George Armstrong Custer’s forces were a number of "Indian Scouts” from the Crow and other tribes who were traditional enemies of the Sioux – the Sioux had been relentlessly aggressive, attacking the Crow and taking away their lands. These Scouts knew the ways and languages of the enemy. The Scouts were smart enough to warn Custer not to attack; they knew that Custer’s force was outnumbered six to one, but Custer ignored the advice of these Scouts. The Crow and Custer shared the same interests and objectives. Good and Bad Partnering- Fort Duquesne, PA French and Indian War - North America June 1775 The British and American colonists were defeated with heavy losses, including Braddock who died four days after the battle. British Commander General Braddock expected to fight the way battles were fought in Europe with troops lined up on open fields and firing their weapons as they marched toward each other. The French worked closely with their Indian allies refused to fight in this manner, preferring instead to hide in the woods, donning clothes that made them difficult to see and shooting at British troops from behind cover. American colonists recommended similar tactics. Gen Braddock did not listen. Who listened to the people who knew the countryside? Why didn’t the French fight as usually happened in Europe? Partnering. Photo four Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) Vietnam 1965-1971 The Combined Action Platoons were a Marine rifle squad and a medical Corpsman combined with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon to provide continuous local security for villages in the tactical zone. The Marines lived in the villages, trained the local militia, and conducted patrols and ambushes, both day and night. Training was accomplished jointly. The Vietnamese taught local customs, Vietnamese language, local terrain peculiarities, and furnished information about the VC in the area. The Americans taught tactics, discipline, and civilian population control. Working with other militaries is not new. Provide some short vignettes that demonstrate both good – and bad- partnering in history for context. Good partnering-LTC Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and the Askari German East Africa 1914-1918 At the beginning of WWI, Lt Col Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was the commander of a small garrison of 260 Germans and 2,472 Africans in German East Africa. For over four years, Lettow-Vorbeck , with his Askari partners, conducted successful guerilla operations against much larger Allied forces in the British colonies of Kenya and Rhodesia. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s unit expanded to some 14,000 soldiers, most of them Askari, but all well-trained and well-disciplined. Lettow-Vorbeck led his troops and their partners for over four years without suffering a defeat. Lettow-Vorbeck’s fluency in the Swahili language earned the instant respect and admiration of his African soldiers; Appointed black officers and "said — and believed — 'we are all Africans here'."[6] Bad Partnering-Failed Opportunity to Partner- The Battle of Little Bighorn; “Custer’s Last Stand” Montana 1876 Summer of 1876, South Central Montana Little Bighorn Valley, USA Among George Armstrong Custer’s forces were a number of "Indian Scouts” from the Crow and other tribes who were traditional enemies of the Sioux – the Sioux had been relentlessly aggressive, attacking the Crow and taking away their lands. These Scouts knew the ways and languages of the enemy. The Scouts were smart enough to warn Custer not to attack; they knew that Custer’s force was outnumbered six to one, but Custer ignored the advice of these Scouts. The Crow and Custer shared the same interests and objectives. Good and Bad Partnering- Fort Duquesne, PA French and Indian War - North America June 1775 The British and American colonists were defeated with heavy losses, including Braddock who died four days after the battle. British Commander General Braddock expected to fight the way battles were fought in Europe with troops lined up on open fields and firing their weapons as they marched toward each other. The French worked closely with their Indian allies refused to fight in this manner, preferring instead to hide in the woods, donning clothes that made them difficult to see and shooting at British troops from behind cover. American colonists recommended similar tactics. Gen Braddock did not listen. Who listened to the people who knew the countryside? Why didn’t the French fight as usually happened in Europe? Partnering. Photo four Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) Vietnam 1965-1971 The Combined Action Platoons were a Marine rifle squad and a medical Corpsman combined with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon to provide continuous local security for villages in the tactical zone. The Marines lived in the villages, trained the local militia, and conducted patrols and ambushes, both day and night. Training was accomplished jointly. The Vietnamese taught local customs, Vietnamese language, local terrain peculiarities, and furnished information about the VC in the area. The Americans taught tactics, discipline, and civilian population control.

    18. Voices from the Field ISAF Partnering Survey Pulse of the force on their attitudes towards partnering Approximately 2000 responses mostly US in RC East and RC South Completed in Feb 2010 Definitions, pro’s and con’s, where and at what level units partner Open Ended Questions include: “What is partnering? Describe good and bad partnering? What are the advantages and disadvantages of partnering? Closed end questions include: “How often does your unit partner?”; “At what level does your unit partner?”; “What activities does your unit partner?”; “During what phase of the operation do you partner?”

    19. 1. “Living with, eating with, training with, and sleeping in the same place as your counterpart unit-no matter what level MoD to Sqd. But the most important part is the planning WITH and executing WITH your counterpart. That is how the ANA/ANP will learn how to conduct their own operations.” NCO, ISAF HQ 2. “When you see them together after work hours- just socializing” “When they know each others story” “When CFs know the culture and respect it” “When they enjoy a common operational story of being together in a battle” “When you exchange emails, cell phone numbers or addresses to stay in contact” “When mission success highlights the HN forces” Highlights from across ISAF 3. “Conducting patrols with different ANSF units each time, lack of consistently working with same ANSF units, inability to establish rapport and confidence in one another.” - FIELD GRADE OFFICER, RC South “Disrespectful of the other unit, thinking we are better than them, unfairness, pushing off our unwanted jobs on them, fairness if a key part of good partnership.”- ENLISTED, RC East 4. “The biggest risk to partnering is if the population see a relationship breakdown real or a perceived then it affects the legitimacy of the body as a whole to the population”- ENLISTED, 4TH BCT, 4TH ID Trust, drug use, safety. 5. We can tap into knowledge of the region that might be impossible for an American unit to gain. NCO RC South “Overall support from the communities. The people feel that the ANSF understand the local customs and ISAF gives professional credibility.” Co Cdr 4BCT 6. No surprise. 91% respond that “None” or “very few” members of their unit have a working knowledge of local language” 1. “Living with, eating with, training with, and sleeping in the same place as your counterpart unit-no matter what level MoD to Sqd. But the most important part is the planning WITH and executing WITH your counterpart. That is how the ANA/ANP will learn how to conduct their own operations.” NCO, ISAF HQ 2. “When you see them together after work hours- just socializing” “When they know each others story” “When CFs know the culture and respect it” “When they enjoy a common operational story of being together in a battle” “When you exchange emails, cell phone numbers or addresses to stay in contact” “When mission success highlights the HN forces” Highlights from across ISAF 3. “Conducting patrols with different ANSF units each time, lack of consistently working with same ANSF units, inability to establish rapport and confidence in one another.” - FIELD GRADE OFFICER, RC South “Disrespectful of the other unit, thinking we are better than them, unfairness, pushing off our unwanted jobs on them, fairness if a key part of good partnership.”- ENLISTED, RC East 4. “The biggest risk to partnering is if the population see a relationship breakdown real or a perceived then it affects the legitimacy of the body as a whole to the population”- ENLISTED, 4TH BCT, 4TH ID Trust, drug use, safety. 5. We can tap into knowledge of the region that might be impossible for an American unit to gain. NCO RC South “Overall support from the communities. The people feel that the ANSF understand the local customs and ISAF gives professional credibility.” Co Cdr 4BCT 6. No surprise. 91% respond that “None” or “very few” members of their unit have a working knowledge of local language”

    20. 50% said their unit “Almost Always” partners 30% said “sometimes” 22% said “never” or “rarely” Combat arms twice as likely to respond “almost always” Support units twice as likely to respond “Never or Rarely” 50% said their unit “Almost Always” partners 30% said “sometimes” 22% said “never” or “rarely” Combat arms twice as likely to respond “almost always” Support units twice as likely to respond “Never or Rarely”

    21. Platoon level most reported. Followed by Company and Squad. Platoon level most reported. Followed by Company and Squad.

    25. Partnering Benefits Felter: Partnering makes us better -Understand the environment. Greater access to the local population. Rapport and communication. Legitimacy. We are not the future of Afghanistan – people know this. Farid: Partnering makes ANSF better. Felter: Partnering makes us better -Understand the environment. Greater access to the local population. Rapport and communication. Legitimacy. We are not the future of Afghanistan – people know this. Farid: Partnering makes ANSF better.

    26. What are the desired effects of partnering? Simply put - Capable, professional, and self- sufficient ANSF Method – not a mission. Partnering is the way we get there. What are the desired effects of partnering? Simply put - Capable, professional, and self- sufficient ANSF Method – not a mission. Partnering is the way we get there.

    27. COIN Advisory and Assistance Team & COIN in Afghanistan COL Joe Felter Good morning. My name is Col Joe Felter and I am the leader of COMISAF’s COIN Advisory and Assistance Team. My organization provides COMISAF and COMIJC a “directed telescope” by which they can get ground truth of what’s happening across Afghanistan at the district or company level. We have teams in each of the 4 Regional Command headquarters which enables them to work with those higher level staffs and get out with units and PRTs. Ultimately our job is to provide sensitive reporting directly to GEN McChrystal and provide the means through which he can change the culture of the force in Afghanistan.Good morning. My name is Col Joe Felter and I am the leader of COMISAF’s COIN Advisory and Assistance Team. My organization provides COMISAF and COMIJC a “directed telescope” by which they can get ground truth of what’s happening across Afghanistan at the district or company level. We have teams in each of the 4 Regional Command headquarters which enables them to work with those higher level staffs and get out with units and PRTs. Ultimately our job is to provide sensitive reporting directly to GEN McChrystal and provide the means through which he can change the culture of the force in Afghanistan.

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